The Divine Lamp

Chapter 10 Of the opinion of those who aver that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God, since this is self-evident. (The arguments presented here will be refuted in chapter 11).

Possibly it will seem to some that it is useless to endeavor to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God.  The reasons for this view are as follows.  Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known: thus as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its parts.  Now such is the statement “God is.”  For by this word “God” we understand a thing a greater  than which cannot be thought of: this is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word “God”: so that God must already be at least in his mind.  Nor can He be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only.  And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God.  Wherefore it follows that it is self-evident that God is, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word.

Again.  It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist: and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist.  Therefore if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God: and this is contrary to the signification of the term.  Therefore it remains remains that it is self-evident that God is.

Further.  Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, for instance: Man is man; or wherein the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: Man is an animal.  Now, as we shall show further on (chapt 22), in God alone do we find that His being is His essence, as though the same were the answer to the question, What is He? as to the question, Is He? Accordingly when we say, God is, the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject.  And thus it will be self-evident that God is.

Moreover.  Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident.  Now it is naturally known that God is, since man’s desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on (book 3, chapt 25).  Therefore it is self-evident that God is.

Again.  That whereby all things are known must needs be self-evident.  Now such is God.  For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is therein that first and foremost intellectual light is to be found.  Therefore it must needs be self-evident that God is, that it is impossible for the mind to think the contrary.

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Now though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature, are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false. Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. See then that the false alone is opposed to the true, as evidently appears if we examine their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally.

Again. The same thing which the disciple’s mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teach insincerely, which it were wicked to say of God. Now the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God himself is the author of our nature. Therefore the divine Wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently whatever is contrary to these principles, is contrary to the divine Wisdom; wherefore it cannot be from God. Therefore those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.

Moreover. Our intellect is stayed by contrary arguments, so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Wherefore if conflicting knowledge were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God.

Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore God does not instill into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom 10:8) The word is nigh thee even in thy heart and in thy mouth. This is the word of faith which we preach. Yet because it surpasses reason some look upon it as though it were contrary thereto; which is impossible.

This is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine who says (Gen. ad. lit. ii) That which truth shall make known can nowise be in opposition to the holy books whether of the Old or of the New Testament.

From this we may evidently conclude that whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of aith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature. Wherefore they lack the force of demonstration, and are either probable or sophistical arguments, and consequently it is possible to solve them.

Further reading:

On Faith and Reason Pope Benedict XVI

The Renaissance of Faith and Reason Robert P. George

Study Notes on Faith and Reason Alfred J. Freddoso

Fides et Ratios: A Radical Vision on Intellectual Inquiry Alfred J. Freddoso

That It Is not A Mark Of Levity To Assent To The Things That Are Of Faith, Although They Are Above Reason.

Now those who believe this truth, of which reason affords a proof, believe not lightly, as though following foolish fables (2 Pet 1:16).  For Divine Wisdom Himself, Who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man the secrets of God’s wisdom: and by suitable arguments proves His presence, and the truth of His doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Ghost, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence.  And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by force of arms, not by the promise of delights, but-and this is the greatest marvel of all-amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things.  That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things, is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible.  And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that He would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith.  This particular kind of proof is alluded to in the words of Heb 2:3-4 Which namely, the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard Him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and diverse miracles and distributions of the Holy Ghost.  

Now such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them, seeing that there is evidence of them in their result.  For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if without any wondrous signs the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime.  Although God ceases not even in our time to work miracles through His saints in confirmation of the faith.

On the other hand those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as instanced by Mahammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates.  he also delivered commandments in keeping with his  promises, by giving the  reins to  carnal pleasure, wherein it is easy for carnal men to obey: and the lessons of truth which he  inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers: yea rather the truths which he taught were mingled by him with many fables and most false doctrines.   Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can be from God alone, proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired: but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, a sign that is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants.   Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practiced in things divine and human, but beastlike men who dwelt in the wilds, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching;  and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his laws.

Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather did he corrupt almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testament Books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood.  Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly

That Those Things Which Cannot Be Investigated By Reason Are Fittingly Proposed To Man As An Object Of Faith.

It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith: because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary also for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith.

For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavor unless it be previously known to him. Wherefore since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel, it was necessary for his mind to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire, and by his endeavors to tend to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially competent to the Christian religion, which alone promises goods spiritual and eternal: for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man: whereas the old law which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things that are above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, in order to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

Again it is necessary for this truth to be proposed to man as an object of faith in order that he may have truer knowledge of God. For then alone do we know God truly, when we believe that He is far above all that man can possibly think of God, because the divine essence surpasses man’s natural knowledge, as stated above. Hence by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man, which surpasses his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think.

There results also another advantage from this, namely, the checking of presumption which is the mother of error. For some there are who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole of nature of things by their intellect, in that they esteem all things true which they see, and false which they see not. Accordingly, in order that man’s mind might be freed from this presumption, and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that certain things far surpassing his intellect should be proposed to man by God.

Yet another advantage is made apparently y the words of the Philosopher (Ethic 10). For when a certain Simonides maintained tha man should neglect the knowledge of God, and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things: the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can. Hence he says (De Anima 11) that though it is but little that we perceive of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He also says (De Caelo et Mundo 2) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can e answered by a short and probable solution, it happens that the hearer is very much rejoiced. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul: and consequently, although human reason is unable to grasp fully things that are above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection, if at least it holds things, in any way whatever, by faith.

Wherefore it is written Many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men (Ecclus 3:25), and The things…that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God has revealed them by His Spirit (1 Cor 2:10-11).

That the Truth About Divine Things Which is Attainable By Reason is Fittingly Proposed to Man as an Object of Belief.

While then the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to  man as  an object of belief.  We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appears to some, that since it can be attained by reason, it was useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural  inspiration.  Now three disadvantages would result if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason.  One is that few men would have knowledge of God: because very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three  reasons.  Some indeed on account of an indisposition of temperament, by reason of which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge:  so that no effort of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest  degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God.  Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs.  For there must needs be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely the knowledge of God.  And some are hindered by laziness.  For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is ale to investigate, it is necessary to have a previous knowledge of many things: since almost the entire consideration of Philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God: for which reason metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied.  Wherefore it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study: and few are willing to take upon themselves this labor for the love of a knowledge, the natural desire for which has nevertheless been instilled into the mind of man by God.

The second disadvantage is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time.  First, because this truth is so profound, that it is only after long practice that the human intellect is enabled to grasp it by means of reason.  Secondly, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above.  Thirdly, because at the time of youth, the mind, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth, whereas calm gives prudence and knowledge, as stated in Physics iii. 7.  Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance, if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God: because the knowledge of God which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time.

The third disadvantage is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in forming its judgments, and by reason of the admixture of phantasms.  Consequently many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated, through ignoring the force of the demonstration: especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise.  Moreover among the many demonstrated truths, there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood that is not demonstrated, but assumed for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration.  Therefore it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith.

Accordingly the divine clemency has made this salutary commandment, that even some things which reason is able to investigate must be held by faith: so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error.

Hence it is written that henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened (Eph 4:17-18).  And all thy children shall be taught of the Lord (Isaiah 54:13) -Excerpted from the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES by St Thomas Aquinas.  Literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers.  Public domain text.

Note: The following is taken from the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, translated by the Dominican Fathers in 1924. The work is not copyrighted in the USA.

CHAPTER 1. In What Consists The Office Of The Wise Man.

My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate wickedness- Prov 7:7

The general use which, in the Philosopher’s opinion, should be followed in naming things, has resulted in those men being called wise who direct things themselves and govern them well (see Top. 1, 5). Wherefore among other things which men conceive about the wise man, the Philosopher reckons that it belongs to the wise man to direct things. (see Meta 2. 3) Now the rule of all things directed to an end of government and order must needs be taken from their end: for then is a thing best disposed when it is fittingly directed to its end, since the end of everything is its good. Wherefore in the arts we observe that the art which governs and rules another is the one to which the latter’s end belongs: thus the medical art rules and directs and art of the druggist, because health which is the object of medicine is the end of all drugs which are made up by the druggist’s art. The same may be observed in the art of sailing in relation to the art of ship-building and in the military art in relation to the equestrian are and all warlike appliances. These arts which govern others are called master-arts (architectonicae), that is principle arts, for which reason their craftsmen, who are called master craftsmen, are awarded the name of wise men. Since, however, these same craftsmen, through being occupied with the ends of certain singular things, do not attain to the universal end of all things, they are called wise about this or that, in which sense it is said (1 Cor 3:10): As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation; whereas the name of being wise simply is reserved to him alone whose consideration is about the end of the universe, which end is also the beginning of the universe: wherefore, according to the Philosopher, it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes (See Meta 1. 12; 2.7).

Now the last end of each thing is that which is intended by the first author or mover of that thing: and the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect, as we shall prove further on (see Bk 1 ch. 44; Bk 2 ch 24). Consequently the last end of the universe must be the good of the intellect: and this is truth. Therefore truth must be the last end of the whole universe; and the consideration thereof must be the chief occupation of wisdom. And for this reason divine Wisdom, clothes in flesh, declares that he came into the world to make known the truth, saying, For this was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth. Moreover the Philosopher defines the First Philosophy as being the knowledge of truth (Ia Meta 1. 4, 5), not of any truth, but of that truth which is the source of all truth, of that, namely, which relates to the first principle of being of all things; wherefore its truth is the principle of all truth, since the disposition of things is the same in truth as in being.

Now it belongs to the same thing to pursue one contrary and to remove the other: thus medicine which effects health, removes sickness. Hence, just as it belongs to a wise man to meditate and disseminate truth, especially about the first principle, so does it belong to him to refute contrary falsehood.

Wherefore the twofold office of the wise man is fittingly declared from the mouth of Wisdom, in the words above quoted; namely, to meditate and publish the divine truth, which antonomastically is the truth, as signified by the words, My mouth shall meditate truth; and to refute the error contrary to truth, as signified by the words, and my lips shall hate wickedness, by which is denoted falsehood opposed to divine truth which falsehood is contrary to religion that is also called godliness wherefore the falsehood that is contrary thereto receives the name ungodliness.

Suggested further readings:

Aristotles Metaphysics, Book 1, Part 1. This link also contains St Thomas commentary on the text

Another translation of the Metaphysics, Bk 1, Ch 1 (without Thomas’ commentary) can be found here.

The subjects dealt with in this post are found in more detail in the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica, question 3. I have provided links to each article of question 3 as it corresponds to what is contained in the post. I’ve also provided at the end of each subject dealt with, a link to pertinent passages in the Summa Contra Gentiles; however, the SCG deals with the subject matter in a different manner than the ST, one would be better off reading Book One of the SCG, chapters 14-27 as a whole.

ST I, 3, 1 Whether God is a body? God is not corporeal; first, because movement is not possible to a body except by an external agent-God is the First cause of motion, Himself being immovable, as was shown above; secondly, a body is a potentiality (in potentia) because, as it is continuous, it is divisible indefinitely, whereas God is the noblest of all Beings in Act; and, therefore, cannot be corporeal, a body being either living or not living, and a living body is nobler than a not living body; but a living body does not live as such, otherwise every body would live, and so it must live y another, which is the soul. That which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is, therefore, impossible that God should be corporeal. (See SCG 1, 16 and 1,20)
ST I, 3, 2 Whether God is composed of matter and form? (See SCG 1, 17, 1, 18, )
ST I, 3, 3 Is there composition of quiddity, essence, or nature, and subject in Him? (See SCG 1, 21)
ST I, 3, 4 Is He composed of essence and existence? (See SCG 1, 22)
God is not composed of matter and form. Matter is of itself a potentiality. God is True Actuality, having no potentiality. Further, every created being is good and perfect by virtue of its form and by participation, as matter participates form; but as God is the first and highest Good, He is not Good y participation, but by His own Essence; therefore He is no composite. It is clear also, from being the First Efficient Cause, an therefore, the First Cause and acting of Himself, and Form by His own Essence, why He is not composed of matter and form. God is identified with His Essence or Nature, whereas in single forms which are their own individuality the subject is the same as the nature; therefore, God is His own Deity and His own Life, and all else that can be predicated of Him. In things composed of matter and form nature differs from the subject, because the nature or essence comprehends in itself only what falls under the definition of Species, and so it does not comprehend the individualizing matter, and thereby it is distinguished from the subject. So God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence; for whatever is in anything besides its essence must be caused either by the essence or by some external agent; but it cannot be by the essence alone, for to e its own cause of being is beyond any being. If this is caused by an external agent, it must be as regards anything that has existence and essence distinct, that it should have a cause other than itself; but with God that cannot be, for He is, we have seen, the First Efficient Cause. Further, existence when distinct from essence is related to it as act to potentiality; but God is Pure Act with not potentiality, and, therefore, He is identified with His Essence; this is evident likewise from the fact that He is the First Being, and, therefore, must Be. If His Existence and Essence were not the same, he would Be by participation, and thus He would not the First Being; which is absurd to say of God.
ST I, 3, 5 Whether God is contained in a genus? Neither is God, properly speaking, in any genus. Species is made of genus and difference; and that from which difference comes stands towards that which makes the genus actual to the potential (thus the rational may be compared to the sensitive, as the actual to the potential, and so on); bus since in God the potential cannot be added to His Actuality, it cannot be that He should be as a species in a genus. Moreover, if God were in a genus, it must be that of Being, for genus signifies the essence of a thing, as when we predicate of a thing that is is such; but Being cannot be a genus, as Aristotle says, because every genus has differences external to its essence, whereas no difference can e external to a simple being. Therefore, God is not in a genus, for outside of Being there is only not-Being, which cannot be the difference among beings. Besides, all the members of one genus have those things in common which constitute the genus in its essence (of which it may be predicated that it is such), but they differ in their being; thus the being of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor is the being of one man the same as another’s. There is a necessary difference, therefore between being (or existence) and essence in things which are in a genus; whereas the contrary has been proved in God, and, therefore, He is not in a genus. Neither does He belong to a genus by reduction to first principles, for whatever belongs to a genus by reduction does not extend beyond it; whereas God is the First Principle of all Being, and hence He cannot be contained as the first principle in any particular genus. (See SCG 1, 25)
ST I, 3, 6 Whether in God there are any accidents? Nor can there be any accident in God. The subject is to the accident as the potential is to the actual, and God being Pure Actuality, the potential has no place in Him. Then, as God is His own Existence, there can be nothing added to His Nature; just as heat has only heat, although a thing which is hot may have something external added to the heat, such as whiteness. Thirdly, whatever exists of itself is prior to that which is accidental. Hence, as God is the First Being, there cannot be in Him anything accidental. (See SCG 1, 23)
ST I, 3, 7 Whether God is wholly simple? God is, therefore, wholly Simple, for in Him there is no composition nor quantitative parts, neither is his Nature distinct from His Subject. he is wholly Simple likewise because what is composite comes after its component parts, and depends upon them; whereas God is the First Being. Moreover, a thing composite has a cause for its unity; But God has no cause, being Himself the First Efficient Cause. Also, in everything which is composite there is potentiality and acutality, which have no place in God. Finally, everything which is composite is a whole separate from its parts, whether like or unlike, which can in no way be said of God, Who is His own Form, or rather His own Form, or rather His own Being, and, therefore, is wholly Simple.

ST I, 3, 8 Whether God enters into the composition of other things? Neither does God enter into the composition of any other things, as some have erroneously thought ans said that He was the soul of the first heavens, or the formal principle of all things, or primal matter (materia prima), for God is the First Efficient Cause, and such cause is numerically distinct from the form of the effect, and only agree with it in species, as in the case of man generating a man. Matter does not agree with its efficient cause either numerically or specifically, for it is in potentia, and the latter is in actu. God, as the First Cause, is the highest, and acts by His own power; and so He is not a part of anything else. Nor can any part of a composite thing be the absolute first among beings, as God is; not matter or form, which are the principles of anything composite; for matter, which is potentiality, is simply posterior to actuality, and form, which is part likewise, is participated form which comes after that which is For by Essence. Therefore God does not enter into composition at all. (See SCG 1, 26 and 1, 27)

From A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA by Walter Farrell:

The most obvious implication from the proofs for the existence of God is that God is in no sense a composite or complex being; He is wholly simple. Before going on to establish the obvious character of this divine attribute of simplicity, it might be well to admit frankly that we have done such strange, contradictory things to simplicity that God might consider this particular attribute a dubious compliment. There is a great difference between the simple things we pity or patronize for their simplicity and the simple things to which we pay the tribute of profound respect and admiration. A simple-minded man is one who, through lack of ability or opportunity, does not know any better; whereas a richly simple gown is the result of supreme ability and unlimited opportunities. The simplicity of the child’s essay is altogether different from thc simplicity of the literary craftsman’s easy grace with words. In the one case we see simplicity as the mark of imperfection, in the other, as the stamp of genius; in both cases we are right, but it must be seen that we are using the word simple in decidedly different senses.

Simplicity is a badge of imperfection and will remain so in the world of created things where perfection must be measured in terms of potentialities and their realization. Man stands at the peak of the physical universe precisely because of his rich potentialities; his life is richer, fuller, as more of those potentialities are realized, as even greater potentialities are acquired, in a word, in proportion to the increased complexity of his life. He may cast an envious glance at a cat sleeping in a sunny window; life is so simple for a cat. But the envy is not real; no man wants to spend his life curled up in sleep. particularly in a window.

Yet this rich potentiality, the very basis of the complexity which makes up the perfection of created things, is itself a statement of imperfection. It implies imperfection; it is a declaration that something can still be had, that there is a void still to be filled up by some one some thing else. The being who has no potentialities, but only pure actuality, who is the source of all potentiality, alone escapes the stigma of imperfection and is free of the basic element of complexity. This being is utterly, completely simple; this is the being who receives nothing but gives all things. The simplicity we so admire and respect in created things, the simplicity that smacks of genius, is not really simplicity at all but the appearance of simplicity; men have succeeded in giving to rich complexity a smooth unity by a perfect coordination to a single end and we salute the faint image of divinity thus produced.

To say that God is simple means, in the concrete, that He is in no sense composite. He is not, has not, a body; He is not a golden calf or a painted idol. He has not divinity as man has humanity; He is divinity. His nature is not a cup filled to overflowing with existence, He is not full of life; He is existence, He is life. There are no family quarrels of the gods; there is nothing in God upon which to base a difference in divine nature. He does not grow fat or thin or red in the face; His thought is not a procession of concepts as is ours, for there is nothing accidental, transient, unessential in God. Because He is simple He cannot enter into composition with others as sugar does with coffee or oxygen with hydrogen; He cannot be immersed in the inert mass of matter like Bergson’s élan vital, expending His divine life fighting free with all the agony of a boy fighting his way out of sleep. God is simple because He is the first the completely independent source of all being.

What follows is from St Thomas Aquinas’ Compendium of the Summa Theologica. It is a simplified form of the five proofs for the existence of God, which St Thomas treats of in the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica, Question 2, which can be read HERE. St Thomas treats of the subject in a much fuller fashion in the Summa Contra Gentiles, chapters 3-13 which can be read HERE (see especially chapters 10-13)
That God exists is in itself a self-evident truth; but it is not so to us who do not see the Essence of God; and it requires to be proved by those things which are more known to us as regards ourselves and less known in their nature, that is, by effects. Although we know God in a general way, we do not therefore know Him absolutely. It is possible to demonstrate the Existence of God by effects, which are more known to us than their cause, for effects, which are more known to us than their cause, for effects being granted, a pre-existing cause there must be; and we call this demonstratio quia, not propter quid, for not even by effects do we know the Essence of God.

The Existence of God may be shown by five proofs. The first is drawn from the principle of motion. It is evident to our senses that motion exists. Whatever is moved must be moved by some external agent. Nothing is moved unless it is in potentiality (in potentia) to its term of motion. Motion is made accordingly as things are changed from the potential to the actual, and this requires some actual agent to move them from the potential state. Since it cannot be that anything should be both potential and actual as regards the same order, it follows that the mover and the moved cannot be identical. Thus, not to go on indefinitely, we must come at last to a First Cause immovable of motion; and there we find God.

The Second Proof consists in the order of Efficient Causes in sensible objects. Nothing can be its own efficient cause, for then it would exist before itself. In every order of being the first is the cause of the intermediate, and this latter the cause of the ultimate; so that if the cause e removed the effect ceases to be, and if the first is gone there can e neither the intermediate nor the ultimate. Hence, not to proceed indefinitely, there must be a First Efficient Cause; and there too we find God.

The Third Proof is taken from possible and necessary things. Some things may be or not be; they are possible, as they are subject to generation and decomposition; but everything could not be always thus, for what is not necessary at some time is not. If, therefore, all things may possily not be, at some time there must have been nothing; and if this be true even now, there would be nothing, for what is not can only exist by that which is. All things, therefore, are not mere possibilities in their origin; there must exist some necessary thing. But whatever is necessary, either has cause for its necessity or it has not; and, not to proceed indefinitely, as regards necessary things with a cause for their being necessary, we are obliged to postulate something necessary in itself with no cause for its necessity, but itself the cause to other things of their necessity; and this is God.

The Fourth Proof proceeds from our finding some things better than others. A thing is said to be more or less as it approaches to that which is called the most. There exists, therefore, something which is best and truest, the source to things of all goodness and truth, and of all their other perfections; and this we call God.

The Fifth Proof is drawn from the idea of government. Some things are without understanding, yet they work for an end, because often and always they work in the same way to obtain the best end; hence it is evident that they attain the end not by chance, but by intention; and since they must act towards the end not by their own but by some one’s knowledge, they reach the end because they are directed by an Intelligent Being. There must, therefore, be such an Intelligent Being Who directs all natural things to their end; and Him we call God.

For further reading: HE WHO IS by Walter Farrell

What follows is from St Thomas Aquinas’ Compendium of the Summa Theologica. It treats in simplified form the three articles of question four of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica. Those articles can be read HERE. One may also wish to read the succinct treatment in the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES. Chapter 28.

The ancient philosophers did not attribute that which is Best and highest to the First Principle, because they considered only the imperfect material principle. god is Perfect, because He is the First Efficient Principle, supreme in Actuality, and, therefore, supremely Perfect. In Him are the perfections of all things, for whatever perfection exists in the effects must be found in the efficient cause, and thus they exist in God in a more eminent manner than is the case in creatures. For God is His own very Existence of Himself, and hence it must be that He contains all perfection of being, for perfection is identified with being. The creature is like to God, because God is the Efficient Cause of all, and every agent does a work like unto itself in proportion to its actuality. If an agent is one in species with its effect, there is likeness between them in species, as man generates a man; and if they are not one in species, there is likeness, but not in species, as those things which are generated by the sun’s heat are like to the sun in some degree, but they do not receive the form of the sun in specific likeness, but only in generic likeness. If there is an Agent outside of Genus, the effect has a more remote likeness to it; for the likeness is not based either on genus or species, but only on analogy, inasmuch as both have being. In this way creatures are like to God, the First Natural Principle of all.

From A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA by Walter Farrell:

Perfection

One of the greatest concentrations of perfection the world has seen was to be found in that small house of Nazareth when Gabriel saluted the Immaculate Virgin; yet even in this sublime company there was the spectre of imperfection, which is limitation, that haunts all creation. The angel had the potentialities of successive thought that all eternity would not exhaust; the virgin had the undeveloped potentialities of mind and heart that are the task as well as the glory of human nature; both had the imperfection inherent in the limited character of their respective nature, for the angelic no less than the human nature has its boundaries fixed. The most intimate glimpse of the limitless perfection of God given to man on this earth is to be had in the picture of the Madonna with the divine child in her arms; for there is all the perfection of human nature along with its inevitable limitation, but there also is the unfathomable abyss of the boundless source of all perfection.

There is simply no place for imperfection in God. In Him there are no potentialities to be realized, as all potentialities must be realized, by something other than themselves. He is absolutely independent because He is first; all others depend on this first cause Who cannot depend on any other without ceasing to be first. More than that, He has in Himself the perfections of everything else that ever has, ever will, indeed, that ever could exist. Unless He be their cause they cannot be; He cannot be the cause of perfections that are not in some way already His.

Virtually, Formally and Eminently

When we come down to detail, the argument for the utter perfection of God seems to involve insuperable difficulties. If we try to picture God as a combination of the ferocity of a wolf and the pathetic friendliness of a dachshund, the beauty of youth and the serenity of age, the grandeur of a sunset and the peace of night we shall drive ourselves insane. But why should we try this sort of thing in our thought of the divinity when we are so careful to avoid it in our thought of the created universe? We know that a father contains within himself all the perfections of the human nature of his son and in exactly the same way; if we had to put this in a technical phrase, any journeyman philosopher could tell us that these perfections were possessed formally. We are quite sure an acorn contains the perfections of an oak; but we do not try to picture the oak’s huge trunk and stubborn leaves as packed into the tiny confines of an acorn. We know these perfections do not exist in the acorn in the same way as in the oak; they are had, not formally, but virtually, radically, in the acorn. We do not hesitate to attribute the perfections of a poem to its author; but we do not make the absurd mistake of expecting the poet’s mind to get musty, yellow with age, or covered with dust on a library shelf. It is not the poet that leaps out of the frightened child’s mouth in elocution class. In this case the poet possesses the perfections of his poem but in a completely superior manner, eminently.

It is in this last fashion, eminently, that the perfections of all creation are found in God; He is the cause of them all, they exist in Him, not virtually, not identically, but eminently. The conclusion that all reality is godlike is quite true. What we see in the world of existence, of beauty, of goodness, of grace and all the rest is had from God Who is overflowing with perfection. These creatures share, participate in the perfection of God. This was a truth close to the heart of Francis of Assisi and Martin de Porres, a truth that made all irrational creation and the whole world of men a lover’s note to be read slowly, tenderly, repeatedly, to be treasured caressingly until the writer in person made plain all the beauties that could not be squeezed between the lines. It is right that the strength of a storm at sea, the innocence of a child, the calm of a country twilight should stir us to the depths of our being for these are shadows of divinity passing by.

It might be well to note here, for accuracy’s sake, that we speak of divine attributes in a double sense, often without realizing the distinction. Thus when we state these attributes positively, such as simplicity and perfection, we are speaking only by way of analogy; that is, we do not mean to attribute these things to God in exactly the same way in which they belong to men but in an infinitely superior manner. On the other hand, when we state them negatively, insisting, for example, that God is incomposite and devoid of all imperfection, we are talking literally, univocally, and expect our words to be taken without qualification.

What follows is an excerpt from St Thomas’ own Compendium to his Summa Theologica; the Summa in simple form. The current post deals with the eight articles that make up question three of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa. By clicking on the text in boldface you can read the articles of the Summa itself, as they are dealt with in the Compendium. At the end of this post I provide a link to an online edition of the Summa Contra Gentiles, wherein the subject matter of the current post is dealt with in much more detail than in the Compendium or the ST. I suggest reading chapters 14-27 in relation to the subject “The Simplicity of God.” Many people find the format of the SCG much easier than the ST.

God is not corporeal; First, because movement is not possible to a body except by an external agent-God is the First Cause of motion, Himself being immovable, as was shown above; secondly, a body is a potentiality (in potentia) because, as it is continuous, it is divisible indefinitely, whereas God is a Being in Act and Pure Act; thirdly, God is the noblest of all Being and Act, and, therefore, cannot be corporeal, a body being either living or not living, and a living body is nobler than a not living, and a living body does not live as such, otherwise every body would live, and so it must live by another, which is the soul. That which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is, therefore, impossible that God should be corporeal.

God is not composed of matter and form. Matter is of itself a potentiality. God is True Actuality, having no potentiality. Further, every created being is good and perfect by virtue of its form; but as God is the first and highest Good, He is not Good by participation, but by His own Essence; therefore He is not composite. it is clear also, from His being the First Efficient Cause, and, therefore, the First Cause and acting of Himself, and Form by His own Essence, why He is not composed of matter and form. God is identified with His Essence or Nature, whereas in single forms which are their own individuality the subject is the same as the nature; and, therefore, God is His own Deity and His own Life, and all else that can be predicated of Him. In things composed of matter and form nature differs from the subject, because the nature or essence comprehends in itself only what falls under the definition of Species, and so it does not comprehend the individualizing matter, and thereby it is distinguished from the subject. So God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence; for whatever is anything besides its own essence must be caused either by the essence or by some external agent; but it cannot be by the essence alone, for to be the cause of its own being is beyond any being. If this is caused by an external agent, it must be as regards anything that has existence and essence distinct, that it should have a cause other than itself; but with God that cannot be, For He is, we have seen, the First Efficient Cause. Further, existence when distinct from essence is related to it as act to potentiality; but God is Pure Act with no potentiality, and, therefore, He is identified with His Essence; this is evident likewise from the fact that He is the First Being, and, therefore, must Be. If His Existence and Essence were not the same, He would Be by participation, and thus He would not be the First Being; which is absurd to say of God.

Neither is God, properly speaking, in any genus. Species is made of genus and difference; and that from which difference comes stands toward that which makes the genus as the actual to the potential (thus the rational may be compared to the sensitive, as the actual to the potential, and so on); but since in God the potential cannot be added to His Actuality, it cannot be that He should be as a species in a genus. Moreover, if God were in a genus, it must be that of Being, for genus signifies the essence of a thing, as when we predicate of a thing that it is such; but Being cannot be a genus, as Aristotle says, because every genus has differences external to its essence, whereas no difference can be external to simple being. Therefore, God is not in a genus, for outside of Being there is only not-Being, which cannot be the difference among beings. Besides, all the members of one genus have all those things in common which constitute the genus in its essence ( of which it may be predicated that it is such), but they differ in their being; thus the being of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor is the being of one man the same as another’s. There is a necessary difference, therefore, betwee4n being (or existence) and essence in things which are in a genus; whereas the contrary has been proved in God, and, therefore, He is not in a genus. neither does He belong to a genus by reduction to first principles, for whatever belongs to a genus by reduction does not extend beyond it; whereas God is the First Principle of all Being, and hence He cannot be contained as the first principle in any particular genus.

Nor can there be any accident in God. The subject is to the accident as the potential is to the actual, and God being Pure Actuality, the potential has no place in Him. Then, as God is His own Existence, there can be nothing added to His Nature; just as heat has only heat, although a thing which is hot may have something external added to the heat, such as whiteness. Thirdly, whatever exists of itself is prior to that which is accidental. hence, as God is the First Being, there cannot be in Him anything accidental.

God is, therefore, wholly Simple, for in Him there is no composition nor quantitative parts,neither is His Nature distinct from His Subject. He is wholy Simple likewise because what is composite comes after its component parts, and depends upon them; whereas God is the First Being. Moreover, a thing composite has a cause for its unity; but God has no cause, being Himself the First Efficient Cause. Also, in everything which is composite there is potentiality and actuality, which have no place in God. Finally, everything which is composite is a whole separate from its parts, whether like or unlike, which can in no way be said of God, Who is His own Form, or rather His own Being, and, therefore, is wholly Simple.

Neither does God enter into the composition of any other things, as some have erroneously thought and said that He was the soul of the first heavens, or the formal principle of all things, or primal matter (materia prima), for God is the First Efficient Cause, and such cause is numerically distinct from the form of the effect, and can only agree with it in species, as in the case of man generating a man. Matter does not agree with its efficient cause either numerically or specifically, for it is in potentia, and the latter is in actu. God, as the First Cause, is the highest, and acts by His own power; and so He is not a part of anything else. Nor can any part of a composite thing be the absolute first among beings, as God is; not matter nor form, which are the principles of anything composite; for matter, which is potentiality, is simply posterior to actuality, and form, which is part likewise, is participated form which comes after that which is Form y Essence. Therefore God does not enter into composition at all.

Summa Contra Gentiles:Book One: God.