The Immutability of God (A Simple Summa)

September 7th, 2008 by Dim Bulb

ST. Ia, Q. 9, a. 1&2 That God is absolutely unchangeable is proved from His being the Pure Act, with no admixture of any potentiality. For the potential strictly speaking, comes after the Actual, and everything subject to change is in some degree in a state of potentiality, and capable of receiving more. Further, whatever is moved partly remains as it was, and partly goes on further, as when a thing changes from white to black, it remains in substance as it was; and hence in every change there is something which is composite; but this cannot be in God, Who is absolutely Simple. Lastly, everything moved acquires something, and attains to that which it had not; whereas God, Who is Infinite, comprehends in Himself the entire plenitude of all perfections in all beings, and cannot acquire anything more, or attain to that which He has not. He is, therefore, absolutely unchangeable. Hence, even among the ancient philosophers, truth compelled some to postulate a First Immovable Principle of all. It belongs, therefore, to God alone to be unchangeable of Himself. The creature is unchangeable through the Creator’s power, in whose hand is its existence and non-existence, for its creation and preservation depend upon the absolute Will of God. In every creature change is possible: in corruptible bodies according to their substance, and in celestial bodies according to place only, because matter’s potentiality is completed by form; hence the latter are not subject to change according to their substance, but only according to place. In the subsistent forms of the angels, who are not in potentiality to non-existence, there is a two-fold changeableness: that by which they are in potentiality to their final end, thus being subject to change as regards choice of evil instead of good; the other, according to place, whereby they can by their finite power reach to some other place. As God, therefore, is not chageable by any of these modes, He alone is absolutely unchangeable.

For Further Reading:

Immutability

Nor is this intimate presence of God in the world to be mistaken for that tortured, twisting, developing god of the moderns that fights its way towards perfection through the struggle of the universe, changing as we change, getting better as we improve. God is altogether unchangeable. For what is change but the realization of a potentiality, the receiving of something new or the loss of something old. In God there can be no potentiality, nothing to be lost, nothing to be gained. He is pure actuality, pure being, possessing all things. He is beyond change and He alone; for He alone is first, dependent on no other, free of all potentiality.

To the modern philosopher this notion makes God completely static; if this be true, then this is a dull, stagnating, deteriorating God. His reason is not dissimilar from thc reasons for a New Yorker’s distaste for travel, an Englishman’s tolerance of the continent or an American tourist’s amusement at the strange antics of the rest of the world. In his own little world of creatures, the modern philosopher sees clearly that there must be change for progress, that immutability is closely akin to stagnation and deterioration. The point is that he is provincial enough to judge everything, even God, by the standards of that created world. It is true that change is inseparable from perfection in the world of unrealized potentialities; but it is also true that such a world is inconceivable without a Being of pure actuality, a Being Who is pure activity, Who has no potentiality, no possibility of losing or gaining but is a white flame of perfection. Such a Being is not in a state of static inertia; His is an activity so intense that change of any kind is impossible to it.- Walter Farrell A Companion To The Summa

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The Existence of God in Things (A Simple Summa)

September 2nd, 2008 by Dim Bulb

Whether God is present in all things? (See ST. Ia, 8, 1)God is present in all things, not as part of their essence, or as an accident, but as the agent is present in what he does, for an agent must be united with, and by his ppower be joined to, what he does; and hence God, as Universal Cause, is present to all things, not only when they begin to be, but as long as they exist. As light, which is caused in the air by the sun, remains so long as the air is illuminated, so God exists perpetually in all things as their Creator.

Whether God is everywhere? (See ST Ia. 8, 2)God is said to be in every place by His Power, not as a body fills place, excluding every other by the fact of its being there, for, rather, God may be said to fill place, inasmuch as He gives to all things in place that which makes them to be in place. Thus God is present effectively in all created things, but objectively in the rational creature which knows and loves Him by act or habit; in such a manner is God present by grace in the saints.

Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence, and power? (See ST. Ia. 8, 3)Thus, therefore, He is present in all things by power, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him; and He is in all things by His Presence, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; and He is in all things by His Essence, inasmuch as He is in all as the Cause of Being. Moreover, (ST. Ia. 8, 4) that is properly said to be everywhere which is necessarily present in any given place, which is proper to God; for however many places there might be, from their very existence it would follow that God must be in them all, for nothing can exist but by Him. Thus it belongs to God to be everywhere first and of Himself; and it belongs to Him alone that, however many places there might be, in each of them He must be present, not by division of parts, but wholly as He is in Himself.

From A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA by Walter Farrell:

Infinity

No limits are to be placed on the goodness of God, as no limits are to be assigned to any other divine attribute. How can you have a fence with nothing, absolutely nothing, on the other side of it? What is there of reality, that God will not have, to mark the spot where the fence must begin? Limitation is essentially a declaration of potentialities achieved or potentialities capable of achievement; without potentiality limitation is a contradiction in terms. And there can be no potentiality in God, for potentiality is a declaration of dependence. God has not received existence within the limits of a human, an animal or an angelic nature; He has not received at all, He is. The idea of reception is the idea of change, of potentiality actualized, of perfection within limits–something that our proof for His existence forced us to exclude from God. He is infinite, and He alone; for He alone is first, receiving from no one, giving to all.

Ubiquity

In a very real sense, this utterly limitless God overflows the limits of the universe. He is everywhere within it, yet not contained by it. Everything in the universe comes from God; existence is His proper effect. Where anything exists,\ there is God. Understand, now, this is not merely a matter of God first giving existence and then abandoning the universe to its fate; He does not give us a pat on the back as we leave the corner of nothingness to jump into the ring of life, leaving us to take the blows while He shouts advice that takes none of the sting out of the blows. Existence belongs to God; as long as existence endures, there is the hand of God sustaining it as a mother supports her infant or the throat of a singer sustains his song. God is everywhere, and only God; for only God is the infinite, the first cause explaining every existent thing.

The ubiquity of God, in common with all the divine perfections, is not a cold, abstract thing meaningless to men. Its significance for human living is inexhaustible. In thc concrete, it means, for instance, that God is in the surge of the sea, the quiet peace of hills and valleys, the cool refreshment of rain, the hard drive of wind-driven snow. In the cities He is in the bustling of crowds, the roar of traffic, the struggle for pleasure, for life, for happiness, in the majesty of towering buildings. In homes He is not to be excluded from the tired, drowsy hours of night, the hurried activity of morning, from the love and quarrels, the secret worries and unquestioning devotion, the sacrifice and peace that saturate a home. In every individual one of us God is more intimately present than we are to ourselves. Every existing thing within us demands not only the existence of God but also His constant presence, from every rush of blood from our hearts to every wish, every thought, every act. In other words, everything that is real must have God there as the explanation, the foundation, the cause of every moment of its reality.

Thomas puts this all succinctly and beautifully when he says that God is in the world, in everything and everyone in the world, by His essence, causing all things, by His presence, all things being naked and open to the eye of this intelligent cause, by His power on which everything depends, to which everything is subject.

There is in this conception a majesty that transforms the earth. The mistaken exaggerations of Eastern philosophy made men walk carefully lest, treading on a living thing, they tread on the soul of a man. We have no fear of treading on the soul of man nor on God; but we do live in a world vibrant with divinity. We can give a real reverence to every being because within it, supporting its very existence, is the living God Himself. There is terror in this conception, the terror of moving in an atmosphere pervaded with divinity, of being ourselves wrapped about with divinity, penetrated with the infinite. But there is also courage and comfort here to be had from no other source. We bar the world in general from everything but the surface of our lives; friends are allowed to enter a few rooms of our palace; love throws open the gates as far as it is given us to open them–as wide as physical signs or clumsy, stumbling, inadequate words can open our souls, as wide as sacrifice and devotion can keep those gates open. Only God can walk freely about the innermost corridors of our being. And He does. Unless He be there, we could not be.

The pessimistic pantheism of the East, to which our modern philosophy edges closer every day, distorted the truth of the intimate presence of God to the point of identifying everything with divinity. On such premises there was good grounds for pessimism. All distortions are false, this one is as absurdly false as the identification of my image in a mirror with myself or the inability to see any difference between the poet and his poem. None of the things created by God are divine; rather they are the mirrors of divinity, the effects of the divine cause that depend every instant on that cause for their reality

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The Infinity of God (A Simple Summa)

August 29th, 2008 by Dim Bulb

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ST IA, Q. 7, 1 God is Infinite because His Immensity is not bounded by matter. The Divine Being is not contained in anything, but He is His own Self-Existence, and hence He is Infinite and Perfect. ST Ia, 7, 2 There is nothing absolutely infinite but God, although relatively it may be so. With regard to infinity as applied to matter, it is evident that everything in existence must have some form; thus its matter is determined by form and cannot be infinite, properly speaking; but in so far as matter remains in potentiality to an infinitude of forms, it is accounted relatively infinite. If we speak of infinity as applied to form, it is evident that those forms which are actually united to matter are finite; but the created forms independent of matter, as the opinion is regarding the angels, these would be relatively infinite as not limited by matter; but, however, because they are limited by a determinate nature, they cannot be, [properly speaking, infinite; and, therefore, God alone is absolutely infinite.

ST Ia, 7, 3 No natural body can be infinite in magnitude, because every natural body has a determinate substantial form to which belong fixed accidents; hence a body has a determinate quantity of more or less, which makes it impossible for it to be infinite. The same is evident if we consider motion. Every body has some movement, whereas an infinite body could have none; neither straight, for nothing can so move except outside its own place, which could not exist at all were it infinite; nor circular, because such a movement requires that one part be transferred to the place hitherto occupied by another part, and this could not be in an infinite circular body, for the lines radiating from the center become more distant from each other as they are more and more drawn out; if, therefore, a body were infinite, such lines would become infinitely distant from each other, and one could never get near the other.

ST Ia, 7, 4 It is likewise impossible for an infinite multitude to exist. A multitude exists according to some kind of multitude, and kind exists according the species of numbers; and no species of number is infinite, for number is multitude cannot be, either directly or accidentally. There can be, however, an infinite multitude in potentially, because increase of multitude follows upon division of multitude, and the more a thing is divided the greater will be the result in number. The infinity of being is thus found in potentiality, by the division of that which is continuous; and a like idea of infinity is also found in the addition of multitude.

From Walter Farrell’s Companion of the Summa:

No limits are to be placed on the goodness of God, as no limits are to be assigned to any other divine attribute. How can you have a fence with nothing, absolutely nothing, on the other side of it? What is there of reality, that God will not have, to mark the spot where the fence must begin? Limitation is essentially a declaration of potentialities achieved or potentialities capable of achievement; without potentiality limitation is a contradiction in terms. And there can be no potentiality in God, for potentiality is a declaration of dependence. God has not received existence within the limits of a human, an animal or an angelic nature; He has not received at all, He is. The idea of reception is the idea of change, of potentiality actualized, of perfection within limits–something that our proof for His existence forced us to exclude from God. He is infinite, and He alone; for He alone is first, receiving from no one, giving to all. (Source)

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Summa Contra Gentiles Bk. 1, Ch. 9

August 25th, 2008 by Dim Bulb

Chapter 9 OF THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK.

Accordingly, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be  directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to refutation of contrary errors: and that the research of reason is ale to reach to one of these, while the other surpasses every effort of reason.  And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things, not on the part of God Himself Who is Truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, the relation of which to the knowledge of divine things varies.

Wherefore in order to deduce the first kind of truth we must proceed be demonstrative arguments whereby we can convince our adversaries.  But since such arguments not available in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth because, as shown above (chapt 7), natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith.  In a special way my the opponent of this kind be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles: since we believe not what is above human reason save because God has revealed it.  In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error, if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.

With the intention then of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first of all endeavor to declare the truth which is the object of faith’s confession and of reason’s researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and holy men, so as thereby to confirm the truth and convince our opponents (this is the burden of the first 3 volumes).  After thins, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall with God’s help proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason, by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority (in book 4).

Seeing then that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in Himself (in book 1); the second (in book 2) will be the procession of creatures from Him; and the third (in book 3) the relation of creatures to Him as their end.  Of those things which we need to consider about God in Himself, we must give the first place (this being the necessary foundation of the whole of this work), to the question of demonstrating that there is a God: for unless this be established, all questions about divine things are out of court.

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Aquinas On Group Life And The State (Part 2)

August 23rd, 2008 by Dim Bulb

Note: To read the first post on this subject go HERE.

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6. The Sovereign People and its Representatives. To understand properly the Thomistic view on the seat of authority or of government in the State, we must distinguish as he does between two questions: (a) where is the seat of sovereignty in any case, (b) what is the most perfect form of government?

(a) At the outset, and in every state, sovereignty belongs to the collectivity, i.e., the sum total of individuals. The people are the State. This is logical, for the only realities in society are the individuals, and apart from them the State is nothing, and moreover, government has as its object the well-being of all (see # 2, 5). The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people is thus no modern invention.

But the collectivity or sum total of individuals is too complicated, too chaotic, to exercise power itself. In its turn, therefore, the collectivity delegates it usually, but not necessarily, to a monarch. For in theory one could choose instead an aristocratic or a republican form of government: “To ordain something for the common good belongs either to the whole community, or to someone taking the place of the community.” (Summ Theol. Ia Iae. q. 90, art. 3) Thus power is transmitted by successive delegation from God to the people, and from the people to the ruler. The people hold it by a natural title which nothing can destroy, the king holds it by the will of the people, and this may change. There is, accordingly, at the ase of the p[eople’s delegation to the king a contract, rudimentary or implicit in less perfect forms of society, explicit in States which have arrived at a high degree3e of organization. This will of the people, which can make itself known in many different ways, legitimatizes the exercise of power. Monarchy, in the opinion of Thomas, has the advantage of not scattering power and force. But he adds that circumstances must decide which is the best form of government at a particular moment in the political life of a nation. This gives his theory all the elasticity which could be desired.

(b) Still, he himself shows a very marked preference for a composite form; which he considers to be the most perfect realization of delegated authority. It is a mixed system of government, in which sovereignty belongs to the people, with the intervention of an elective monarchy, and an oligarchy which modifies the monarch’s exercise of power. “The best regime will be realized in that city or state, in which one alone commands all the others by reason of his virtue, where some subordinate rulers command according to their merit, but where nevertheless power belongs to all, either because all are eligible as rulers, or simply because all are electors. Now this is the case in a government which consists of a happy combination of royalty, inasmuch as there is only one head, or aristocracy inasmuch as many collaborate in the work of government, according to their virtue, and of democracy or popular power inasmuch as the rulers may be chosen from among the people, and it belongs to the people to elect their rulers.” (Summ Theol. Ia Iae. q. 97, art. 1) Aquinas affirms such political principles as universal suffrage, the right of the lowest of men to e raised to power, the appreciation of personal value and virtue, the domination of reason in those who govern or an ‘enlightened government,’ an elective system giving the means of choosing those most worthy, and the necessity of the political education of the people.

7. The duties of the Sovereign, and the Legislative Power. In the De Regimine Principum, of Thomas Aquinas, the ruler is charged with a threefold duty: he must establish the well-being of the whole, conserve it, and improve it (Lib. I, cap 15). First he must establish the common weal by preserving peace among the citizens (sometimes peace is referred to as convenientia voluntatum,agreement of wills), by encouraging the citizens to lead a moral life, and providing a sufficient abundance of the material things which are necessary to it. Teh public weal once established, the next duty is to conserve it. This is accomplished by assuring the appointment of sufficient and capable agents of administration, by repressing disorder, by encouraging morality, through a system of rewards and punishments, and by protecting the state against the attacks of external enemies. Finally the government is charged with a third mission, which is vague, more elastic: to rectify abuses, to make up for defects, to work for progress.

The means par excellence by which a Government is enabled to fulfill its threefold task is the power of making laws, i.e., of commanding. The Thomistic theory of human or positive law, in its double form of jus gentium, law of the nations, common to all states, is closely connected with the theory of law in general. For the civil law is, and can only be, a derivation from natural law, and in consequence it ultimately comes from the eternal law (13:2). Here once again the individual is protected against the State, for “in the measure that positive law is in disagreement with the natural law, it is no longer a law, but a corruption of law” (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 95, art. 2). In this way the arbitrary element is banished as “a rational injunction, made in view of the common good, and promulgated by the one having charge of the community” (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 90, art 4). Positive law adapts to concrete circumstances the immediate prescriptions of the natural law, which in their abstract form belong to the law of nations. For instance, the law of nations enjoins that malefactors are to be punished. Positive law determines whether the punishment is to be by fine, imprisonment, ect. Positive law is therefore at once fixed and variable. It changes with the circumstances, and it belongs to a government to modify it if necessary, always on condition that it bears in mind that every modification of a law lessens its force and majesty.

8. Social Justice and the Commonwealth. The common good is the result of good government and the reign of social justice. Thomas’ views on social justice and solidarity are worthy of note. To understand them we must ear in mind what we have said of the notion of right and of justice (14:3).

A compensation is due to each individual for whatever benefit accrues from his acts, and right is simply the requirement that this equal adjustment be made. To render to each one his due is to do justice. When the act benefits an entire community, social justice arises.

Hence social justice demands two elements :(a) that the actions of the individual citizen or of the several members of a group be conducted in such a way that the community, i.e., all its members, shall be benefited thereby; (b) that, in return, the individual should receive from the community an adequate compensation.

Social justice thus understood rest upon a solemn affirmation of solidarity and mutual assistance. Every human action, inasmuch as it is performed in a community, has its reaction upon that community, and benefits or harms it more or less, in some way (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 58, art. 5. Cf. art. 6). The soldier who fights, the laborer who works, and the scholar who studies are engaged in social activities which, being such, do good to the whole community. Even the outbursts of individual passions admit of being referred to social justice, and “can be regulated with a view to the common good,” (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 58, art 9, ad.3) since these outbursts intensify action, and every action has its echo in society.

Who ensures this convergence of individual activities? An individual citizen is obviously without the qualifications necessary for this task. It therefore belongs to the ruler to orient all good acts towards the common good of all. He is the custos justi, the justum animatum,-the guardian of right, the living embodiment of justice (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 58, art. 1, ad 5). He is the architectonic chief architectonice). Just as the master builder of the cathedral supervises the stonecutters, the carpenters, the sculptors, the painters, so that they may be ready at the proper time and place, so the master builder of social justice oversees all the diverse social activities and takes account of their relative importance in the community. It belongs to the ruler to see that the soldier fights, the scholar studies, the laborer works, ect., in such a way that all their activities may be directed to the realization of the harmony of the body politic. He must think out the best way of ensuring mutual assistance in order that everything may be of profit to all. His intervention will above all regulate all external actions: such as diligence in work, temperance, meekness. But if necessary he will also occupy himself with actions which belong to the “internal forum” (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 58, art. 9).

How is the ruler to carry out this high humanitarian mission? He can only do so by way of commandment. For, he possesses the virtue of justice as commanding per modum imperantis et dirigentis, while the citizens share in it only as obeying per modum executionis (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 58, art. 1, ad 5). At first sight this looks like an intolerable and autocratic notion, a worship of the state, which is bound to destroy individual autonomy. But these fears are groundless. The theory contains within itself the correctives for those abuses to which it seems to open the door, for the realization of the common good is the one and only motive which can render legitimate the intervention of the ruler. And this common good “is no other than the good of each one of the members of the collectivity” (Summa Theol. Ia IIae, q. 58, art. 9). An arbitrary intervention on the part of the ruler which would be destructive of individual good-and thus of liberty-would be contrary to the common good, and as a consequence to social justice.

The doctrine of social justice constitutes in the Thomistic system and ideal which governments must never forget, and which they must realize to the fullest measure consonant with the actual conditions of a good civilization.

As to the compensation to the individual, which is owed by the community for services done, it is again the ruler who should decide as to the demands of social justice, although Thomas Aquinas does not insist upon this second aspect of the question.-Maurice De Wulf

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Aquinas on Group Life and the State (Part 1)

August 21st, 2008 by Dim Bulb

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    Note: Due to the length of the entry under this heading, it will be posted in two parts.

    1. The fundamental principle of group life. Man is intended by nature to form a society. The group life is necessary, for if left to himself in an isolated state, an individual would be deprived of the materials, the intellectual guidance, and moral support necessary for the attainment of happiness. The group life is necessary precisely and only because of this insufficiency of the individual for his own needs.

    In this way, then, we justify the fundamental principle of life in society, which we may enunciate as follows: The collectivity exists for the sake of the individual, and not the individual for the sake of the collectivity.” Similarly, the well-being of a group will not differ in kind from that of the individuals which compose it.

    The principle is a general one, and applies to domestic groups, political (village, city, state), religious (parish, abbey, diocese, Christendom), and economic ones (e.g., trade union or guild). It is based upon general ethics, which emphasizes the value of human personality, and this moral individualism, itself one of the most striking achievements of the civilization of the Middle Ages, is in turn linked to metaphysics, which recognizes no other existent, substantial reality than the individual, in the particular sphere in question.

    2. The unity of the group and the inalienable rights of its members. The collectivity therefore is not a substance as such, as is taught by some contemporary philosophers, and the very notion of ‘a collective person’ is contradictory (10:1). Its unity is not the internal unity which belongs to a natural substance, and which ensures coherence within it, but rather an external unity. Each member of a group retains his value as a person, but his activities are united or rather co-ordinated with those of others. This is especially true of the State, “which comprises many persons, whose varied activities combine to produce its well-being.” (Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 1)

    The unity of a social group or of the State is a “unity of functions” exercised by the different members. The only difference between natural groups (such as the family or the State) and artificial ones (such as a club or a political party) is that the working in common is necessary in the first case and not in the second.

    Since the group exists for the sake of the members, it goes without saying that it cannot take away or modify those inalienable rights which are expressions of the personality, i.e., which belong to the individual as possessing a rational nature. Whether he be slave or free, rich or poor, ruler or ruled, an individual has “the right to preserve his life, to marry and to bring up children, to develop his intelligence, to be instructed, to hold to the truth, to live in the Society.” (Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, 1. 94, art. 2). These are some of the perogatives of the individual which appear in the thirteenth-century Declaration of the Rights of Man.

    Among the various natural groups, scholastic philosophers paid most attention to the family and the State.

    3. The Family. The family, which forms the cell of the social organism, comprises the husband, wife, children, and servants. The father is the head of this group, and derives his authority from God (15:4). Although the wife belongs in a sense to the husband (she is said to be part of the husband), her independence relative to her husband is greater than that of children relative to their father, or servants to their masters The subordination of a child to his father is complete, as is that of a serf to his master.

    From this it follows that there will be stricter relations of ‘justice’ between husband and wife than between father and children, masters and serfs, for, as we have seen above, justice requires a distinction (ad alterum) between persons. But always the individual rights of human beings remain. As for the serfs, the thirteenth century was not prepared to give them complete enfranchisement, but still their condition was altogether different from the slavery of antiquity and the early Middle Ages. Moreover, both canonical and civil legislation were constantly bettering their condition.

    4. Origin of authority in the State. Whether great or small, a State consists of a group of families under the authority or power of one or several persons. Whence comes this sovereignty, i.e., the power of a man to command and rule his fellows? Schoolmen reply that all power comes from God, and explain this as follows: The whole universe is regulated by the plan of Divine Providence, the eternal law of all reality (lex aeterna). Each individual thing contributes, by attaining to its own end, to the realization of this divine plan and the object of the whole. In consequence, man will play his part in the cosmic order ordained by God for the Universe precisely by achieving the destiny which belongs to him as a rational being and thus ensuring his happiness (12:1-2). Now, since the group life was instituted in order to help individuals to attain their ends, the governing authority which forms a necessary element of a society (ratio gubernationis) must be a way of realizing the divine plan, and ultimately come from God also. “Since the eternal law is the reason or explanation of government in the chief ruler, the reason for governing rulers must also be derived from the eternal law.” (Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 95, art. 3) Rulers are therefore divine delegates. The theory is a general one, and applies to every kind of authority. In the case of the State, it does not matter by what means this divine power is transmitted, or in whom it is found. These are points for separate consideration.

    5. Government is an officium or duty. The raison d’etre of government determines its nature: it is utilitarian, and officium, ‘office’ or duty. The princes of the earth are instituted by God not in order that they may seek their own profit, but in order that they may ensure the common well-being. Even in the case of the papal theocracy, the idea of officium is always found with that power, and the Pope describes himself as the servus servorum Dei, servant of the servants of God. Hence all treatises written for the use of princes and future monarchs condemn the capricious, selfish, arbitrary or tyrannical exercise of power.

    Thomas builds up a whole system of guarantees in order to save the State from a government so completely opposed to its nature. (De Regimine Principum, lib. I, cap. 6) The guarantees are preventative in the first place:let the people carefully inquire concerning the candidate for power when choosing their ruler. Similar guarantees will exist throughout the monarch’s reign, for his power will be controlled and countered by the intervention of other factors, as we shall shortly see. There are likewise repressive guarantees: resistance to unjust commands of a tyrant is not only permitted, but even enjoined. Thomas expressly condemns tyrannicide: one must go to any length in order to put up with an unjust ruler, but if the regime becomes quite unsupportable, then one must have recourse to that power of deposing the monarch which is the corollary of the right to choose one. This doctrine holds good whatever be the nature of government,-monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. This brings us to the question of the depository of power.-Maurice De Wulf

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    The Essence Of Happiness a commentary on the Summa Theologica II: Ia-IIae, Q. 1-5

    June 16th, 2008 by Dim Bulb
    1. The key to the mystery of human life is happiness:
    2. Happiness consists in the attainment of the goal of life.
    3. The study of happiness must begin,
    not at the beginning, but at the end, the goal:
        (a) There is a goal of life:
    	(1) Fact of man’s goal — from his activity.
    	(2) The failure of modern philosophy.
        (b) The nature of this goal:
    	(1) It is uniquely human.
    	(2) It is ultimate:
    	    a. Each man has but one goal.
    	    b. That goal is the source of all other desires.
    	    c. It is the same for all men.
    	(3) It is the end of all creatures, but differently:
    	    a. By participating an image.
    	    b. By essential participation.
    4. Objective Happiness — determination of the beatifying object:
        (a) Three possible — and historical — mistakes:
    	(1) External goods: riches, honour, fame, power.
    	(2) Corporal good: the body itself, its pleasure.
    	(3) The soul of man.
        (b) The true object in whose possession lies happiness is the Universal Good.
    5. Subjective or Formal Happiness — the attainment of the goal:
        (a) it is possible — from a comparison of man’s faculties man’s goal.
        (b) it is accomplished by an act of man:
    	(1) Not by any of his inferior acts.
    	(2) But by the supreme act of man — intellectual vision.
    	    a. The essence of formal happiness.
    	    b. Two common errors in regard to this formal happiness:
    		1. Cannot be had.
    		2. Would not give happiness if it were had.
        (c) Characteristics of formal happiness:
    	(1) Once gained it can never be lost.
    	(2) It cannot be had by natural power alone.
    	(3) it is strictly a personal accomplishment.
    6. The perfection of happiness:
        (a) The three essentials or happiness: vision, comprehension, joy.
        (b) Role of the body in happiness.
        (c) Role of external goods.
        (d) Role of friends.
    Conclusion:
    1. Key to present or imperfect happiness — where and how happiness is to be found here and now.
    2. Activity and progress as a measure of happiness.
    3. Answers to the puzzles:
        (a) of activity.
        (b) of despair.
        (c) of boredom.
    

    CHAPTER I
    THE ESSENCE OF HAPPINESS
    (Q. 1-5)
    Here we have, as a matter of fact, reason for the same terror that engulfs a man at the beginning of his study of God. The terrific complexity of man’s life and man’s activity might well seem an overpowering assignment for the limits of one volume. The scope of those activities, stretching from ocean to ocean, from pole to pole, from the earliest beginnings to the limitless future, would be far too much to touch upon, let alone plunge into, if man were not man. Because he is man, there is an element of unity that binds together the whole sweep of man’s doings as closely as his nature binds the individual; there is a common harmonious note that reveals the meaning of the whole apparently discordant chorus.

    The key to the mystery of human life is happiness

    That note of unity and harmony is human desire. The same force that has driven men apart, that has set nations at one another’s throats, that has wiped individuals and races off the face of the earth, is at the same time the one great focal point of human agreement and harmony. All men agree on this — they want what they want. And because of this desire, men act. In the attainment of what they want we have the essential notion of happiness. It is not pleasure, not enjoyment, but the possession of the object of desire which constitutes happiness. And in this sense all men want to be happy. Happiness is the key to the mystery of human life, of human activity.

    Happiness consists in the attainment of the goal of life.

    The material of our study in this volume, therefore, is human action, particularly in its culmination in happiness. It is fortunate for our feeble courage in the face of this task that the fundamental notions involved are so clear. At least most of us will agree theoretically on what a human action is; certainly all of us will agree practically in determining when a man is acting humanly. Theoretically, an act is human over which a man has control, an act that is done deliberately, i.e. on purpose, for a precise reason, to attain a definite goal. When we catch ourselves up now and then and ask in astonishment, “Why in the world did I do that?”, only to find there is no answer to the “why” of that question, we are right in concluding that we need sleep, or a vacation, or a visit to the doctor. For while a human being has certainly placed an act, he has not acted humanly. Practically, we have a whole set of phrases to express the difference between a human action and one that is not human. A servant explains: “I’m sorry, I didn’t mean that”; and of course the apology must be accepted, even though the coffee spilled on us is, unlike most coffee, incredibly hot. A man whose foot has been trampled in a subway crowd says what he says because he “is angry, not himself”. we are “beside ourselves” with indignation, “in a trance, absent-minded, forgetful, cross, hysterical or terror-stricken”, and of course our actions are not human.

    The study of happiness must begin, not at the beginning, but at the end, the goal

    For if human they are, then they must be done for some reason, to some end, for some goal. For, after all, action has to do with the attainment of the object of desire, and the object of desire is precisely the goal or end of that particular action. The study of happiness, then, cannot begin at the beginning; it is too intimately wrapped up with the finish or goal. It is not that man’s head is befuddled, but rather that man has the kind of head which makes it necessary to begin at the end. He is not living his life backwards but has that divine faculty of standing off to one side and looking at his life, or of looking ahead of his life, and so is capable of appreciating its meaning as well as its humour. And looking ahead, he will see that the goal does much more than flavour the action directed to it; it does even more than explain the existence of that action, as we shall see presently. For on the determination of the nature of that goal depends the meaning of the whole life of a man, the nature of all his activity, the very destiny of man.

    There is a goal of life: Fact of man’s goal — from his activity.

    From what we have seen of action that is human, we know the life of man has some end or ends, some goal or goals. The very fact that an act, to measure up to our requirements of human action, must be deliberately controlled, places it as coming from deliberate will; the act is ours and imputable to us because we have willed it. This is universally true of any act that presumes to be human; so that human activity comes from the human will and goes to the object of the human will. In other words, it is placed because of some good, some end, since it proceeds from the instrument of human desire (will) whose only object is good.

    The failure of modern philosophy

    Here we come upon one of the most drastic failures of modern philosophy. Face to face with the unquestionable fact of finality — purposiveness — in human action, modern philosophy has taken refuge in the murk of vague speculation. In the face of modern contempt for any but the most empirical knowledge, modern philosophy has committed itself to the building of castles in the air. It is dangerous to attempt to classify modern ethical theories; they are so intensely flavoured by the individual philosopher’s personal outlook and background that almost every man has a system of his own. But, roughly, we can split modern ethical theory into three classes: (a) the first trles to explain this finality of human activity in terms of the society to which man belongs, reducing ethics to positive law, to some form of public opinion, to sociology; (b) the second attempts the same task in terms of a necessity of the universe in which man moves, whether mechanical or animal, reducing ethics to mathematics, biology, or psychology; (c) the third, faced with the dilemma that reduced Aristotle’s magnificent reasoning to vague muttering, makes a god out of man and talks in frankly, or insidiously, subjectivistic terms, describing its ethics as individualistic, emotional or autonomous.

    The human being, in whose name all this has been done, is an intensely individual and practical being. To explain patiently that his efforts, his sufferings, his triumphs, his courage, his loyalty, his failures have no objective significance for him personally, merely exasperates him If all his activity is only in the name of, and for the vague purposes of a very intangible, perhaps very distant, community perfection; or is only the ceaseless grinding of a giant machine, the necessary, irresistible urging of an animal, or the frail spinnings of his own mind, he will do one of two things: either he will stop all his effort, all his activity, or he will push the theorizing of philosophies into the room with the children’s toys and make his own decisions. And this latter is precisely what he has done. The position and influence of philosophy in our universities today are adequate testimony of philosophy’s failure in the field of ethical theory. The pursuit of wealth, of power, of pleasure, of food or drink, of physical perfection, or of scientific inquiry as the goal of human life, gives the other side of the picture, the failure of philosophy in the field of ethical practice.

    Men and women of today are no more satisfied with tables than were the men and women of any other age. And if we are to get at the truth of human happiness, we cannot simply scramble human activity with every other form of action in the universe. To act for a goal of our choosing, and that means to attempt to attain happiness, is a uniquely human fight. Other things, other creatures, may be propelled towards a goal by the drive of physical necessity or of animal instinct, much as an arrow is shot towards a target by the impulse and aim of the archer. But only man can direct action towards a goal, for only man is in control of his actions. Control of action involves deliberate will, the ability to see the connection between the tools used and the Job to be done, between the means and the end. To envy the secluded happiness of a pampered lap dog is a waste of energy; he cannot be happy because he cannot know what it is all about. We might, indeed we do, whip a puppy for chewing up slippers, we hope that he will remember the whipping in connection with the slippers and avoid both; but we never think of absolving him from his sins.

    Aristotle, and St. Thomas after him, laid the solid foundation for the investigation of human activity by tying its goal up with the order of reality. In his treatment of God, St. Thomas triumphantly vindicates both the reality and the sublime supremacy of the divinity by first showing its connection with the very first principles of being and thought. Here, in the very beginning of his investigation of the meaning of human life, we see him laying down the same metaphysical basis for his thought, bringing out clearly the connection between that goal of human activity and the first principles of reality.

    The nature of this goal: It is uniquely human

    Precisely because a human action, to be human at all, must be directed to some goal, to some good, it follows that there must be some goal that is the last, the ultimate explanation of all human activity. Just as all movement must have one supreme beginning if there is to be any movement at all (as we saw in the first volume in proving the existence of God), so all human movement must have one goal, one end, if there is to be any movement at all. In concrete terms, I buy a boat-ticket to Europe, either because the supreme goal of my life is the possession of such a ticket, or because I want that ticket for some other purpose, such as to go to Europe. Whatever it is I strive for, I want that thing either for itself, or as a step to getting something else. Of course no one starts to climb a flight of stairs devoid of the conviction that the stairs go somewhere, that they have some end; for after all the whole purpose of stairs is to get us to some other place. So, no human being starts a chain of action that is going nowhere; for the whole reason of acting at all is to get somewhere, to attain some object of our desire. This is the first argument used for the existence of God, but taken from the order of efficient cause and put to work in the order of final cause. To question its validity is to demand action and at the same time, in the same breath, make action impossible.

    Each man has but one goal

    A final, ultimate, supreme end, or goal, is necessarily solitary, unique. In simpler language, no man or woman can have two final goals at the same time, any more than a person can walk in two directions at the same time. Action is a majestic flight towards a landing field; and motion, swift or slow, crooked or straight, has only one final stopping place. The family likeness of all desirable things — goodness — is an unerring clue to their common origin and final resting place.

    That goal is the source of all other desires

    This ultimate, supreme goal is the giant power-house from which the current flows out to all other lesser goals. This is the head of the house of desirable things, from whom comes all the beauty and allure of the lesser members. These lesser ends are intermediaries, steps, which have value because of their connection with the supreme end; separated from it, they are as pathetically useless as a bridge torn from the banks of a river it was meant to span.

    It is the same for all men.

    In a very real, very objective sense, this supreme, ultimate good which draws forth all human activity is identical for all men. For on this one point are all men agreed; the purpose of their action is happiness. And it is precisely this supreme end which can fulfil that purpose. Actually, the ends of human activity are as multiple as the energies men put forth in search for happiness, as diverse as the mistakes men make in trying to determine just what that final, supreme good is. A man with a thick tongue and a headache is not a dependable judge of the tastiness of a breakfast; neither is a perverted will a dependable judge, of the object in which human happiness is to be found. Our next steps in the investigation of the essence of happiness will be the determination of the healthiness of the human appetite or will, the concrete discovery of just what particular object can confer happiness on man.

    It is the end of all creatures, but differently

    But first, and passingly, we might point out that the majestic force which has swept the universe on from its dim beginnings towards its final goal has made no exception in the case of man. He may be the very summit of nature, the lord of the world, but he is none the less a part of that natural order, subject to those same natural laws, and moving along with nature to the same supreme end. For it is quite true that the end of nature and the end of every man in nature is the same; as all motion must have had the one source, so it must have the one final resting place, the one goal. In this same sense, we might say that Admiral Byrd’s plane, his dog, and himself all reached the same goal, the South Pole, but certainly not in the same way. So with the creatures of our universe: some by merely existing, some by living, others by living and feeling, reach a little image of that final good; while men and angels speed on to the very core of that final good on the wings of knowledge and love.

    Objective Happiness — determination of the beatifying object:
    Three possible — and historical — mistakes

    It is the peculiar genius of our race to be able to make mistakes. And that genius has been exhausted in the attempt to determine the object the possession of which will mean happiness for us. Men have placed their chips on every number that the universe offers in the gamble for happiness, and they have always been wrong. As a matter of fact only two classes of mistakes were possible: placing all chance for happiness in some external, particular good, or on some good within the nature of man himself, whether of body or of soul.

    External goods: riches, honour, fame, power

    Of the external seducers, riches have played a leading role, but their beauty has been an illusion produced by make-up and a spotlight. For the ultimate goal of man cannot exist for anything else; because it is ultimate it is desired for itself, it is never a step but always that to which steps lead. And riches, whether natural (such as food and drink) or artificial (such as wealth) are always steps, always for something else: the first for the sustaining of life; the second, even more obviously, for the purchase of natural goods.

    The other external goods — honour, reputation, power — are just as easily disposed of as being claimants to the place of honour in man’s quest for happiness, no matter how many millions of men and women they have fooled. Natural and artificial riches, as instruments used by man for his ends, are servants, not the supremely desirable answer to his lifetime of longing. Honour and reputation are quite outside of the man himself and indeed often independent of his efforts; in any case they bring nothing intrinsically within the scope of a man’s own being. Honour is rather a witness to excellence than the constituent of happiness. Reputation (fame or glory) is another witness, not in us at all but in those who are honouring or praising us. These are frail things, often grossly erroneous, as we well know, at the mercy of every circumstance, and presupposing, not establishing, some claim to happiness. No, these are not the reason for man’s existence, the final goal of all his efforts.

    If the supreme good to which every man dedicates his life could be conceived as capable of being utterly vicious, capable of being possessed and still leaving its possessor a fool, or even dragging a man down to the gutter, we might be forced to hesitate before the throne of power in determining the object which will give us happiness. Power is quite capable of all these things; but, by the same token, it is incapable of being the final answer to man’s quest for happiness.

    Corporal good: the body itself, its pleasure

    Since his happiness is not to be found in the universe in which he lives, man looks, quite logically, in the only other obvious place, within himself. But his body is no more helpful than was the whole scope of the universe. Its conservation, its health, its beauty, its sensitive acumen or vegetative prodigality, are no more the explanation of man’s activity than the conservation of a ship is the real purpose, the last end of a captain. The captain’s job is to make a port, to navigate his ship; everything else about that ship serves this master purpose. The body’s job is to make possible that activity we call human and all of its various and complex workings serve that same master purpose; ministering the material to the intelligence and will which the body serves.

    The soul of man

    To pass immediately to a consideration of the soul of man would be to treat with contempt the mistake about happiness most common in our own day. And no human mistake deserves contempt, if only because there is behind it a human heart which, until its last beat, is capable of that incredible courage that snatches victory from despair. What of sensual pleasure? Can a man lose himself here and find the complete happiness whose absence has been the driving force of all his days? Because there is so much of the animal in us, this is a mistake easy to make and difficult to remedy.

    But mistake it is. For if human activity is distinctive, the goal at which it aims is no less distinctive, not at all a place where we must lie down with the brutes. As a matter of fact, a child does not have pleasure because it is enjoying ice-cream, but because it has ice-cream to enjoy. In other words, pleasure, delight, does not cause itself, but is caused by possession of some good, some end. No pleasure can make up happiness; rather it must always follow humbly in the wake of happiness, like a train-bearer following a bride.

    Our attempt to determine the object which will bring man his happiness has thus far been entirely a consideration of facts. It has been no more than a pattern of the final or the ultimate, demanded by every human act, laid on the actual choices made by men. We have not been theorizing, not preaching, but simply comparing facts and rejecting obvious misfits. This strict adherence to facts brings us to the last possibility — the soul of man. It is the end of a great experiment; the last step which many have not bothered to make because they think the answer could not be other than the right one, the one sought. But honest facing of the facts cannot allow cowardice to creep in at this last stage. Let us put that pattern of finality, of supremacy in the order of things desirable over the soul and its possibilities — and the answer again is no! They do not match.

    Indeed, if they did match, there would be no necessity for the bustle of human life; man would be happy from the very beginning. The very urge of man’s nature that he get out of himself, as well as the shrivelled, distorted result achieved by the introvert, are indications that man’s happiness does not lie within himself. Man, by his knowledge, can in a sense take all things into himself. He can become all things, and so he can desire all good. But he is not all things, he is not God. Neither he nor any creature is all good; and only that which can satisfy man’s desires can bring him happiness.

    The true object in whose possession lies happiness is the Universal Good

    The object of his pursuit of happiness is not outside man and in the universe; it is not within man, body or soul. But this does not mean that the whole affair is a grim joke of cosmic proportions. It is still real, still decidedly objective, this beatifying object — but it is above man and the universe. It is the answer to the human capacity to desire all goods and be satisfied with none; it is the final good that can leaves nothing to be desired; it is the absolutely universal good, outside and above man; outside and above the world, outside and above any good that bears the brand of limitation, of particularity.

    Subjective or Formal Happiness — the attainment of the goal

    A boy is not happy because an apple will bring him happiness; but because he has the apple in his possession. Neither is a man happy because the universal good will bring him happiness; but because he possesses that universal good. The attainment of the final goal, not its mere existence, marks the close of the pursuit of happiness. And that means no less than our having reached out and taken possession of the final good, bringing it into ourselves, making it our own. In this strictly formal sense, happiness, the final accomplishment of our human actions, is indeed within man.

    Dr. Cabot of Harvard(The Meaning of Right and Wrong (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936), p. 112 ff.) insists that man’s business in life is to grow. The dimly seen truth behind this statement is the same as that behind modern philosophers’ insistence on progress, advance, constant change, evolution without end. For to the naked eye it is apparent that action and perfection have a strange affinity. When I have absorbed all that an educational system can offer me in the way of knowledge, quite patently I have more of perfection than I had in my grammar-school days. A potential opera star has much less perfection of voice than the opera star who has realized her potentialities. It is quite true then that perfection is in exact proportion to actuality, as true of man as of plants, or indeed as of God.

    Happiness possible — from a comparison of man’s faculties man’s goal

    Consequently, this ultimate perfection of man, which is his complete happiness, is to be found in his consummate, most perfect act. In modern terms, substance exists for the sake of function; the ultimate in perfection of any substance, then, will be its most perfect function. More simply, the goal of life will be the realization of the best that is in man.

    It is accomplished by an act of man

    This truth is so obvious that, stated in common-place language, it seems almost insulting to intelligence. Everyone knows that man’s desires are satisfied only by his reaching out and getting what he lacks. Of course, since some object he now lacks will satisfy his desires, will bring him happiness, the thing for him to do is to reach out and get it — a feat that is accomplished by using the tools at our command, human actions.

    Not by any of his inferior acts

    Since we know what we are after — the universal good — we can immediately exclude all those operations that are not distinctively human, those sense operations common to all animals, whose goals are not universal but particular goals. This action must be a distinctively human action, i.e. an act of intellect or will. And again the process of exclusion is simple. I can desire a hat in a draughty room by a mere act of my will: I can enjoy the possession of that hat with my will. But if I ever expect to have that hat, I’ll have to get up and get it. As a universal good is not something to be had by reaching out my hand, or by calling a servant, the only possibility of its possession is by an act of my intellect. Can I make it? Why not? That same intellect can know all things, even the universal; and it is the universal good that I am after.

    But let it be well understood that no substitutes will do. My will can be satisfied only when I possess that universal good, only when it is present within me by my knowledge of it. The lofty considerations of truth offered by philosophy or science will not do; not even the absorbed contemplation of angelic beauty will be tolerated patiently. It must be all or nothing: either the universal, all-embracing good, or the failure of the pursuit of happiness. The intellectual perfection that will help me to take more steps towards a goal is not sufficient; rather that is necessary which will mean no more steps.

    But by the supreme act of man — intellectual vision

    In plain words, I must see God. From the very beginning I have been driven by the desire to plumb the depths, to be unsatisfied with the superficial, to know the inner workings, the very essences of things. And having come upon the traces of God in nature, having learned of His existence, my nature will not be satisfied until I have seen the very essence of God.

    So far Aristotle managed to trudge up the last hill in his pursuit of happiness. He saw man standing at the summit of the created universe; at the peak of man’s nature was the intellect; and the zenith of that intellect’s activity was the contemplation of truth. Here, he concluded, must lie the happiness of man: in the supreme act of his supreme faculty, in the perfect realization of his greatest potentiality.

    Looking down from these heights, Aristotle was brought to earth with a crash. The men of that earth were real; the labours, interests, worries of their lives were decidedly real and left very little room for silent contemplation. Perhaps their offices were not as busy then as ours are today, but certainly their lives were. Moreover, how many of these men were capable of contemplation; and how long could the best of them keep it up? What an end to the quest of happiness! Such was the way Aristotle must have felt about the whole thing. His courage and devotion to facts were great enough to make him hold doggedly to the conclusions facts had forced upon him; but they were not great enough to make him take the last few steps that were possible to philosophy — to come out clearly with the last conclusions demanded by the facts. He chose to leave them vague.

    Two common errors in regard to this formal happiness:
    Cannot be had.
    Would not give happiness if it were had.

    Two obvious difficulties jumped at Aristotle — and at men ever since. For it seems evident that man cannot see God, and, even if he did, the act, like all his acts of contemplation, would endure for only a short time and could not give him happiness. To these objections St. Thomas had the infallible answers of divine faith. As a matter of fact, men do see God; and in their vision is their supreme happiness.(Ex Constitutions Benedict XII, “Benedictus Deus” H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbobrum (Freiburg, Germany: Herder & Co., ed.; 17, 1928), #530.) It is quite certain that the universal Good, the essence of God, cannot be crowded into a mental concept, nor be abstracted from sensible things; and yet that is the way our intellect works. Yes, the way it works naturally; the way it works at the present time, not because of its intelligence, but because of that crutch which intelligence must use and which we call reasoning. Man can be, and is, lifted above that lowest grade of intelligence; he is enabled to throw away the crutch and come to grips with divinity, not through an image or a concept, but in the way the divinity sees itself — through the immediate union of that supremely knowable essence to the intellect of man.

    Supernatural? Of course it is supernatural. But that fact is no more of an affront to man’s self-sufficiency, to the efficacy of nature, than is the fact that man is born without protection and clothes but is given hands and reason to make up for the deficiency. Here he is given a free will by which he can co-operate with the supernatural help infallibly offered him and reach the happiness which hangs over his head. That the contemplation of divinity is unsatisfying in this life, is beyond all question; and if reason could not have discovered that fact, faith would broadcast it to the four winds.(Council of Vienna, condemned propositions of Beghards, 1,4,5. (Denzinger, #471,474,475).

    But that dissatisfaction is in this life, seeing that divinity through a glass darkly and while we are sadly pressed by all the necessities of physical existence. Aristotle was right as far as he went; but it had not entered into the mind of man that God would insist on such a perfect image of Himself in the unfolding of the goal of human activity.

    Characteristics of formal happiness:
    Once gained it can never be lost.
    It cannot be had by natural power alone.
    It is strictly a personal accomplishment.

    Of this ultimate goal, then, it is strictly true that it is supernatural, not to be attained by natural powers. Yet, paradoxically, it is strictly personal attainment. No other creature, neither man nor woman, nor the highest angel in heaven, can get it for us; nor will God force it upon us. We approach it step by step, by onr own human actions, working with the constant help of God; and the last and eternally enduring act by which we grasp God Himself is an act of our intellect, something that can no more be done for us than our thinking here and now can be done by someone else and still be ours. Once had, this supreme good which satisfies all our desires and puts an end to the quest of happiness cannot possibly slip from our fingers. On its part, the beatifying object cannot dry up and blow away, it cannot decrease or cease to be what it essentially is, the universal good; on our part, we cannot get tired of it, there is nothing else that can tempt us from it, that can seem to have something that is not contained in that ultimate goal. Otherwise it would not be the ultimate, the universal good. Just as now we must will everything under the guise and in the name of good, so then we must will everything in the name of the divine good — what attractiveness there is in other things, comes from this final end. The perfection of happiness:
    The three essentials or happiness: vision, comprehension, joy

    Summing this up: a universally good object and its attainment by us is required for our complete happiness. In that attainment of the final goal there is involved the intellectual vision of the beatifying object; not merely a passing glance, but a tenacious grasp, an enduring comprehension of that object, and, finally, the eternally enduring joy (or rest) of our will, our appetite, in the accomplishment of our goal, in the possession of the all satisfying good.

    All else that may be involved in our final happiness, however much it may contribute to the perfection of happiness, is secondary and relatively unimportant — a delicate touch perhaps, like a drop of perfume on the gown of a perfectly dressed woman, but adding nothing substantial.

    Role of the body in happiness

    In this way, the reunion of body and soul will add to the perfection of the happiness of man. After all, his body belongs to a man, the soul was made for union with that body, and without it, the soul is in a very real sense incomplete; but the addition of the body will not add to the essential joy and glory of the soul, rather the other way around. From the soul will come joy and glory to the body, much as at present a light heart gives buoyancy to our steps.

    Role of external goods

    This overflow from the soul to the body will carry that body far beyond the limits of natural perfection. Often the body is in command of the situation at present, as the protest of our knees at an overlong prayer will testify; but then, the body will be completely subservient to the soul as it was meant to be. It would seem difficult then to find a place in the perfection of happiness for external goods. At present they are ordained to the needs of physical life; even the most sublime contemplative needs food and clothes. But the question of clothes in heaven would seem to be still very much open to debate.

    Role of friends

    Friends, of course, there must be, in the same way that we must have our bodies. They are our other selves; something of ourselves would be missing without them. And this is true, even though the principal end of friendship — the opportunity to help, to sacrifice, to give to others — will no longer exist; that subtler, infinitely precious joy in the beauty, the triumph, the happiness of friends will give a splendidly human air to the courts of heaven.

    Key to present or imperfect happiness — where and how happiness is to be found here and now

    All of this may seem very far away, very unsatisfactory to men and women who are engaged in the actual pursuit of happiness — as always the tape at the end of a race seems infinitely distant from the starting line. We want happiness now. What can we do about it today? What, if any, is the possibility of some happiness in this life?

    Activity and progress as a measure of happiness

    All of the answers to questions that might be put about present happiness are contained in what we have already said. Perhaps one of the most important is that no perfect happiness is to be had this side of death. It is an important thing to know. What happiness is possible can be had only by going in the general direction of that final goal, for because of that goal every other good is desirable, every other good has what power it possesses to satisfy the longings of our hearts. And what happiness can be had will be had slowly, trudgingly, little by little, with many an imperfection, distraction, interruption mixed in. The degree of present happiness is in exact proportion to our approach to the final goal of life, as the heat we feel from a fire is in exact proportion to our proximity to the fire. In utterly simple language: happiness, even the imperfect happiness this life can offer, is a matter of approaching God. The closer we get to Him, the greater our share of this imperfect happiness; the farther away we get, the less happiness we can expect to garner. The words of the child’s catechism are an adequate summary of all we have said: man was made to know and to love God. The goal of life is the knowledge and love, the vision and enjoyment, of divinity; what happiness we get in this life will be through an imperfect knowledge or love of God, either in Himself, or in one of the mirrorings of divinity which we call creatures.

    Answers to the puzzles: of activity, despair and boredom.

    The rush of New York life is not necessarily an improvement on the sleepy quiet of a tiny Irish hamlet. Man gains his happiness by activity; but not by every activity, rather by activity that is going somewhere, going to the right place. There is such a thing as being so busy we have no time to live; having our heads so full of knowledge we have no chance to think; or our hearts so crowded that there is no place for love. Activity for activity’s sake, bustling for its own sake, may help us to forget, may prevent our thinking, but it will not bring us happiness. Progress is indeed a measure of happiness — if it is progress towards God. But progress in time saving devices, or labour-saving devices, in wealth, health, strength, beauty, athletic ability, business efficiency — all of these can easily be synchronizing with flight away from the ultimate goal of human life. At best they are helps; at times they make that true progress easier. There can be no question that a young man of today has made less real progress as a result of fourteen or eighteen years of intensive educational efforts than did the Apostles by rubbing elbows with Christ for three years. A man or woman who starts off in high expectations of grasping full happiness within the span of human life is headed straight for despair; for despair is the fruit of reaching for the impossible. The person today starting life with a denial of life’s goal, of the ultimate universal good, has no choice, eventually, but to choke out life or to attempt to choke out reason. The first is despair. The second produces a weariness from trying to pretend that the petty particularities of the universe can be the absorbing explanation of human activity, the goal of human life, the reward for the pursuit of happiness. This is boredom.  Excerpted from A Companion to the Summa by Walter Farrell, O.P.

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    The Goodness of God

    June 16th, 2008 by Dim Bulb

    God is the Supreme Good. he is the Efficient Cause of all things, whence all derive their beings, and have a desire for Him in order to participate in His likeness, for the likeness to the agent is the perfection proper to each thing. Wherefore, if His very likeness is an object of desire, much more is God Himself to be desired. Hence He is not only Good, but He is simply Goodness itself. Good, therefore, belongs t Him as the Source of all perfections, and as the First Cause, not as the agent of like nature with the effect, but as One not belonging to the same order as the effect, either according to species or genus; in a super-excellent way the First Cause of all things, not of the same kind, but outside of genus, and the principle of existing creatures; whence he is called the Supreme Good.

    God only is Good by His Essence. The rule of goodness is that of the degree of perfection which is possessed, and perfection is threefold; as, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in the existence which is given by its substantial form; its second perfection is found in the accidents added to it for its perfect action, such as heat, dryness, lightness, and so on; its third perfection, that it remains in its own place.

    Such perfections as these belong to no creature by its own essence, but in that way to God only, whose Essence is His Existence, and in whom there is nothing accidental. For such things as are said to be accidental in others belong to Him essentially, as, for example, to be powerful and wise. Nor is He related to an end, for He is Himself the Last End of all things. Hence God alone has all perfections by His Essence; and so He only is essentially Good. Each thing is called good by the Divine Goodness; from the Exemplar, the First Efficient Cause and the Final End of all goodness. Each thing is good formally by its likeness to Him. This goodness is one, and it is also multiform.

    From A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA by Walter Farrell:

    Goodness

    Another caution that may not be amiss is that we have an entirely accurate notion of the particular attribute under discussion. Thus, to speak of the goodness of God in the sense of sanctimoniousness is to divorce the discussion from reality, as, well as to flavor it distastefully. The notion of goodness adds nothing to being but the smack of desirability, that is, a thing can be good, desirable, only insofar as it is possible or thought to be possible; it can be pursued and enjoyed only insofar as it has being. We do not desire an automobile that can be folded up and dropped into a purse. We can see the advantage of a servant with five arms, but we do not advertise for such a one. We do, however, have a real desire for real things–for friends, a ham sandwich, new clothes, knowledge. It is this smack of desirability that goodness adds to being which is at the root of all activity.

    Activity, then, is striving for the desirable thing, for something good; boredom, on the other hand, is the absence of knowledge of and interest in the good and is the nearest approach to stagnation to be found among living things. As a matter of fact. everything in the world has its desirable something, its goal. Concretely that goal is the completion, the perfection, the complete fulfillment of the particular creature; every creature is good in proportion as it is, it is better in proportion as it has approached its goal. Briefly, a thing is good insofar as it is real. Bluff, defect, incapacity have nothing desirable about them because there is nothing real about them. But He Who is, the cause of all reality, the perfect Being, is the highest goodness for He is the most real Being. Not that He has goodness; rather He is goodness, as He is reality. On His goodness all other goodness is modeled, from His goodness all other goodness proceeds; all other goodness is a similitude, a participation, a limited miniature of the limitless goodness of God.

    Because of the smack of desirability which goodness adds to being, God is most desirable, most lovable. So true is this that everything in the universe hustles eagerly to this goal of goodness, each in its own way: man with alert steps along the dangerous road of knowledge and love, brutes with the unerring aim of instinct, the inanimate world with the blind, plodding step of physical necessity devoid of all knowledge. For each creature in the universe is spurred on to action by the goal of its own perfection, a goal which is nothing but a similitude, an image, a mirroring of the goodness of God.

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    Good in General (A Simple Summa)

    May 3rd, 2008 by Dim Bulb

    This part of the Compendium of the Summa treats of Goodness in general and corresponds to question 5 of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica. That question is treated in six articles which you will find links to below. I have also included pertinent links to the Summa Contra Gentiles.
    ST I, 5, 1 Whether goodness differs really from being?
    ST I, 5, 2 Whether goodness is prior in idea to being? Goodness and Being are the same in substance but different according to our mode of conception; for Goodness implies the notion of desirability, where as Being is necessarily not bound up with anything of that kind. Nevertheless, as everything is good and perfect according to its actuality, a thing is good in proportion to its measure of being, which is actuality, and hence Goodness and Being are substantially the same. Being, however, is prior to Goodness in our conception of them, because a thing is knowable accordingly as it is actual; and, therefore, since Being is the proper object of the intellect, it falls under knowledge, and is thus prior to Goodness.

    ST I, 5, 3 Whether every being is good?
    ST I, 5, 4 Whether goodness has the aspect of final cause?
    Every being, as such is good, for being is actuality, which is a perfection, and this again is desirable and good in our idea of it, and hence everything is good; and good is a final cause for the reason because that which is first in the cause itself comes last in the thing which is caused; thus fire gives heat before it produces the nature of fire in its effects, although heat in the fire produces the substantial form. Hence in the process of causation we find, first, good, and the end which moves the efficient cause; secondly, the act of the efficient cause to the form; thirdly, there comes the form; and hence the contrary must be the case in the effect caused; for first is the form which makes it a being; secondly, the effective power which makes it perfect in being, because each thing is perfect accordingly as it can produce its likeness; thirdly, comes the idea of goodness which makes a thing perfect.

    ST I, 5, 5 Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
    ST I, 5, 6 Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous
    (just), the useful and the pleasant ( delectable)? The idea of Good is expressed in Mode, Species, and Order. The form makes everything what it is, and this presupposes antecedent and consequent principles, as, for instance, determination to one form or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient; and this is signified by mode; hence it is said that measure fixes the mode. The species is signified in the form because each thing is constituted in a species by the form, and tendency to the end or to action follows from the form. Further, each thing acts so far as it is in actuality and tends to that which belongs to it according to its form; and this belongs to order. hence the idea of Good implying perfection consists in mode, species, and order. So Good is properly divided into the useful, the just and the delectable. That which is desirable and terminates the movement of desire as the means wherey it tends to something else, is called useful; that which is desired as an end so as to entirely terminate desire and is desired for its own sake, is called just; and that which, being desired for its own sake, terminates desire by rest in the desired thing, is called delectable. Good is thus properly divided into these three.

    S t Thomas doesn’t deal with this subject in the SCG in isolation but in relation to God. the SCG Book One, Chapter 37 can, however, be read at this point.

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    The Simplicity of God (A Simple Summa)

    May 3rd, 2008 by Dim Bulb

    The subjects dealt with in this post are found in more detail in the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica, question 3. I have provided links to each article of question 3 as it corresponds to what is contained in the post. I’ve also provided at the end of each subject dealt with, a link to pertinent passages in the Summa Contra Gentiles; however, the SCG deals with the subject matter in a different manner than the ST, one would be better off reading Book One of the SCG, chapters 14-27 as a whole.

    ST I, 3, 1 Whether God is a body? God is not corporeal; first, because movement is not possible to a body except by an external agent-God is the First cause of motion, Himself being immovable, as was shown above; secondly, a body is a potentiality (in potentia) because, as it is continuous, it is divisible indefinitely, whereas God is the noblest of all Beings in Act; and, therefore, cannot be corporeal, a body being either living or not living, and a living body is nobler than a not living body; but a living body does not live as such, otherwise every body would live, and so it must live y another, which is the soul. That which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is, therefore, impossible that God should be corporeal. (See SCG 1, 16 and 1,20)
    ST I, 3, 2 Whether God is composed of matter and form? (See SCG 1, 17, 1, 18, )
    ST I, 3, 3 Is there composition of quiddity, essence, or nature, and subject in Him? (See SCG 1, 21)
    ST I, 3, 4
    Is He composed of essence and existence? (See SCG 1, 22)

    God is not composed of matter and form. Matter is of itself a potentiality. God is True Actuality, having no potentiality. Further, every created being is good and perfect by virtue of its form and by participation, as matter participates form; but as God is the first and highest Good, He is not Good y participation, but by His own Essence; therefore He is no composite. It is clear also, from being the First Efficient Cause, an therefore, the First Cause and acting of Himself, and Form by His own Essence, why He is not composed of matter and form. God is identified with His Essence or Nature, whereas in single forms which are their own individuality the subject is the same as the nature; therefore, God is His own Deity and His own Life, and all else that can be predicated of Him. In things composed of matter and form nature differs from the subject, because the nature or essence comprehends in itself only what falls under the definition of Species, and so it does not comprehend the individualizing matter, and thereby it is distinguished from the subject. So God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence; for whatever is in anything besides its essence must be caused either by the essence or by some external agent; but it cannot be by the essence alone, for to e its own cause of being is beyond any being. If this is caused by an external agent, it must be as regards anything that has existence and essence distinct, that it should have a cause other than itself; but with God that cannot be, for He is, we have seen, the First Efficient Cause. Further, existence when distinct from essence is related to it as act to potentiality; but God is Pure Act with not potentiality, and, therefore, He is identified with His Essence; this is evident likewise from the fact that He is the First Being, and, therefore, must Be. If His Existence and Essence were not the same, he would Be by participation, and thus He would not the First Being; which is absurd to say of God.
    ST I, 3, 5 Whether God is contained in a genus? Neither is God, properly speaking, in any genus. Species is made of genus and difference; and that from which difference comes stands towards that which makes the genus actual to the potential (thus the rational may be compared to the sensitive, as the actual to the potential, and so on); bus since in God the potential cannot be added to His Actuality, it cannot be that He should be as a species in a genus. Moreover, if God were in a genus, it must be that of Being, for genus signifies the essence of a thing, as when we predicate of a thing that is is such; but Being cannot be a genus, as Aristotle says, because every genus has differences external to its essence, whereas no difference can e external to a simple being. Therefore, God is not in a genus, for outside of Being there is only not-Being, which cannot be the difference among beings. Besides, all the members of one genus have those things in common which constitute the genus in its essence (of which it may be predicated that it is such), but they differ in their being; thus the being of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor is the being of one man the same as another’s. There is a necessary difference, therefore between being (or existence) and essence in things which are in a genus; whereas the contrary has been proved in God, and, therefore, He is not in a genus. Neither does He belong to a genus by reduction to first principles, for whatever belongs to a genus by reduction does not extend beyond it; whereas God is the First Principle of all Being, and hence He cannot be contained as the first principle in any particular genus. (See SCG 1, 25)
    ST I, 3, 6 Whether in God there are any accidents? Nor can there be any accident in God. The subject is to the accident as the potential is to the actual, and God being Pure Actuality, the potential has no place in Him. Then, as God is His own Existence, there can be nothing added to His Nature; just as heat has only heat, although a thing which is hot may have something external added to the heat, such as whiteness. Thirdly, whatever exists of itself is prior to that which is accidental. Hence, as God is the First Being, there cannot be in Him anything accidental. (See SCG 1, 23)
    ST I, 3, 7 Whether God is wholly simple? God is, therefore, wholly Simple, for in Him there is no composition nor quantitative parts, neither is his Nature distinct from His Subject. he is wholly Simple likewise because what is composite comes after its component parts, and depends upon them; whereas God is the First Being. Moreover, a thing composite has a cause for its unity; But God has no cause, being Himself the First Efficient Cause. Also, in everything which is composite there is potentiality and acutality, which have no place in God. Finally, everything which is composite is a whole separate from its parts, whether like or unlike, which can in no way be said of God, Who is His own Form, or rather His own Form, or rather His own Being, and, therefore, is wholly Simple.

    ST I, 3, 8 Whether God enters into the composition of other things? Neither does God enter into the composition of any other things, as some have erroneously thought ans said that He was the soul of the first heavens, or the formal principle of all things, or primal matter (materia prima), for God is the First Efficient Cause, and such cause is numerically distinct from the form of the effect, and only agree with it in species, as in the case of man generating a man. Matter does not agree with its efficient cause either numerically or specifically, for it is in potentia, and the latter is in actu. God, as the First Cause, is the highest, and acts by His own power; and so He is not a part of anything else. Nor can any part of a composite thing be the absolute first among beings, as God is; not matter or form, which are the principles of anything composite; for matter, which is potentiality, is simply posterior to actuality, and form, which is part likewise, is participated form which comes after that which is For by Essence. Therefore God does not enter into composition at all. (See SCG 1, 26 and 1, 27)

    From A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA by Walter Farrell:

    The most obvious implication from the proofs for the existence of God is that God is in no sense a composite or complex being; He is wholly simple. Before going on to establish the obvious character of this divine attribute of simplicity, it might be well to admit frankly that we have done such strange, contradictory things to simplicity that God might consider this particular attribute a dubious compliment. There is a great difference between the simple things we pity or patronize for their simplicity and the simple things to which we pay the tribute of profound respect and admiration. A simple-minded man is one who, through lack of ability or opportunity, does not know any better; whereas a richly simple gown is the result of supreme ability and unlimited opportunities. The simplicity of the child’s essay is altogether different from thc simplicity of the literary craftsman’s easy grace with words. In the one case we see simplicity as the mark of imperfection, in the other, as the stamp of genius; in both cases we are right, but it must be seen that we are using the word simple in decidedly different senses.

    Simplicity is a badge of imperfection and will remain so in the world of created things where perfection must be measured in terms of potentialities and their realization. Man stands at the peak of the physical universe precisely because of his rich potentialities; his life is richer, fuller, as more of those potentialities are realized, as even greater potentialities are acquired, in a word, in proportion to the increased complexity of his life. He may cast an envious glance at a cat sleeping in a sunny window; life is so simple for a cat. But the envy is not real; no man wants to spend his life curled up in sleep. particularly in a window.

    Yet this rich potentiality, the very basis of the complexity which makes up the perfection of created things, is itself a statement of imperfection. It implies imperfection; it is a declaration that something can still be had, that there is a void still to be filled up by some one some thing else. The being who has no potentialities, but only pure actuality, who is the source of all potentiality, alone escapes the stigma of imperfection and is free of the basic element of complexity. This being is utterly, completely simple; this is the being who receives nothing but gives all things. The simplicity we so admire and respect in created things, the simplicity that smacks of genius, is not really simplicity at all but the appearance of simplicity; men have succeeded in giving to rich complexity a smooth unity by a perfect coordination to a single end and we salute the faint image of divinity thus produced.

    To say that God is simple means, in the concrete, that He is in no sense composite. He is not, has not, a body; He is not a golden calf or a painted idol. He has not divinity as man has humanity; He is divinity. His nature is not a cup filled to overflowing with existence, He is not full of life; He is existence, He is life. There are no family quarrels of the gods; there is nothing in God upon which to base a difference in divine nature. He does not grow fat or thin or red in the face; His thought is not a procession of concepts as is ours, for there is nothing accidental, transient, unessential in God. Because He is simple He cannot enter into composition with others as sugar does with coffee or oxygen with hydrogen; He cannot be immersed in the inert mass of matter like Bergson’s élan vital, expending His divine life fighting free with all the agony of a boy fighting his way out of sleep. God is simple because He is the first the completely independent source of all being.

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