The Divine Lamp

• The following is an introduction written by Father William Lockhart to a short work written by Blessed Antonio Rosmini Serbati, wherein Serbati sketched a critique of the philosophies of Locke, Berkeley, and Fichte, and also presented a sketch of his own philosophy. In this introduction Father Lockhart gives a succinct description of the major point of Rosmini’s system.
  

It often happens that I am asked to say in a few words what it the characteristic principle of the system of philosophy named after Rosmini, the venerated Founder of the Order to which I have the honor to belong.

The following Short Sketch of Modern Philosophies, written by Rosmini forty years ago, but only recently published in the Italian original, seems well suited to the above purpose. I commend it to all who wish to know what Rosmini’s system is, but who have not time or inclination for studying it in his larger works; or who perhaps have only heard Rosmini spoken of as one against whom much opposition has been raised by many Catholic writers, especially by Italian members of the Jesuit Order.

On this point it may be well to say a few words. Many accusations having been laid before the Holy See against Rosmini as a theologian and philosopher, Pope Pius IX, appointed, in 1850, a special Congregation to examine and report on his works. A most searching examination was instituted of more that three years duration, made by twenty-four Consultors of the Index, all bound under oath to study thoroughly all the inculpated works, independently, without consultation with others, and in relation to the charges, more than three hundred in number, that had been brought against them. In the month of June, 1854, Pius IX presiding over the assembly of the Cardinals and Consultors of the Index, and having heard the all but unanimous verdict of acquittal, pronounced the following Decree: “All the works of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, concerning which investigation has recently been made, must be dismissed; nor has this investigation resulted in anything whatever derogatory to the good name of the author, or to the praiseworthiness of life and singular merits before the Church of the Religious Society founded by him.” To this Decree was added at the same time the following Precept of Silence: “That no new accusations and discords should arise and be disseminated in the future, silence is now for the third time enjoined on both parties by command of his Holiness.”

Being myself in Rome in the early part of the year 1854, a little before the sentence of acquittal on Rosmini’s works, I one day received a visit from the English Assistant of the General of the Jesuits, who informed me in the course of conversation that he had been sent expressly by the General to assure me, and through me the Superiors of our Institute, that the General wished it to e understood that “the opposition to our venerated Founder was not the work of the Society of Jesus, but a School in the Society.”

I have always treasured these words, because they assure me that the opposition on the part of those writers, which is as active as ever, notwithstanding the Precept of Silence, is not to be understood as committing a venerable Order, for which I feel so high an esteem; between which and ourselves I feel sure there one day e a perfect harmony of views on the subject of philosophy, since we are agreed in taking St Thomas as our master. We may differ with those writers in some of their interpretations of St Thomas’ meaning, but we both recognize in the Holy See an infallible umpire if ever it should declare any philosophical opinions to clash with any principle of Catholic Doctrine.

a few remarks on the fundamental principle of Rosmini’s philosophy may not e out of place. This concerns thee origin of ideas in the human mind.

Now the preliminary difficulty in understanding the Rosminian philosophy is that it goes deeper than what are popularly assumed to be the first principles of human thought. It undertakes to account for ideas. But to many people it has never occurred that there is any difficulty in this matter requiring explanation. They have been used to assume with Locke and others, more or less of the same school, that the formation of ideas is so simple that it does not require to e accounted for. It is assumed to e a simple fact like sensation. They say “We have sensations, and we have ideas; the sensations come first, and they are transformed into ideas y the faculty of reflection.”

Those who talk thus are not aware that between sensations and ideas they have jumped a gulch which is not less than infinite!

This mental condition reminds me of a conversation I once overheard in a railway carriage between two countrymen. “John,” said to one, “how about this railway telegraph; how do they send messages by it?” “Oh,” said the other, “it is very simple. You see them wires along the line. They run from London to York. They are fastened to a thing at each end with a dial plate and hands to it like a clock, with letters all round, and when they turn the hands in London this’,n and that’n, the hands in York goes that’n and this’n.” “Ah,” said the other, “it seems very simple when you have it explained.”

Much like this is the state of mind of those who do not see any difficulty in the formation of ideas, and serenely talk, as Locke and his school do, of “sensations eing transformed into ideas by means of the faculty of reflection.” They ignore the crucial point in philosophy, much like the countryman who explained the electric telegraph, omitting all mention of electricity-that occult and mysterious force which is behind the phenomena. (See note 1)
The fundamental principle of Rosmini’s philosophy concerns, as I have said, the origin of ideas-how the ideas or thoughts of things arise in our mind. For, it is certain that whenever that modification of our sensitivity which we term our sensation takes place, we immediately and necessarily think, not of the sensation within us, but of a something outside of us to which we attribute existence, call it a thing, and credit it with being the cause of our sensations; so that we actually attribute to it the qualities of heat or cold, blackness, whiteness, or the like, which, when we reflect or think again, we know exists within our own sensitivity only.

This mental process is obviously a judgment, in which we predicate the existence of a cause of our sensation. To say nothing at present of the idea of cause; it is clear that we could not apply the predicate of existence unless we knew what existence is, that is to say, unless we had the idea of existence already in our mind. We have thus two modes of knowledge to e carefully distinguished from each other-knowledge by judgment, whereby we affirm the reality of individual things-knowledge by intuition, whereby we intellectually think pure ideas. With this fundamental distinction in view I now Proceed to trace the origin and show the relative position of these two modes of thought. A little reflection will make it clear that the idea goes before the judgment, and is necessary for it formation.

We are said to know a thing when we apply to it the idea of existence or judge that it is an existing thing.

That which is no thing is unthinkable, for the object of thought-the idea of existence-is gone. And this shows that the idea of existence is the necessary object of thought, as St Thomas says, “Objectum intellectus est vel verum commune” . It is the first idea, without which we can form no judgment and know nothing. It is plain, therefore, that the idea of existence must be self-known (per se nota), otherwise we should be incapable of knowing it or of knowing anything. And this is the same as to say that it must be the first idea and the one innate idea in the human mind. (see note 2)
But how does this idea of existence make its appearance in the mind?

Not as a product of the senses, for we are obliged to apply this idea on occasion of each sensation, in order to form that idea of the thing which necessarily arises in our mind on occasion of each sensation. In the following brief treatise Rosmini shows very clearly from the very nature of the idea of existence, which is the formal part of all our ideas, why this idea can not come from the senses. He shows that the sensations are limited to the particular impression made on our sensorium, whereas ideas are unlimited, and can be applied ad infinitum to any number of beings, and to any number of the same genus or species. (see note 3). Now the idea of a thing is the same as the logical possibility of the thing. That which is possible was always possible, and is therefore eternal, and that which is eternal is divine, therefore Rosmini teaches that ideas are in a certain sense divine, i.e., because they have divine characteristics.

The idea, therefore, is so totally distinct from the sensations, so immensely elevated above them, that it is absurd to suppose it to be the product of sensations, because no effect can rise higher than its source; although it is, at the same time, an obvious fact that the ideas are made known to us on occasion of the sensations. In a word the sensations furnish the material element, the innate idea of existence, the formal element, of all the ideas we form by aid of the senses.

If then the idea of existence is not a product of sensation, yet if on occasion of the sensations we always find in our mind, it is clear that we find there what has there before, which was never formed but which was given from without, by means of another faculty, that of intelligence, which, as Rosmini teaches, is endowed with the intuition of the idea of existence by God, in whose Mind the idea of existence, and of all existences was from all eternity. This is expressed by St Thomas when he says: “Deus cognoscendo se cognoscit naturam universalis entis” SCG, I. 50).

And, indeed, this is self-evident if we believe in God as the infinitely intelligent Creator, willing and therefore knowing every particle of creation from all eternity.

These ideas of possible being in the mind of God are the types according to which He created all things, by an act of His free will, selecting out of all possible things such as He saw it was for the best to create. Thus an architect forms in his own mind the design which he intends to draw or to build, selecting also for good reasons, not always the thing most perfect in itself, but that which is best, all the circumstances being considered.

In like manner, regarding the communication of ideas; (to carry out the same analogy), the architect may if he pleases keep his idea to himself, or if he pleases he may communicate it or any portion of it to another mind, and then it becomes the thought or idea of that other; yet it would still be the original idea in essence, and the idea of the originator would always stand objectively to the recipient, as something distinct from his own subjectivity.

Analogously to this we say that the idea of existence, and the ideas of existences, which we find in our mind, and which were elicited on occasion of the sensations, are the same that were originally in the mind of God, Who, seeing all creation, saw even the modes in which the forces of the universe would make themselves perceived by us, and be classed as things, objects, or beings (see note 4). These ideas, Rosmini teaches, could come into our minds only by communication from God, through the intellectual faculty, or intuition of the idea of existence, which combines with the sensations that are perceived by us, in the unity of the identical human subject, which is at once sensitive and intelligent. Thus it is the identical Ego or self which feels and knows, and the result is the intellectual perception of objects, or the formation of ideas and the application of them (see note 5).

St Thomas says: “Esse in quantum est esse non potest esse diversum” (SCG I, 52). The idea, therefore, of existence or of possible being in the mind of God is the same essence of being as the idea of existence in the mind of man. It must, therefore, be a communication to man of some thing that considered in itself is Divine, since the ideas in God are His Divine substance. In God they are God. But if so, it is objected “to suppose man to be by nature in communication with the Divine substance is the error of the Ontologists and tends logically to Pantheism.” Rosmini replies, in his answer to Gioberti, “that the human mind has only the intuition of a light which descends from God and which is, therefore, an appurtenance of God. Now every appurtenance of God is God, if we consider it as it is in God, but if we consider it abstracting from all the rest that makes the reality of God, it is an appurtenance of God, as the Divine Goodness and the Divine Wisdom are appurtenances of God but not God himself, for God is not Wisdom or Goodness only. Thus although in God there are no real distinctions except those of the three Divine Persons, God is able to distinguish mentally His ideas from His Divine substance; and a man likewise can abstract his ideas from himself and may impart his ideas or a part of his idea to his fellow man without imparting his own substance, so God may abstract His ideas from Himself, and may communicate His ideas or some part of them, such as the idea of existence or being, without communicating to man His Own Divine substance. He may manifest His idea without manifesting His Reality or subsistence, and to the objection of Gioberti (that “this idea must be God, because everything is either God or a creature, but the idea of being is not a creature seeing it has Divine characters, therefore it must be God”), Rosmini replies, “Every real being must be God or creature, but not so every ideal being. The idea of being abstracted from God’s reality is neither God nor creature, it is something sui generis, an appurtenance of God.”

The idea of existence is the light of the mind, according to the analogy with the material light, so that the light of reason is the name given universally to the informing constitutive principle of the intellectual faculty. For as it is y the material light that our eye is enlightened so as to receive the impressions of form and color which aid us to distinguish one thing from another (and without this light the whole universe would remain for us perfectly dark); so the idea of existence is the light of our mind, by which we actually distinguish objects and know existences, on occasion of our eye being enlightened by the material light, or on receiving other sensitive impressions.

The light of reason is, according to Rosmini, what Philosophy, following the lines traced out by Aristotle, defines as the Lumen intellectus agentis, and of which St Thomas says that it is participatio Luminis in nobis impress, seu participatio Lucis aeternae.

St John tells us, Deus erat Verbum…erat Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum-“The Word of God is the light that enlightens every man coming into the world.”

It is this “idea of existence” or “light of being” given to man which constitutes the objectivity of truth, as seen by the human mind. For truth is that which is, as falsehood is that which is not. It is this which makes man intelligent and gives him a moral law y which he sees the beingness or essence of things, and recognizes the duty of his own being, to act towards each being whether finite or infinite, creature or God, according to the beingness or essence of being which he eholds in the light of the truth of being.

Thus, according to Rosmini, is secured the objectiveness of truth; and the high rule of morality and religion is summed up in the grand sentence of Rosmini which he shows to be the divine imperative in the conscience of man, “Riconoscere l’ente secondo la sua entita”- “Recognize being according to the beingness that is in it.” He shows, too, that this same principle of natural reason, when sublimated by Divine Grace, becomes the great principle of faith and charity, dictating to us the duty, and giving the power of loving God above all things and our neighbor as ourselves, inspiring the soul of man to perform deeds of supernatural self-sacrifice, arising from the intimate sense of the presence of God in the soul, and the conviction of the nothingness of all things, except as they give glory to God, by being used according to the infinitely perfect will of God, in which He designed the universe, and which he causes man to know by the natural and supernatural light, and by the external manifestations of His Providence.
Notes:

1. Every sensation is particular; reflection simply reproduces the particular, imagination pictures it; but ideas are universal, and all involve the idea of existence which is the most universal of all. how do we get the universal?
2. It does not account for the origin of the idea of existence in our minds to say we have in us a faculty endowed with the virtue of acquiring the idea of existence on occasion of the sensations. The question is, what is the nature of this faculty? For, in order that this faculty may be able to operate must it not be itself in act? Surely that which is not in act, does not exist, and therefore can not operate. For a faculty is nothing but a “first act (actus primus) whence “second acts” (actus secundi), or what we commonly call “acts,” may proceed. Now the first act of the intellectual faculty-the act by which this faculty exists-must in the very nature of things, e an intellectual act; else the faculty would not be intellectual; and if the act is intellectual it must consist in the vision or intuition of an object; because this is what is meant by an intellectual act. The very etymology of intellectus (derived from intus legere, to read within) shows this clearly. The act of reading necessarily implies the act of seeing; and there can be no seeing without something which is seen; in other words, without the intelligent subject, and the object which this subject looks at and thus understands. The thing seen-the object present a initio to the intelligent subject-the constitutive form of the human understanding (vis intellectiva), is existence, being, and this is the light of reason.

3. Rosmini makes the faculty and art of language, as taught to man by the tradition of human society, a chief factor in the formation of abstract ideas, for words are sensible signs of ideas, and stand as sensible representations of ideal things, enabling us to form classes of things in our mind-genera and species, which are all abstract ideas.

4. Qui cognoscit perfecte naturam universalem, omnes modos cognoscit in quibus illa natura potest haberi (SCG I, 50).

5. Rosmini teaches that there is a spiritual as well as a corporeal sense, and that the soul feels itself as it knows itself.

Article1.  various aspects of the difficulty.

134.  As I have already observed, all the principal philosophers have fallen on the difficulty so often mentioned, as upon a rock standing in the way, so to speak, of their philosophical course.

It has always been so in the solution of great problems.  A great problem is nothing but a great difficulty to be overcome.  Now, we must not imagine that in the proposing of difficulties a philosopher has his own free choice, as though he knew or surmised them all beforehand, and could take up for consideration whichever of them he pleased.  If difficult problems have been solved only after the lapse of many ages, this arose not so much from the greatness of the difficulty involved in them, as from the circumstance that they were not known.  It may be said with truth, that a difficulty once brought under the notice of men is already half solved, and that it is sometimes brought under the notice of the learned by a mere accident.  This we see, for instance, in the case of oscillations of Galileo’s lamp, to which mathematical science owes its theory on isochronous arcs; and in that of the falling of the apple, which resulted in Newton’s system of universal gravitation.

But it is not sufficient that the difficulties be seen in any sort of way.  To be solved aright, they must be seen aright.  The tardiness of their solution is in great part to be attributed to the length of time which must elapse before the state of the question can be presented to the student with simplicity and fulness, so that he may look at it, not merely sideways, on occasion of his thinking of some other thing, but straight in the face.

This is precisely what has happened in reference to our difficulty.  Thrown in the path of nearly all philosophers, it was nevertheless lightly passed over by them, because they had not made it the direct object of their inquiries; while the greater number of them saw it only in a confused way and under an accidental form.

I take note of this in order that I may deal fairly by those authors; for it seems nothing but equitable to believe, that, had they only been able to put the difficulty to themselves as clearly as we now can, thanks to the labors which they accomplished, and of which we reap the benefit, they would have solved it quite as well as we.

135.  To recapitulate, then, the various accidents which have placed our difficulty in the way of modern philosophers:-

Locke stumbled upon it when obliged to speak of the idea of substance, and also when coming to define the term knowledge-he perceived that he could not define it without having recourse to judgments.  Condillac came very close to it when he had to distinguish ideas from sensations, and to treat of general ideas.   Reid did the same thing while seeking to account for the persuasion we have of the existence  of external bodies; for he then discovered that Locke had erred in making the  development of the human mind begin with acquired ideas, and that the acquisition of ideas presupposed an original and natural judgment.  And how was the difficulty seen y the late Dugald Stewart, who had been in his time the mainstay of the meritorious Scottish school?  He also went very near  it, though not near enough to  see it clearly.  This was on the occasion of his trying to explain how general ideas can  be formed through the imposition of names to things.  Let us examine carefully how it faired with him.

Article 2.  Dugald Stewart Grounds His Theory On A Passage Of Adam Smith.

136.  In that chapter of his ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND where he undertakes to treat of the faculty of abstraction, Dugald Stewart quotes a passage from the DISSERTATION ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE, by Adam Smith, which as it contains the principal idea of his theory on abstraction, I shall insert here.

• •  ”The assignation of particular names to denote particular objects- that is, the institution of nouns substantive-would probably be one of the first steps towards the formation of language.  The particular cave whose covering sheltered the savage from the weather; the particular tree whose fruit relieved his hunger; the particular fountain whose water allayed his thirst, would first be denominated by the words cave, tree, fountain, or by whatever other appellations he might think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark them.   Afterwards, when the more enlarged experience of this savage had led him to observe, and his necessary occasions obliged him to make mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other fountains, he would naturally bestow upon each one of those new objects the same name y which he had been accustomed to express the similar object he was first acquainted with.  And thus those words, which were originally the proper names of individuals, would each of them insensibly become the common name of a multitude.
  • “It is this application,” continues Smith, “of the name of an individual to a great number of objects whose resemblance naturally recalls the idea of that individual and of the name which expresses it, that seems originally to have given occasion to the formation of those classes and assortments, which in the schools are called genera and species, and of which the ingenious and eloquent Rousseau finds himself so much at a loss to account for the origin.  What constitutes a species is merely a number of objects bearing a certain degree of resemblance to one another, and on that account denominated by a single appellation, which may be applied to express one of them.” (Chapter 4, sec 1)

137.  This mode of explaining how the ideas of genera and species are formed, seems at first sight very easy and natural.  But if we diligently search into it we shall find that the explanation, its plausibility notwithstanding, is no better than an illusion.  I look upon it as one of those explanations which, owing to the seductively elegant form in which they are presented, divert the minds of unwary readers from things contained in it.  Being charmed with the pleasing smoothness with which the argument seems to proceed, these readers do not think it necessary to verify for themselves what is said, but confidingly take its truth for granted.  As regards myself, however, having been taught by a painful experience that under reasonings of the most plausible kind there often lie errors pregnant with numerous evil consequences, I must be forgiven if, before accepting the reasoning above quoted, I consider it my right as well as my duty to scan carefully.

133.  Such, then, is the nature of the controversy between Locke and Reid.  Both sides find themselves in such a position that, although very well able to destroy, they are utterly incapacitated by their principles from building up a theory that will bear examination.

Reduced to its simplest form, the question upon which they differ may be stated as follows:-

Locke says to Reid, “Ideas must be anterior to judgments, because it is absurd to suppose that a comparison can be made between two things which do not as yet exist;” and his reason seems to be evident.  Reid replies, “Judgments must be anterior to ideas because it is impossible for us to form the idea of a thing before we have judged that the thing exists:” and his reason seems also to be evident.  How are these two propositions, each apparently true, and yet mutually contradictory, to be reconciled?

As we have already seen, the difficulty involved in these propositions ultimately reduces itself to the origin of the idea of existence.  I trust that the theory I shall set forth at length in the second volume will offer a satisfactory solution of this important question, which forms the whole theme of the present work

Article 10.  The Part in Which the System of Reid Holds Good as Against That of His Adversaries.

130.  Nevertheless, from all that has been argued thus far we may see that the system of Reid has in it a very strong point as compared with that of his adversaries.

We will suppose that Reid, having by some means of other discovered the error he had committed through giving an undue extension to his thesis, had wisely corrected himself.  This would have entitled him to speak with force to his adversaries in the following way: “I am willing to acknowledge that the interior judgment by which we affirm the real existence of the things which strike our senses, is composed of to elements-the idea of existence and of sensation.  Still you must on your part admit, that at the very moment in which we receive the sensations, our intellectual nature obliges us to affirm the presence of a being, to make that judgment which I call original, and natural: not, indeed, because it precedes all ideas, for, as I now find, to say this would be a contradiction, but because it precedes all other judgments.”

In truth, the real merit of the system of Reid consists in his having fully grasped the fact that no sooner does our sense happen to be affected by the action of external agents than we necessarily affirm their existence, y “a simple act,” as he says, though he is wrong when he adds “y an act  which cannot be defined.”

What I have said in the preceding article proves that there is no need in this case of admitting a principle wholly sui generis, incapable of explanation, a sort of occult quality, a philosophical arcannum.

131.  If Reid had clearly seen in what consisted the deficiency of the system of his predecessors in the philosophical arena, he, instead of insisting upon the necessity of placing judgments before ideas, would have ascended higher, and, to use his own phrase, brought a “more refined chemical analysis” to bear on those simple apprehensions which are supposed y his adversaries to precede the persuasion and judgment of the existence of external objects.

Even from this side he could have driven them to close quarters by arguing as follows: “You suppose that the simple apprehensions or ideas of things precede the judgment we make on their real existence, and you therefore describe the development of the human mind as proceeding in accordance with this principle.”

Now, I find a great difficulty here; for it seems to me that you cannot have the idea or simple apprehension of a thing except by means of a judgment.

To see whether I am right or not, let us come to particulars.  Let us take, for example, the idea or simple apprehension of a horse,  I ask, “On what condition is it possible for me to have this idea or simple apprehension?  If, as your books positively state, I get it by abstracting from the perception which I now have, or formerly had, of some  particular horse, it is evident that this perception, of the horse in the concrete, together with the affirmation and persuasion of its existence, which this perception implies, has preceded the idea or simple apprehension.  Indeed, how could I make an abstraction if there was nothing for me to abstract?   Therefore, your two assertions-first, that the simple ideas of things precede all the judgments which we make on them; and, second, that these ideas originate in abstraction-are in palpable contradiction with each other.”

132.  Nay, he could have pushed his argument still further, thus: You say “that the simple ideas of things are anterior to all our judgments;” but if you will take pains to analyze any one of these ideas, you will find that it necessarily includes a judgment.  Let us keep to the idea of a horse.  When you conceive a horse, even though apart from its subsistence, present or past, what are you really thinking of?  is the object of your thought so simple that it cannot be decomposed into several distinct ideas, or is it not rather the contrary?  Assuredly, if I think of a horse in the abstract,  I think (1) of a being, and (2) of all those constitutive of it by which the idea of a being in general becomes determined to that particular kind of being which is called  horse.

Therefore, this idea is composed of two kinds of ideas’ (1) the idea of a being in general, and (2) the ideas of of those constitutives whose aggregate gives the idea of the nature of a horse-an idea much less extended than the first.

Let us now see how these two ideas come to be so bound up together as to make but one idea.

A very little reflection will suffice to show that the narrower is conceived by us as existing in the wider idea; which is the same thing as to say that we conceive the horse as belonging to the class of  beings; or, against, that to have the idea of a horse is to have the idea of a being possessed of those determinations which constitute the animal known by the name of horse.  

Now, from this analysis it is easy to see that the idea of horse has in it all the requisites of a complete judgment.

To make a judgment (1) there must be two terms, the one less extended than the other; and (2) the less extended term must be conceived as existing in the more extended.   And both these conditions we have found in the idea of horse as just explained.

Therefore ,the simple apprehension of a finite thing is itself a complex idea, and such as to include a judgment.  It is one of those ideas which cannot be formed except by comparing or joining together other ideas or apprehensions.

Therefore, the proposition that “the simple apprehension of things is anterior to all the judgments which we make on them,” must be considered as altogether untenable.  (Excerpted from The Origin of Ideas, Vol 1 by Antonio Rosmini)

Article 9. Defect Common To Reid And His Adversaries.

121. The adversaries of Reid have certainly the best of the argument so long as there is only question of the demonstrating that to make a first judgment without some idea pre-existing in the mind is an impossibility; but they are not equally fortunate when they have to defend the proposition that “The simple apprehension or pure idea of a thing precedes the judgment which affirms its real existence.”

On the one hand, this proposition seems quite true; for how can I judge that a being exists of which I have no idea? Looking, therefore, at the matter under this aspect, it would appear that the idea or simple apprehension of that being must precede the judgment on its subsistence.

But, on the other hand, this is altogether contradicted by experience. To anyone who looks at this matter in the light of experience, it must be obvious that, as regards external things, we in the first place, for a concrete idea of them-i.e. an idea couples with the actual perception and persuasion of their real existence, and that only latter do we draw from it (by abstracting from this perception and persuasion) that pure idea which is called simple apprehension. For instance, who thinks of a purely ideal or possible horse without ever having seen some particular horse in actual existence?

122. This knot of the question was not clearly seen either by Reid or by his opponents. hence it came to pass that each side could successfully attack the position of the other, while it was unable to defend its own.

Reid confounded together two questions which are very different. For it is one thing to ask “whether a judgment on the real existence of external things can be made y us without some universal idea pre-existing in our mind;” and another thing to ask “whether, before we can make that judgment, we must have the simple apprehension or abstract idea of the things themselves.

The adversaries of Reid answered the latter question in the affirmative, and in this they were wrong.

Now, Reid did not restrict himself to opposing them on this particular ground, which would have been enough to overthrow their system. He further undertook to prove that we affirm the existence of external things by an original judgment, not only without possessing the simple apprehension of the things themselves, but also without possessing any universal ideas at all; that is, by a judgment wholly involved in darkness and mystery.

By thus unnecessarily widening the controversy, Reid damaged his cause in such a manner that his adversaries, although silenced by his argument as against themselves, could nevertheless turn around upon him, and convict him of grievous error.

In fact, it does not require much effort to see that no one can make a judgment who does not possess some universal idea; and, therefore, the thesis which Reid, in his zeal for the truth, undertook to maintain, was exaggerated and altogether untenable.

Moreover, the task of showing to his adversaries, by an appeal to experience, that our first judgments on the real existence of external things must precede the simple ideas of them, was an easy one; but it was far from easy to find a satisfactory answer to the formidable question:-”How can I judge that a thing exists of which I have no idea?”

The answer to this question would have led the Scottish philosopher very far in his investigations; but whether it was that he despaired of finding it, or that he considered it of no importance, he did not even seek for it. He contented himself with enveloping his “original judgment” in a cloud of mystery, thus, possibly, to screen it from all further questionings on the part of inquisitive minds.

123. There could be only one way of finally settling the point. This was by devising a system where the object judged to exist, was the effect of the judgment itself, or, which comes to the same, “where the specific ideas of things were produced by the self-same act which affirmed the real existence of those things.” The whole difficulty, therefore, lay in finding a judgment of this description.

124. Now, by passing in review the various species of judgments which we make on things, we find that, so long as the judgment is merely about some quality belonging to a thing, the idea of that thing necessarily exists in our mind before the judgment, as well as before the idea of the quality which the judgment attributes to it. On the contrary, when the judgment is such as to fall on the existence of itself of the thing, then the idea of the thing judged of is not in our mind prior to, but in virtue of, this judgment. For until a thing is thought of by us as existent, either really or potentially, it is nothing so far as we are concerned; it is not an object of our thought, an idea. Therefore the judgment by which we affirm the existence of things different in this from all other judgments, is itself the producer of its object, This fact shows that such a judgment is possessed of a peculiar and almost creative energy which eminently deserves the attention of the philosopher. For us, then, the object begins to exist, at the very most, simultaneously with the judgment of which I am speaking.

125. About this power three questions may be asked:-

1. How is it moved to think of a thing as existent?
2. hence does it draw the universal idea of existence which is indispensable for forming that thought?
3. How does it come to limit that universal idea to a determinate thing, in such a way that this thing, and not any other, is the object it thinks of as existent?

126. The first and third of these questions are easily answered by the aid of experience.

For our understanding is moved both to think of an object as existent, and to determine it as such or such, y the sensations. These produce in us a certain modification, and in response to that modification we say to ourselves, “That which causes in me these sensations exists.”

The only difficulty, then, is as to how we come by the idea of existence, without which it would be impossible for us to make that judgment whereby we know for the first time that a certain external thing exists, Here is the great problem of ideology.

127.  To recapitulate in other words.   To the question, “How can I judge that a thing exists of which I have as yet no idea?”  the answer is as follows: This judgement includes two parts; first, the thought of existence (or being) in general, and secondly, the thought of the particular thing which I have now before me, with all its determining properties.

So long as I think only of existence in general, or not determined in any way, I make no judgment.  I begin to judge when I apply the thought, or determine it to this or that particular thing.

Now, suppose that I were already in possession of the idea of existence (or being) in general; all that I should then require in order to make the judgment “Such or such a thing exists,” would be the sensations, for they would give me the determination of the existence (being) which by the hypothesis is present to my mind.  The whole difficulty therefore reduces itself to explaining the origin of the idea of being, the great sine qua non in all first judgments.

128.  But, whatever be the origin of this idea, let us for the present continue to speak on the supposition that we have it prior to all our judgments on the actual existence of this or that determinate and sensible thing.

In this case the judgments may be very easily explained and analyzed in the following manner:

We are by nature at once sentient and intelligent; that is to say, we are endowed with both sense and understanding.

The sense is the faculty of perceiving things in so far as sensible; the understanding is the faculty of perceiving things as existent in themselves.  

Now he reason why all that is perceived by our sense becomes the  object of our understanding is, because WE who experience the sensations are the identical human subjects who are also possessed of understanding.

Given, therefore, that our sense has perceived the sensible qualities, what will be the intellectual operation which we exercise on them?

The understanding, as I have said, is the faculty of perceiving things as existent in themselves.  It will therefore perceive the “sensibles”- not as the sense perceives them-i.e. not in the intimate relation they have with ourselves in so far as they sensations-but as existing in themselves independently of us.  Now, to perceive in this manner is nothing but to judge that there is a being outside of us wherein are the sensible qualities; although as to how those qualities are in it (and certainly there must be a way in which they  can be there), this first judgment does not make any pronouncement.

Let us, then, seize well on the difference between the two species of judgments which are made by us on external objects.

One species consists of those judgments by which we simply think of a quality as existent in a being of which we have already the idea.  Thus when I say, “This man is blind,” I attribute the quality of blindness to a person whom I already know, and to whom my judgment refers.

By the judgments of the other species, on the contrary, we think of a being as adhering to certain sensible qualities.  Such is the judgment we make when we say to ourselves, “Here is a being determined by these and these qualities which fall under my senses.”

In the first species, the object exists to us antecedently to the judgment we make on it; in the second, the object does not exist prior to the judgment, but only the elements  of it-that is, (1) the sensations, not yet become cognitions; (2) the idea of existence, which illumines the sensations by adding being to them, and causes them to be known in and through being.

To conclude: judgment does not always refer to an object previously thought of, but it sometimes refers to the “sensibles” which become objects of our thought in virtue of the act of judgment itself.

129.   First Question:  “is it necessary that the simple apprehension, or pure idea, of the external objects should e in our mind antecedently to the judgment by which we affirm their actual existence?”

Answer:  No; it is only necessary that we should have the sense-perception of the sensible qualities.

The mistake of the adversaries of Dr Reid in thinking  that we have first the idea of a thing, and then form the judgment on its existence, arose from their not having well mastered the distinction between a sensation and an idea.  By confounding these two things together, and at the same time seeing that it is only by the sensations that we are led to judge of the existence of a body, they concluded that before making this judgment we must have the idea of that body.  Had they reflected that the sensations give us the   particular sensible qualities only, whereas by an idea we think of a being endowed with those qualities, they would easily have seen, that our idea of a body presupposes a judgment-I mean, that judgment which to the particular sensible qualities supplied to us by the sensations joins the thought of existence and thus forms the idea of the body determined by the qualities which actually fall under our senses,  This idea is the object understood by us, and it is formed, as I have said, by the judgment itself.  Then reflection comes in and by considering the object apart from the persuasion of its actual existence-that is to say, leaving it before the mind in a state of pure possibility-forms that species of abstraction which the Schoolmen called simple apprehension.

    Second Question:   “is it necessary that before making that judgment by which we affirm for the first time the existence of a body, we should be in possession of some universal idea.”

Answer:  Undoubtedly it is; because a judgment not preceded by some universal idea is an impossibility; and to have overlooked this truth was the great blunder of Reid.  He admitted an original judgment, qualifying it as mysterious and incapable of any explanation.  Now, it is certainly in some cases lawful for a philosopher to admit a principle which he declares to be mysterious, and, if you will, utterly inexplicable; but it is none of the attributes of a philosopher to admit an absurdity: and a judgment made independently of all universal ideas is an absurdity.  Nor is it less unbecoming in a philosopher to lay down a principle and at the same time not to examine the conditions which are necessary to make it possible: for in that case, even if the principle were not shown to be manifestly absurd, the fact of its not having been examined would at least leave a doubt as to its truth.  Now, an antecedent universal idea is a condition absolutely necessary for that judgment by which we affirm for the first time the existence of a body.  Therefore, Dr Reid should not have abruptly suspended the process of analyzing the “original and natural judgment” on which he based his theory, but should have prosecuted it until he found whether or not it had all the essential requisite for its formation.

Article 7. Dr. Reid Maintains, Against Locke, That The First Operation Of The human Mind Is, Not Analytic, But synthetic.
117 Dr. Reid considers that the above is the only satisfactory account of the formation of our mind begin by synthesis, and not by analysis. Accordingly he proceeds as follows:-

“It is the operations of the mind, in this case, as with natural bodies, which are indeed compounded of simple principles or elements. Nature does not exhibit these elements separate, to be compounded by us; she exhibits them mixed and compounded in concrete bodies, and it is only by art and chemical analysis that they can be separated. (Reid: “An Inquiry, & c., chap. 2. sec. 4)

Article 8. The System Proposed By Dr. Reid Cannot Be Considered Satisfactory.
118. It must e admitted that the adversaries of Dr. Reid can have nothing to say against his description of the facts. Most undoubtedly, the simple apprehension of an object, or the concept of it divested of the persuasion of its existence, cannot be had by us until we have perceived that the object as existent, and then by an intellectual operation divided it from the persuasion of its existence, and considered it only in that abstract state.

119. But if Dr. Reid’s appeal to the fact as presented to observation is the decisive against his adversaries, they may in their turn take the offensive, and show him that the system which he would substitute for theirs is not by any means free from objection.
Their rejoinder might e expressed in some such form as the following:-

“We will for the sake of argument suppose that the intimate persuasion of the existence of the things perceived by man is, as you have said, antecedent to the simple apprehension of them, and that this apprehension is the result of an abstraction which man exercises on the judgment whereby he has affirmed their existence. Yet we fail to see in this proof that you have gone up to the first and highest of the facts of the human spirit in connection with the origin of ideas. You suppose that the first product of the action of the human spirit is composite; for such is that persuasion which you place before simple apprehension. In short, you make the development of man’s intellectual life start, not from ideas, but from judgments. Now this is precisely what we cannot understand. To say that the composite goes before the simple, judgment before ideas, seems to us a contradiction in terms. We will explain ourselves more fully.

“if as you assert, the first operation of the human spirit is a judgment, you must concede that it is, not a simple, but a composite operation-i.e. resulting from several elements.

“It is true that you qualify this judgment by the epithets of natural and original; which is tantamount to saying that man makes it by necessity, by an intrinsic force or, as you express it, a certain ‘inspiration’ (Essay 2. chap 6). But this does not make it any the less a veritable judgment, and you yourself call it so. Indeed, how can a man be persuaded of the existence of a being until he has said within himself, ‘This being exists’? and what is this interior pronouncement but a judgment by which existence is attributed to being?

“We beg to repeat it, it is quite immaterial whether this judgment which is immediately conjoined with the sensations be made from an internal and natural movement which man cannot resist, or whether it e made freely: in either case its nature as a judgment remains unchanged. So far it seems that we are agreed.

“You may, if you like, change the formula, and instead of saying, ‘I judge that this being exists,’ say, ‘I feel that this being exists,’ or, ‘My consciousness tells me that what I now perceive by my senses has existence;’ or you may use some other still more accurate expression. But the self-same concept of a true and complete judgment will remain. It will always be true that you inwardly feel that there is a relation of identity between what affects your senses and existence; and that to feel this is the same as to make a judgment. There is, therefore, no gainsaying the fact, that the natural and original judgment which you have laid down as the basis of your theory is a judgment in the strictest sense of the word, and must precede our persuasion of the existence of external things.

“But if so, you certainly begin the development of man’s intellectual life, not by a simple but by a composite operation, by the conjunction of a predicate with a subject; for this, and nothing else, is what all philosophers, your ownself included, understand by a judgment. Thus, in the judgment we are discussing (”such or such a thing really exists”), existence is the predicate, and the “sensible,” or the thing in so far as felt, is the subject.

“we ask, therefore, how can a man thus join the predicate of existence with the thing which affects his senses, unless he be already in possession of these two elements? And how can you, therefore, call this judgment original in the sense that it is not preceded in man by any knowledge? If to make such a judgment it is necessary, on the one hand, to experience the sensation, and, on the other, to have the idea of existence, surely you must acknowledge that this operation is not original, but preceded by two simpler operations, of feeling the sensation, and intueing the idea of existence. The fact of the judgment taking place immediately upon our experiencing the sensations in no way invalidates the force of our argument. The two elementary operations must exist before they can be conjoined.

120. “Now, think, if you please, of the idea of existence. The object seen in this idea is a universal, and you assume it without giving any account whatever of its origin in our mind. It is a necessary element in the formation of the judgment; it is simpler than the judgment, and must precede it, logically at least. With what consistency , then, can you charge us with error for maintaining that man’s intellectual development begins with ideas, when you do the very same y representing it as strting with a judgment which is necessarily conditional upon an antecedent idea?”

Article 5. Objection Urged By Reid Against Locke.
115. Reid, then, perceived that the system of Locke was defective, and although he did not clearly see in what the defect consisted, he was nevertheless in a position to urge some weighty objections against it.
He presented the whole problem of the origin of ideas in the following form: “Does simple apprehension of things precede the judgment which affirms their existence, as Locke and his followers maintain, or, is the simple apprehension preceded by this judgment?”
of these two alternatives, he declared for the second.
“It is acknowledged by all,” he says, “that sensation must go before memory and imagination; and hence it necessarily follows that apprehension, accompanied with belief and knowledge, must go before simple apprehension, at least in the matter we are speaking of. So that here, instead of saying that the belief or knowledge is got by putting together and comparing the simple apprehensions, we ought rather to say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analysing a NATURAL AND ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.” (Reid: An Inquiry, &c., chap 2. sec. 4.)
Article 6. Reid Places Judgment Before Ideas.
116. Certainly in the words just quoted there is a flash of light.
Dr. Reid see quite clearly that the supposition of his adversaries, that man acquires in the first place the simple apprehension of things, and then, through comparisons and judgments, the persuasion of their real existence, is inadmissible.
His adversaries, on the other hand, saw not less clearly that it is impossible for a man to be intimately persuaded that a certain thing exists, without affirming its existence y a judgment. But they saw, at the same time, that no man can make a judgment if he is supposed to be wholly devoid of ideas. They imagined, therefore, that the persuasion of the existence of the things perceived was not contemporaneous with the perception itself, but followed afterwards, when man, having already perceived the things, is in possession of their ideas, and can compare these together, and through this comparison make the judgment affirmatory of the real existence of things, and thus have the persuasion in question.
But to Dr. Reid this “appears to be all fiction,” prompted by the love of system, and “without any foundation in nature.”
In his opinion, an unprejudiced observation of the facts as it really takes place, will show that we perceive external things by means of our senses, and that thereupon we instantly make “A NATURAL AND ORIGINAL JUDGMENT” which persuades us of the real existence of those things. The perception having thus been formed, we, by an act of abstraction, separate the things from their real existence, present as well as past, and contemplate them purely in that manner which is called simple apprehension, or the concept of a thing divested of the persuasion and thought of its real existence.

Article 4

The difficulty found by Dr. Reid in the system of Locke had in some way been perceived by Locke himself.

113. If writers would only listen attentively to the voice of their own conscience, they would probably avoid much of the adverse criticism which is heaped on them y the public. For it seldom happens that anything deservedly reprehensible is found by the public in their productions, of which the authors themselves had not beforehand some secret fear, some suspicion, but which they unfortunately had not the courage to look straight in the face and thoroughly sift to the bottom.

114. I should think that some such feeling as this must have been experienced by Locke as regards the opposition which his system would be likely to encounter, and of which Dr. Reid became afterwards the exponent. I have already noticed the uncertain tone of Locke in speaking of the idea of substance. A similar embarrassment may be observed in him where, in defining knowledge, he refuses this name to whatever in our mind is not accompanied by a judgment. this, in reality, is the same as to say, that without making a judgment it would be impossible for us to know anything.

I have no desire to dispute about words; but I believe that I may safely say, that either Locke is not consistent, or else he attributes to the word idea a sense different from that in which it is generally used. For the generality of men, to have the idea of a thing and to have knowledge of a thing, are equivalent expressions. Nor could anyone understand how it would be possible to have the idea of a thing without having some knowledge of that thing. If, then, it is a contradiction to say, in the ordinary sense of the words, “i have an idea of a thing, but I have no knowledge of it whatever,” it must be conceded that, according to the common belief of men, the idea of a thing always includes a knowledge of some sort. From which it seems legitimate to infer, that since Locke perceived that every cognition necessarily supposes a judgment, he had also some suspicion that the same must be said of ideas. but as, on the other hand, he was unable to explain to himself how our first ideas are formed-since before them there could be no judgment, because every judgment supposes some antecedent idea-so, to escape from the troublesome dilemma, and to supply the need he had of making it appear that some ideas could be acquired independently of any judgment, he betook himself to the imaginary distinction between knowledge and idea, and to the absurd supposition that there are ideas wholly devoid of knowledge.

It seems to me, therefore, that it was the love of system which led him to adopt an expedient as repugnant to the general belief of men as it was a deviation from the practical good sense, free from frivolities, which he usually exhibits. Such was the consequence of his pledging himself to the principle, that “There is nothing innate in the human mind, but all knowledge is acquired through sensation and reflection.”

Article 3

The difficulty as seen by Reid

109.  But to come to our difficulty, we must see what Dr. Reid understands by the three words, sensation, memory, and imagination.  He says:

A sensation-a smell, for instance-may be presented to the mind in three different ways.  It may be smelled; it may be remembered; it may be imagined or thought of.  In the first case it is necessarily accompanied with a belief of its present existence; in the second, it is necessarily accompanied with a belief of its past existence; and in the last, it is not accompanied with belief at all, but is what the logicians call  a simple apprehension.

110.  It being immaterial to the correctness of a reasoning in what sense words are used, provided that one takes care to define them beforehand, and then never to use them in any other meaning, I shall not stop to examine whether the sense given by Dr. Reid to the three words sensation, memory, imagination, be the same as is attributed to them in common discourse.  Instead of doing this, I shall ask the reader to note well the concepts which Dr. Reid wishes respectively to convey by those terms.

    First of all, I would call attention to the difference he makes between the first two and the third.  By the first two (sensation and memory) he wants us to understand, not the bare perception of a being, but a perception united with  the persuasion of the real existence of that being; with this sole distinction, that, in the case of the sensation, we are persuaded that the being really exists now, and in the case of the memory, the being really existed heretofore.  On the contrary, by imagination he means the faculty of perceiving the being, but without any persuasion of its existence, either present or past, accompanying the perception; which kind of perception the Schoolmen designated-and, I think, with greater propriety-by the name of simple apprehension.

111.  The question now arises as to whether the simple apprehension of a being, or the act of imagination taken in the sense of Dr. Reid, precedes in our soul the sensation and the memory, as Locke and Hume appear to maintain, or whether it is preceded by them, as Dr. Reid contends.

    Now, it is precisely by following up the controversy between these philosophical antagonists, that we see the difficulty which I proposed at the beginning, brought out to full view.  That difficulty is, in substance, ever the same; but it assumes a great variety of forms according to the aspects in which it has happened to fall in the way of philosophical inquirers.  Let us see, then, whether either party has succeeded in untying the knot, or in showing us the way out of the labyrinth.

112.  The system of the adversaries of Dr. Reid, or, as he calls it, the ideal system, is described by him as follows: “The ideal system teaches us that the first operation of the mind about its ideas is simple apprehension: that is, the are conception of a thing, without any belief about it; and that after we have got simple apprehensions, by comparing them together, we perceive agreements or disagreements between them; and that this perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas is all that we call belief, judgment, or knowledge.”

    Such is what we may call the last expression of the system of Locke and of his followers both in England and France.

     In analyzing the system of Condillac I pointed out how its whole essence consists in this, that it places the formation of ideas first, and then, through a comparison between these ideas, the formation of judgments.  but here at once the difficulty of which I speak showed itself, and in such a way that, according to that system, it could not possibly be solved.  For Condillac himself supplied me with arguments which necessarily led to the conclusion that no idea could be formed except through a judgment; and that therefore the question of ideas could not be treated separately from that of judgments.

    But as on the other hand no judgment can be formed except through some idea, there remained to explain how a judgment was possible antecedently to all ideas, in Locke’s and Condillac’s hypothesis that all ideas are acquired (see 86-98).

    Now, this was the difficulty as seen and noted by Dr. Reid, though in a more partial form: on which account he could, indeed, confute the system of his adversaries, but not, as it seems to me, propose a system capable of affording a satisfactory solution of the difficulty itself.

Article 2

The System of Reid on the Distinction of the Human Faculties.

104.  The difficulty to be overcome in explaining the origin of ideas did not present itself to Dr. Reid in that generality in which I have endeavored to propose it.  He never had occasion to consider it under so wide an aspect, and this is perhaps the reason why we have not on this subject as much as we might have expected from a philosopher of so solid a mind.

    Nevertheless, he saw it partially, and did is best to solve it in the part which he saw; for it is impossible to answer, as Reid professes to do, the arguments of the Idealists and Skeptics, without entering into that difficulty at least to some extent.

105.  To see in what form the difficulty was viewed by him, we must know what were the opinions he underook to impugn.

    As I have before observed, Condillac, misled by the double meaning attributed by him to the word sensation, maintained that between the object of sense (2) and the object of memory there is no essential difference, the first being a present sensation, and the second a sensation also, but past.  He thus believed that these two faculties could be reduced to one; and not only these, but likewise all the other faculties of the human soul; for, according to him, the objects of them all do not differ essentially, being, as he expresses it, nothing but sensation transformed.

    Locke had known that the object of the memory was not the same as that of sense; and he had therefore made a specific distinction between these two faculties.  For instance, when we remember a rose we smelt yesterday, the object of our memory is not the actual smelling of the rose, but an idea, an exemplar, a phantasm, something, in short, which that sensation had left behind it in our soul.

    Berkeley and Hume, who perfected the erroneous system of Locke in England, as Condillac had done in France, strove likewise to bring the objects of sense and memory to one only; and this by supposing that the objects differed merely in the degree of their vividness.

106.  Singular as it may appear, Dr. Reid, while directing his fine talents to combat the idealism and skepticism of these two philosophers, thought it necessary to abolish the distinction which Locke had made between the objects of sense and ideas (3).  He writes: “In the mean time I beg leave to think with the vulgar that when I remember the smell of the garden rose, that very sensation which I had yesterday, and which has now no more any existence, is the immediate object of my memory; and when I imagine it present, the sensation itself, and not any idea of it, is the object of my immagination” (Inquiry into the Human Mind &c., chap. 2, sec 3.).

107.  Them mind, then, can actually think of a thing which is in no way present to it-i.e. neither through an idea, because Dr. Reid repudiates all ideas, exemplars, or signs whatever of the same; nor through the thing itself, because its presence is excluded by the hypothesis!  How this can be, I am wholly at a loss to comprehend.  Neither do I believe that on this point the vulgar are at one with Dr. Reid.   It seems to me, on the contrary, that when an illiterate man remembers a thing which he has seen or felt, he believes , not,  indeed, that he has before him the actual thing itself, but that he recognizes it as that thing, because he has the idea  of it, and the trace left in his soul (4).

 108.  Nevertheless, although Dr. Reid reduces all the objects of the human faculties to one only, he does not do the same with the faculties themselves; and herein his system differs altogether from that of Condillac.  Let us hear how he continues after the words we quoted above: “But though the object of my sensation, memory, and imagination, be in this case the same, yet these acts or operations of the mind are as different and as easily distinguishable as smell, taste and sound.  I am conscious of a difference in kind between sensation and memory, and between both and imagination” (5).  And elsewhere he says: “If a man should maintain that a circle, a square, and a triangle, differ only in magnitude and not in figure, I believe he would find nobody disposed either to believe him or to argue against him; and yet I do not think it less shocking to common sense to maintain that sensation, memory, and imagination, differ only in degree and not in kind” (Inquiry into the Human Mind &c., chap. 2, sec 5.).

I had intended on posting notes to the above, but due to certain circumstances beyond my control, these will have to wait.