The Divine Lamp

That It Is not A Mark Of Levity To Assent To The Things That Are Of Faith, Although They Are Above Reason.

Now those who believe this truth, of which reason affords a proof, believe not lightly, as though following foolish fables (2 Peter 1:16).  For Divine Wisdom Himself, Who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man the secrets of God’s wisdom: and by suitable arguments proves His presence, and the truth of His doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Ghost, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence.  And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by force of arms, not by the promise of delights, but-and this is the greatest marvel of all-amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things.  That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things, is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible.  And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that He would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith.  This particular kind of proof is alluded to in the words of Hebrews 2:3-4 Which namely, the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard Him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and diverse miracles and distributions of the Holy Ghost.  

Now such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them, seeing that there is evidence of them in their result.  For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if without any wondrous signs the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime.  Although God ceases not even in our time to work miracles through His saints in confirmation of the faith.

On the other hand those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as instanced by Mahammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates.  he also delivered commandments in keeping with his  promises, by giving the  reins to  carnal pleasure, wherein it is easy for carnal men to obey: and the lessons of truth which he  inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers: yea rather the truths which he taught were mingled by him with many fables and most false doctrines.   Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can be from God alone, proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired: but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, a sign that is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants.   Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practiced in things divine and human, but beastlike men who dwelt in the wilds, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching;  and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his laws.

Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather did he corrupt almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testament Books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood.  Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly

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That Those Things Which Cannot Be Investigated By Reason Are Fittingly Proposed To Man As An Object Of Faith.

It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith: because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary also for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith.

For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavor unless it be previously known to him. Wherefore since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel, it was necessary for his mind to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire, and by his endeavors to tend to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially competent to the Christian religion, which alone promises goods spiritual and eternal: for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man: whereas the old law which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things that are above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, in order to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

Again it is necessary for this truth to be proposed to man as an object of faith in order that he may have truer knowledge of God. For then alone do we know God truly, when we believe that He is far above all that man can possibly think of God, because the divine essence surpasses man’s natural knowledge, as stated above. Hence by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man, which surpasses his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think.

There results also another advantage from this, namely, the checking of presumption which is the mother of error. For some there are who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole of nature of things by their intellect, in that they esteem all things true which they see, and false which they see not. Accordingly, in order that man’s mind might be freed from this presumption, and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that certain things far surpassing his intellect should be proposed to man by God.

Yet another advantage is made apparently y the words of the Philosopher (Ethic 10). For when a certain Simonides maintained tha man should neglect the knowledge of God, and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things: the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can. Hence he says (De Anima 11) that though it is but little that we perceive of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He also says (De Caelo et Mundo 2) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can e answered by a short and probable solution, it happens that the hearer is very much rejoiced. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul: and consequently, although human reason is unable to grasp fully things that are above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection, if at least it holds things, in any way whatever, by faith.

Wherefore it is written Many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men (Ecclus 3:25), and The things…that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God has revealed them by His Spirit (1 Corinthians 2:10-11).

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1. Conscience. The obligation to act in a particular way in a particular instance affects the will through the intermediary of an act of knowledge. This is evident from the data of psychology and ethics. I ought to know the moral law not only as expressed in more or less general principles by means of general judgments of the practical reason, but also as applying or not applying to the particular case before me. The act by which the reason applies a universal principle of morality to a particular case is the judgment of conscience. The practical reason says: “you must be honest in business and give to each his due.” Conscience says: “You must return to your customer the sum of a hundred dollars, above the price of the article sold to him, which he gave you by error.”

A law which is not known cannot bind us, and we are never bound to act otherwise than our conscience tells us, even if its judgment happens to be erroneous. “We must say, unconditionally, that any act of the will which goes astray from reason, whether that reason be correct or false, is evil.” In applying his principle in this way, Aquinas shows his breadth of view, and-let us remark incidentally-demonstrates the tolerance of the thinkers of the thirteenth century in religious matters. For if anyone thought in good faith that he would do wrong in becoming a Christian, he would do wrong in believing in Christ, although the Christian Faith is in itself good, and necessary for salvation. For the same reason, a doubtful or ‘probable’ conscience does not bind or at any rate binds to a less degree. Obligation is a function of knowledge.

But we must add something further to this thomistic doctrine. It must not be supposed that every act of willing evil, under the impression that it is good, is morally upright, for a man has a positive duty to instruct himself concerning his moral obligations, seek light on doubtful points, and weigh probabilities (see 13:2). Error, doubt, hesitation become blameworthy if they are voluntary. Still, it remains true that anything which diminishes our clear vision of what we ought to do, such as prejudices, education, heredity, organic disease or weakness, fear anger, and other passions, defects or evil tendencies in the will, emotions, ect. (7:5), reduces the moral character of an act, and likewise responsibility.

2. Responsibility and sanctions. Moral acts, whether obligatory or not, are imputable to the individual, in so far as they are freely performed. As Aristotle puts it, a man is the father of his acts as he is the father of his children.

responsibility, relative to oneself or to others, involves merit and demerit. These are regarded by the Schoolmen as the natural consequences of the use of liberty. If an act freely willed, moral or immoral, had nothing to do with merit or demerit, and if ultimately we could not fall back upon a system of sanctions (i.e., rewards and punishments) which need to be completed in a future life,-not only would the good cease to be rewarded and evil punished, but liberty itself would no longer have a sufficient reason. What would be the use of liberty, if its proper or improper employment were without effect upon our final happiness?

3. Moral Virtues. Prudence and Justice. The performing of acts morally good engenders moral virtue: it impresses upon the higher part of our being a lasting bent which inclines us to act well in all the circumstances of our life. Moral virtue is the result of moral conduct in the past, and the source of similar conduct in the future. The moral virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance (see 8:3).

At the base of the moral life is prudence, the recta ratio agibilium-”right reasoning concerning things to be done”-which determines what acts should be performed in particular circumstances. Certain primary and very simple judgments which are present in every mind (such as, for instance, “it is necessary to live in society”) originate a tendency or inclination to act in accordance with them (for instance, a general tendency to do all that is necessary for life in society). Then comes a series of practical judgments which, considering all the circumstances (consilium, counsel), determine our choice. This in turn the will decides to follow (imperium). A prudent man is one who by the frequency of such judgments sees and decides rapidly and without hesitation what is to be done in a particular case. Prudence therefore belongs both to knowing and to acting, and exemplifies the intimate compenetration of knowledge and will in the unity of consciousness. Situated at the threshold of the moral life, prudence impregnates all the other virtues which guide us in our actions, especially justice, fortitude, and temperance.

To understand the meaning of justice we must begin y considering the notion of right (jus). Right presupposes the living together of many human beings in a community. Since I have a personal end to attain, my acts are naturally means which serve for my own perfection. If the directly benefit others, then these others owe me compensation, and right, jus, consists precisely in this requirement of equity. “Right, or that which is just, is some work related to another according to some kind of equity.”

Justice, the virtue par excellence of life in society, is the psychological and moral state of a man who wills “firmly and permanently to render to each one his due.” It accordingly supposes a plurality of distinct persons, capable of bringing about this equity by means of their actions. “Since it belongs to justice to regulate human actions, this equity which is called for by justice must be between different persons, capable of action.” This is indeed called for y the individualism which runs through the Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy of Thomas. He never loses an opportunity of stressing the value or personality.

Now, it is easy to see that the ‘other than self,’ for whose benefit justice exists, may signify an individual, or the community, and we thus obtain the division of justice into particular and social. For instance to give to a shopkeeper the price of an article purchased is to perform an act of private or particular justice.

In the present chapter only particular justice is in question. Since right-that which is due to others-rests upon an objective equality, it is independent of our passions and affections. The same is true of the virtue of justice. On the other hand, fortitude, which regulates boldness and fear, temperance, which bridles our appetites, and other virtues, are directly related to our passions and our inner dispositions.

We can say that Thomas Aquinas retains for the group of moral virtues the Aristotelian notion “in medio virtus” on condition that the means here is determined y reason, and differs in the case of different virtues. For instance, not to eat when one ought to, or to eat more than we ought, is not to observe the limits of temperance dictated by reason. Where the virtues are concerned, we must keep close to reason.

The moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is in close dependence upon his Metaphysics. The moral value of personality, the end of man, the notion of moral goodness, the moral richness of a human act, are all established in a way conformable with the great principles of pluralism, of universal finality, and of the goodness of being.

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That the Truth About Divine Things Which is Attainable By Reason is Fittingly Proposed to Man as an Object of Belief.

While then the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to  man as  an object of belief.  We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appears to some, that since it can be attained by reason, it was useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural  inspiration.  Now three disadvantages would result if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason.  One is that few men would have knowledge of God: because very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three  reasons.  Some indeed on account of an indisposition of temperament, by reason of which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge:  so that no effort of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest  degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God.  Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs.  For there must needs be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely the knowledge of God.  And some are hindered by laziness.  For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is ale to investigate, it is necessary to have a previous knowledge of many things: since almost the entire consideration of Philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God: for which reason metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied.  Wherefore it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study: and few are willing to take upon themselves this labor for the love of a knowledge, the natural desire for which has nevertheless been instilled into the mind of man by God.

The second disadvantage is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time.  First, because this truth is so profound, that it is only after long practice that the human intellect is enabled to grasp it by means of reason.  Secondly, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above.  Thirdly, because at the time of youth, the mind, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth, whereas calm gives prudence and knowledge, as stated in Physics iii. 7.  Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance, if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God: because the knowledge of God which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time.

The third disadvantage is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in forming its judgments, and by reason of the admixture of phantasms.  Consequently many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated, through ignoring the force of the demonstration: especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise.  Moreover among the many demonstrated truths, there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood that is not demonstrated, but assumed for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration.  Therefore it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith.

Accordingly the divine clemency has made this salutary commandment, that even some things which reason is able to investigate must be held by faith: so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error.

Hence it is written that henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened (Ephesians 4:17-18).  And all thy children shall be taught of the Lord (Isaiah 54:13) -Excerpted from the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES by St Thomas Aquinas.  Literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers.  Public domain text.

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1.  Nature and extension of moral obligation.  The study of moral obligation is one of the chief features in which the Schoolmen advance beyond the Greek philosophers, who confined themselves to the study of the good.  Among acts which are morally good some are obligatory; others are not.  For instance, all men are not called upon to be heroes or martyrs, but it is required of all to respect the rights of others to life and property.

Psychologically, moral obligation manifests itself to us in the form of command, or compulsion, which pushes the will in a certain direction, and yet does not destroy liberty in those cases where there is room for freedom.  For example, we are all aware that we should respect our parents, but we are all nevertheless free not to do so.

To what voluntary act does this moral obligation belong?  In the first place we are bound to will our end, i.e., our well-being, and to seek it where it is to be f– in that which answers to the deep-rooted tendencies of our rational nature–and not to look for it exclusively in those secondary goods which cease to be good when not controlled by reason.  In the second place we are morally bound to will whatever is indispensable in order to reach this end, and to avoid that which must of necessity turn us away from it.  Thus natural religion becomes a duty, since God is the end in which man finds his happiness, and since we are obliged to know God and to love Him, with the entire strength of our nature.  With the Schoolmen, natural religion is a religion of love and inspires all human conduct.  Therefore, God is not merely a frigid metaphysical skeleton, the changeless being which explains all change, but He enters into the whole moral life of man.  Obligation in the case of the necessary means is a corollary from the obligation to seek the end.  But obligation stops there.  In order to bet from Boston to New York, I must somehow cover the distance which separates the two cities, but I can get to new York by train or by ship.  So also I can freely choose between different means, when each of them leads to the end and no one is the exclusive way to reach it.  This is the reason why all states of life are good, why neither marriage nor celibacy are obligatory,  and why a man may choose any career  which he thinks will enable him to reach his destiny.  Hence moral obligation consists in the necessity of willing our supreme good, combined with the liberty of choosing the concrete objects wherein it is in  fact realized.

What is the basis of moral obligation?  The psychological fact of compulsion reveals moral obligation, but cannot e a sufficient reason for it, since we may ask further: upon what does this feeling rest?  For the Schoolmen, moral obligation is founded upon human nature itself and its need of well-being.  Such is at any rate the proximate basis of obligation.  But the ultimate foundation is a Divine decree.  God alone can dictate a law which binds morally; He alone can add the necessary sanction to it.  Obligation and moral law stand to man in the same relation as the natural law to all beings: they concern the application of the eternal law to a nature which is rational and free.

2.  The Natural Law of Mankind.  Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of commands dictated by the natural law to man.  (1) First we have the fundamental command to act according to reason, “to do good and to avoid evil,” and to follow some general precepts which flow from this fundamental obligation.  For instance men are obliged “to preserve their own life and to ward off its obstacles…to know the truth about God and to live in Society.”  These commands are the same for all men and for all time.  They may become clouded over in certain cases, but they can never be altogether effaced, for they are a corollary of our inborn tendency towards our real well-being.  It follows from this that human nature is radically sound, and that the worst of criminals is capable of moral reformation.

(2) In the second place we have principles which we may describe as circumstantial, since human conduct is necessarily bound up with conditions of space and time, and physical and social surroundings.  Human reason must take the circumstances into consideration in enunciating a moral law.  The more closely a law is applied to particular circumstances and cases, the more numerous will be the exceptions to the law, and these exceptions will be justifiable at the bar of reason.  Accordingly, Thomas says that a moral law governs only the majority of cases, “ut in pluribus.”  “Consequently, in contingent matters such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be true in the greater number of cases, though at times, and less frequently, it may fail.”  “From the principle that we must act according to reason, we can infer that we ought to return things entrusted to us, and this is true in the majority of cases.  In certain instances, however, restitution would be dangerous and therefore unreasonable, as in the case where the one to whom the article was returned would make use of it to put and end to his life, or do harm to his country.”

3. Fixity and variability of laws.  These conditions explain why in circumstantial laws-which after all are the only ones which regulate our daily life-we find both change and fixity.  The historical and social circumstances may vary, and thus some elasticity in the moral laws becomes possible.  But the fundamental precept, and the immediate corollaries from it, which are known by all and bind all, are fixed and invariable.  They are permanent as human nature and human reason themselves.  They form a deposit in the depths of every human soul and an interior voice informs us of them.  They correspond to the unwritten dictates spoken of by Sophocles in Antigone, Cicero, the Stoics, and the Fathers of the Church, and which the Schoolmen incorporated into their comprehensive system of metaphysics.

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1. The Science of Morality. The activity of man is characterized by teleology, i.e., he desires certain things as ends, and he wills other things as means to these ends. In this, he resembles all other natural beings, which are, as we have seen, endowed with this teleological character. But whereas these others tend towards their ends in virtue of certain internal inclinations themselves unconscious and not subject to control, man, being endowed with reason and liberty, is master of his own conduct,-”master of the acts which lead towards his end.” The study of human conduct as directed by us towards an end forms the subject matter of Ethics or Moral Philosophy. The knowledge which we thereby obtain is concerned with an order of things of which we ourselves are the authors, and not merely spectators (see 18:2). For our conduct is our own work, and the resulting relations between us and the universe in general are what we ourselves make them.

Starting from facts duly observed, Moral Philosophy discusses three general questions: the end in view, the act whereby we seek to attain it, and morality, or the relation of agreement or suitability between the one and the other.

2. The problem of ends or aims. it is a matter of common experience that our conduct is motivated by different aims: riches, honor, material pleasure, social positions, ect. All these are desired as being good things, for the only possible motive of actions is our well-being, and the suitability of things or actions in view thereof. The good is that which all desire. Even a man who commits suicide, in order to to an end some trouble or other, obeys the same law. Man’s nature is to will the good, and all that is good. And when our knowledge puts us in presence of an external reality or an action “simply as desirable or suitable for us,” we necessarily will it, unless indeed we first reflect, and as a result realize that “all is not gold that glitters.”

The good which constitutes the end we aim at is always our own good. Nothing is more personal than conduct, and the ends we aim at in our lives. If the end be pleasure, our fortune, our knowledge. The end is a personal one, because man is an individual substance. Of course, the well-being of others enters as a motive of conduct, but it can only be a second one. It will be seen below that every human act is a social act, which benefits or harms a community. The realization of individual happiness is the sole reason for living in society. Hence it is still for our personal perfection that we care for the well-being of others. For instance, those who aid their neighbor see in their good work the accomplishment of an act which their reason approves, and which perfects them in their own eyes.

The Schoolmen are so convinced of the personal character of happiness that they raise the question whether an act of disinterested love is possible, even when God is the object. So that no one could say in general: we love ourselves in the first place and others only secondarily.

Experience also teaches us that some ends are subordinated to others, and that all have not the same value. They are arranged in a hierarchical order: I go on a particular voyage, in order to do some business of a particular kind; this I want to do in order to make money; this again I want that I may be my own master, and so on. An end which is subordinated to another, or is useful, becomes a means. Now there must evidently be a supreme end or aim which dominates and under lies all the others. If not, I should never desire anything at all, and should never go beyond a mere platonic consideration of the possibilities of action. But we do make actual decisions, and in order to explain their actuality, there must be some real end towards which they are directed. Otherwise we should be led into an infinite regression, which is as absurd in this connection as in the order of efficient causality (see9:1). For, an infinite regress would render any actual decision impossible; and yet, particular decisions or acts of the will are facts. What is the supreme end? We may say in the first place that it is my whole good or my good in general. But such a statement would be incomplete, for one would go on to ask where this whole good or good in general is to be found. Here we are confronted with the theory of values. Concrete good things of many kinds lie within our grasp: pleasures of the body and of the mind, good health, fortune, friendship, and so on. All these correspond in a certain measure to our aspirations, but it becomes necessary to draw up a scale of their respective values, and this can only be done by the reason. Now our reason tells us that the truly human good ought to consist in that which will satisfy our specifically human aspirations, or, in other words, corresponds to those faculties which are the highest we possess, and which makes us human, namely intelligence and will. Things other than the intellectual will be good only as supplementary, so to speak, and as controlled by reason.

The happiness which corresponds to our mode of being will consist in knowing and loving. To know in a perfect way, to penetrate all the mysteries of the material universe and to dominate it, and to know in addition by means of His works the great Creator of them all, God Himself; then to love in the same perfect way, to delight in knowledge for its own sake, and to cast ourselves towards God our Creator,-this will constitute philosophic happiness.

Doubtless, the man who desires good as such, perfect good, does not at once perceive that it is God alone who can satisfy the aspirations of his mind and heart. His reason arrives at this conclusion by the gradual elimination of objects other than God. Until this process of reasoning is performed, man seeks for happiness, unaware that God is his happiness. “To perceive that someone approaches is not to know Peter, although Peter is the man who approaches. Likewise, to know that a supreme good exists is not to recognize God in it, although God is that supreme good.”

Doubtless, in this purely natural state of existence, we should have surmised that a knowledge and a love of another and higher kind, and out of the reach of our powers, was in itself possible,-we refer to a direct intuition of the Divinity, and a corresponding love. But in any case, we should have realized that is was beyond us, and we should have known also the reason why.

At this point Catholic theology intervenes, and states that this higher destiny and state, which surpasses the powers of our rational nature, is given us by grace. God offers us supernatural happiness as a free gift. The “blessedness of abstraction” fades in “blessedness of vision,” just as a shadow is absorbed in a ray of light.

The end of man, then, according to scholastic philosophy, is an intellectual one. To behold God, whether in His works, or face to face, is more essential for happiness than love itself, according to Thomas Aquinas, for love is after all a necessary consequence of such a vision. Surely no philosophy could give to knowledge a higher or more magnificent role than this.

It must not, however, be thought that the Schoolmen exclude other good things, such as physical well-being, from human happiness. Rather these things are considered to contribute to happiness as a whole, and since man has a body, his body ought to share in happiness just as his would, always on condition that these complementary good things remain in due subordination to the human good par excellence.

In concluding this section, let us note that the supreme end of man, consisting in the full development of his powers of knowing and willing, is not beyond his grasp. Happiness is not a mirage. Scholastic Moral Philosophy is optimistic.

3. Voluntary acts and Free acts. Human conduct consists of voluntary acts, for it is the will that tends towards the good in general as presented to us by our reason, or towards any particular thing which exhibits the quality of goodness. ‘Particular thing’ must here be taken in a large sense, so as to include not merely external objects which we may wish for (as a landowner may wish to add a field to his property), but also any activity (eating, drinking, games, study) performed in obedience to the orders of the will. We have already seen that when confronted with a good thing which our minds regard as simply good and without defect, we necessarily will it. We cannot possibly destroy this tendency in our nature. Our will has an insatiable thirst for the good. Liberty enters only in the choice of things which are partially good, or which reflection shows to be limited in goodness.

It is therefore the voluntary act, and more especially the free act, which is endowed with morality. A morally good or bad act is above all a free act. Why is this?

4. Moral goodness of a human act. A thing or act is good when it is suitable for us in some way. To live a life of pleasure, or to think only of getting rich, appears as good only to a sensual and grasping man. A thing or act is morally good only if it is in agreement with the true end of man, and contributes directly or indirectly to our real perfection. From the moral point of view, pleasure and wealth are neither good nor evil. They only become so when the will, guided by the reason, either does or does not employ them in the service of the truly human good, by allocating them their proper place in the scale of values. Goodness and moral goodness are accordingly not synonymous: The latter is only one species of the former. Morality will differ with the end assigned, since it consists in the relation between act and end. The conception of morality will accordingly be different in the hedonistic systems which regard pleasure as the only end, and in the intellectualist system of the Schoolmen.

Morality belongs to the sum total of human volitions, but more especially to our free acts. Although the profound and necessary tendency of man towards the good in general is indeed endowed with morality, since it is that which sets the human will in motion, moral character belongs principally to the act which is freely willed; for once the fundamental tendency referred to translates itself into an actual volition, it will then be concerned with a concrete, limited good, which forms the subject matter of free choice. Thus man has the awful power of choosing his path. He can turn away from that which constitutes his true well-being, and attach himself instead to things which are doubtless endowed with real goodness of a sort, but are nevertheless destructive of his own true interests.

Liberty takes on a moral aspect when it is considered in conjunction with the end of human conduct. In consequence, anything which increases or diminishes liberty-dullness of mental vision, the duly ordered or disordered state of passions, bodily health or disease, education and habits-all will affect the morality of the actions.

5. Objective distinctions between moral good and evil. The end of man follows from his nature. The supreme human good is what it is because man has a consciousness, is rational, and is endowed with free will. In the ultimate analysis, human nature, like other essences, is founded upon an immutable relationship of similitude with God.  Since this is the case, the relation which exists between a human acct and man’s end must also follow from the nature of things.  Whether we like it or not, it is what it is.  Morality does not depend upon the caprice of men, and not even God Himself could change it.  Whether we wish it or not, a prayer must draw us towards God, and blasphemy must separate us from Him.  And, if life in society is an indispensable condition for the attainment of our individual ends, to help our fellows must be morally good, and to seek to destroy authority must be morally bad.

As for these acts which in themselves have no relation to man’s end, and which are accordingly known as ‘indifferent,’ they will have a subordinate importance, and the end for which we freely perform them will give them a borrowed moral character as it were, which will make them really good or evil.  The most bana of all our acts-such as going for a walk, or working in a laboratory-will possess its character of goodness or evil, because of the repercussions which it must ultimately have upon our lives or upon the lives of other members of human society.

6. Moral richness of an act.  From this it follows that the more an act conduces to the perfection of our nature, the richer will be its morality.  Besides the intrinsic character of an act which makes it good or evil, and of which we have just spoken (finis operis), Thomas Aquinas calls attention to the intention (finis operantis) and the circumstances of this act, as being two other elements, which increase or diminish its moral goodness or evil.  Thus, to open a subscription for the relief of the poor is a good act by its very nature, and no human intention could alter this intrinsic goodness (finis operis).  But the vanity of him who organized the charity lessens the moral value of the undertaking.  In the same way, this value increases, if he must undergo sacrifices or difficulties to attain his purpose.  It may be noticed that these same elements (intrinsic character, intention, circumstances) affect not only the morality, but also the degree of reality of the act itself.  Consequently they enrich or impoverish the personality from which all our activities originate.-Maurice De Wulf 

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I’m posting this today, but will re-post it on Sunday
By Latin Mass I mean, of course, the extraordinary form of the Roman Rite.

The Introit is from Psalm 47 (Ps 48 in some versions ). It consists of verses 10-11, with verse 2 added to serve as a sort of acclamation of praise at the end.
We have received thy mercy, O God, in the midst of thy temple. According to thy name, O God, so also is thy praise unto the ends of the earth: thy right hand is full of justice. Great is the Lord, and exceedingly to be praised in the city of our God, in his holy mountain.

Through the ministry exercised in God’s temple, the Church, we have become partakers in God’s mercy, and should, therefore, respond accordingly. This means praising the great and merciful God in the Church, the city of God, the mountain of his presence. It also means acting in accord with his saving justice, the bounty he has bestowed on us from the fullness of his right hand. For this reason, at the prayer preceding the Epistle, we pray that the Father, through our Lord Jesus Christ will “grant us the spirit of always thinking and doing what is right, so that we who cannot exist without (God) maybe able to live according to (His) will.”

A s the Epistle teaches (Romans 8:12-17), we are not in debt to the flesh, so we should not live according to the flesh, for those who so live will die. Rather, we have received the Spirit of God. This is not a spirit of bondage to the flesh and the fear it bring, but a Spirit of sonship. The gift of the Holy Spirit is a pledge of our future inheritance as children of God and makes us children of God, so that we can call upon him as His Son did: “Abba! Father!” for we are heirs with Christ.

In the Gradual, which comes from Psalm 30 (31), we pray in hope that God will show himself a loving Father by being our protector and refuge.

The Gospel is from Luke 16:1-9. It tells a parable of a wicked steward who makes use of deceitful, worldly wisdom to make friends and secure a temporal future for himself. He is a son of darkness and, like his brothers and sister of darkness, he shows himself more prudent in securing his future in an evil fashion, than the sons of light, the children of God show in securing an eternal future in righteous fashion. Money and possessions exert a constant temptation upon both the sons of darkness and the sons of light. The sons of light ought to use their wealth is service to others rather than themselves, for in the end, it will in fact be of great service to them. You can’t take your wealth with you when you die, but in using it rightly you secure friends of influence in “eternal habitations” (RSV), who will secure for you an eternal reward. When we act like the prodigal son (see Luke 15:11-22 which immediately precedes this Sunday’s Gospel reading) and waste the wealth the Father has given us on wine, women, and song, we must secure a future for ourselves by returning to the source of are real inheritance.

God will not save those who are “prudent” in evil fashion, but those who are humble, thus we pray in the offertory (see Ps 17): Thou wilt save the humble people, O Lord, and wilt bring down the eyes of the proud; for who is God but Thee, O Lord?”

we must be humble enough to recognize that our wealth is not our own, and thus we pray at the secret: “Receive, we beseech Thee, O Lord, these gifts, which, out of Thine own generosity, we bring unto Thee, that these holy Mysteries, by the working power of Thy grace, may sanctify our conduct in this life and bring us to the joys without end.”

For further reading:

Homily on Romans 8:12-13 by St John Chrysostom

On Works and Alms (Treatise 8) by St Cyprian of Carthage.

Who is the Rich Man That Shall Be Saved? by St Clement of Alexandria (This is a protestant site)

The Danger of Riches John Henry Newman
Lectures on Romans by St Thomas Aquinas (at the bottom of the page you’ll find a box with the page numbers. It will read 1 of 609. Erase this and type in 295 then press your ENTER key. This will take you to the beginning of his lecture on Chapter 8

The Roman Catechism Issued by Council of Trent. Go to Pages 267-269. I cannot link directly to the page. Follow instruction found in the previous link. Read what is found under the heading “Positive part of this Commandment.”

Summa of Theology 2a. 2ae. 62 (Hereafter ST.)on making restitution

ST. 2a. 2ae. 32 On almsgiving

ST 2a. 2ae. 117 On liberality

ST 2a. 2ae 119 On prodigality

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God is the Supreme Good.  he is the Efficient Cause of all things, whence all derive their beings, and have a desire for Him in order to participate in His likeness, for the likeness to the agent is the perfection proper to each thing.  Wherefore, if His very likeness is an object of desire, much more is God Himself to be desired.  Hence He is not only Good, but He is simply Goodness itself.  Good, therefore, belongs t Him as the Source of all perfections, and as the First Cause, not as the agent of like nature with the effect, but as One not belonging to the same order as the effect, either according to species or genus; in a super-excellent way the First Cause of all things, not of the same kind, but outside of genus, and the principle of existing creatures; whence he is called the Supreme Good.

God only is Good by His Essence.  The rule of goodness is that of the degree of perfection which is possessed, and perfection is threefold; as, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in the existence which is given by its substantial form; its second perfection is found in the accidents added to it for its perfect action, such as heat, dryness, lightness, and so on; its third perfection, that it remains in its own place.

Such perfections as these belong to no creature by its own essence, but in that way to God only, whose Essence is His Existence, and in whom there is nothing accidental.  For such things as are said to be accidental in others belong to Him essentially, as, for example, to be powerful and wise.  Nor is He related to an end, for He is Himself the Last End of all things.  Hence God alone has all perfections by His Essence; and so He only is essentially Good.  Each thing is called good by the Divine Goodness; from the Exemplar, the First Efficient Cause and the Final End of all goodness.  Each thing is good formally by its likeness to Him.  This goodness is one, and it is also multiform.

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