The Divine Lamp

3.  Principal characteristics of ideas.

but if ideas, or, in other words, the ideal and possible objects, are not furnished by the senses, whence then do they come?

Let us begin by examining the essential characteristics of ideas.  These are principally two-namely universality and necessity.

An ideal object or one that is merely possible, is always universal, in this sense, that taken by itself it enables us to know the nature of all the indefinite number of individuals in which it is or may be realized.  Take, for example, the idea of man.  The idea of man is the same as the ideal man.  Whatever be the number of human individuals in whom this idea may be realized there is always the same nature of man; that nature is one, the individuals are many.

Now what does the idea of man, or the ideal man express and make us know?  The nature of man, if he had the power of creation, would be able by this alone to produce as many human individuals as he pleased.  In the same way this one idea is sufficient to enable us to discern all men who may ever come into existence.  So also a sculptor who had conceived the idea of a stature, would be able to reproduce it in marble as many times as he pleased, without the idea being ever exhausted.  The ideal stature would remain one and always the same, standing before the mind as the exemplar; the material copies would be many, all formed and made known by means of this same idea.  This is what is meant by the universality of ideas, by which they are categorically  distinguished from the real objects which are always particular, and from the sensations which are also particular.

The characteristic of necessity is equally evident, because the ideas being possible objects, it is clear that what is possible can never have been otherwise than possible, and hence it is such, necessarily.  The possible is that which involves no contradiction;every object, therefore, which involves no contradiction is necessarily possible.  Now all finite and real beings considered in their reality are contingent only and not necessary, in contradiction to possible beings.  For we may think of any finite or real being whatsoever as existing or not existing, whereas we can not think of the possible  object ceasing to be possible, that is to say, becoming not possible.  For example, man in his possibility is necessary, for you cannot make man an impossible being; on the contrary, a real man is always a contingent being, because he may or may not be.

Universality, therefore, and necessity are the two principal characteristics of the ideas.  These include two others-namely, infinity and eternity.

An infinity is necessarily involved in ideas, by reason of their universality.  No real and limited being is universal.  For reason of its very limits it is determined within itself and incommunicable to any other being.  Hence ideas do not belong to the class of real limited beings.

Ideas are also eternal, because they are necessary; for that which is necessary, and that which always is and always was  is eternal.

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2. Ideas are not nothing.  They have a mode of existence proper to themselves.

We have seen that the objects of our cognitions are essentially distinct from ourselves, who are the subjects of the cognitions.  This distinction of the object from the subject of cognition is proper to all objects whatever, whether they are only possible (ideas) or are also subsistent (things).  But not only are all such objects distinct from the cognizing subject, they are also independent of it.  By this observation a new light is thrown on the nature of ideas, for they compel us to conclude by the logic of facts:

1st. That ideas are not nothing.
2nd. That they are not ourselves or any modification of ourselves.
3rd.  That they have a mode of existence of their own, entirely different from that of real or subsistent things.

This mode of existence belonging to the ideal objects or ideas is such that it does not fall under our bodily sense, and hence it is that it has entirely escaped the observation of many philosophers, who began their philosophical investigations with a foregone conclusion, or assumption that whatever did not fall under our senses was nothing.  Yet it is a fact that though the possible objects truly exist they do not fall under sense, and hence that we can in no way account for them by recurring to corporeal sense only; which is a fresh and self-evident confutation of sensism. 

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1. Distinction Between Subject and Object.

It is clear, then, from what we have already said that the object known is a thing entirely different from the subject or knower.  the subject that knows is a person, the object, as such, is impersonal.   Sometimes however we may say that in a certain sense the object known is a subject that knows, when, for instance, the object of thought is man; sometimes also the subject that knows is itself the object known, as when we think of ourselves.  But the subject that knows can never,, as such, e confounded or mixed up with the object known.   Always and in every case the subject and the object retain their respective natures, each remaining perfectly distinct from the other, so distinct that if it were otherwise our knowledge itself would be extinguished.  The distinction between subject and object is therefore an essential characteristic of cognition.

The question, therefore, is reduced to this: Whence does our understanding obtain its object?

Human cognitions are divided into two classes, intuitions and affirmations.

Intuitional knowledge or cognition is that which regards the  things, as considered in themselves, the things in their possibility.  Things considered in themselves as possible to subsist or not to subsist are the ideas.

Cognition obtained by means of affirmation or judgments is that knowledge which we acquire by affirming or judging that a thing subsists or does not subsist.

From this description the following consequences spring:

1. That the cognitions by intuition necessarily precede those of affirmation, for we can not affirm that a thing subsists or does not subsist unless we first know the thing itself as possible to subsist; for example, I can not say that a tree or a man subsists unless I first know what a tree or a man is.  Now to know what a thing is comes to the same as to know the thing in its possibility, for I may know what a tree is, and yet not know that this tree as yet subsists.

That the objects as known all belong to intuitional knowledge, because affirmation is limited to affirming or denying the subsistence of the object as known by intuition.  Affirmation, therefore, does not furnish any new object to the mind, but only pronounces the subsistence of the object already known.  Intuition, therefore, places us in possession of possible objects, and these we call ideas.  Affirmation does not furnish us with new possible objects, or new ideas, but produces persuasions in respect of the objects which we know already.   There are, therefore, cognitions which terminate in ideas, and cognitions which terminate in persuasions.  By the first we know the possible world, by the second the real and subsistent world.  Hence there are two categories of things-things possible and the things subsistent, in other words ideas and things.

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Seventh defect: Smith does not see that to know in things that which is ‘common’ is easier that to know that which is ‘proper.’

153.  The study of antiquity, then, reveals to us the fact that the invention of common nouns is of a very much earlier date than that of proper nouns; that in ancient languages common nouns were employed even when necessity compelled the naming of individual objects; and hence that for truly proper nouns we must look to modern languages only.

This mode of progression in the formation of languages may at first sight appear strange; but if we examine it attentively we shall find that it is perfectly natural-nay, the only one possible to the human mind.

In the first place, a much more difficult abstraction is required, as we have said, for noting and naming the individuality itself of beings, than for giving attention to their common qualities and naming them aaccordingly (see 150).  Now, the development of man’s faculties is gradual, and therefore must commence with the easier, and not with the more difficult, operations.

In the second place, words are only invented to supply a need.  Now, the first need which men experience is that of designating things through their more general qualities.  Then comes a time when things must be named by means of more special qualities, both to prevent a confusion and the damage or annoyance that result from it.  The, again, as experience and the use of things proceeds further and further, men fell called upon to make smaller and smaller subdivisions, and to indicate them by names less and less common; and so on until the social development reaches a stage so advanced as to necessitate the marking by proper names of the individuals themselves.  Proper names are, therefore, the very last to be invented.  They give to language its ultimate completion and perfection.

Accordingly, we find that there is not a single thing which has not a common name: not all have the name of the genus; still fewer have also that of the species; while those distinguished by a proper name form but a very insignificant fraction, and this in modern language only.

It is therefore manifest that the philosophers of whom I speak, in describing the progress of the human mind in the formation of languages, began precisely at the point where they ought to have ended; and they did this because, instead of taking the real facts for their guide, they hastily abandoned themselves to hypothetical speculations.  They imagined the invention of proper nouns to be the first step in human speech, whereas in very truth it is the last.  It, in fact, supposes the very highest degree of social culture; so much so, that even in the modern European languages, brought though they are to so great a perfection-thanks to the civilising influence which Christianity has happily been exercising for nearly two thousand years-proper nouns can still be traced to their origin, and there recognised as having, at first, been nothing but common nouns.

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Article 8
Sixth defect Smith does not see that the first names given to things were common nouns.

148.  For my own part, I thing it more probable that the names given by the supposed savage to his tree, to his cave, and to his fountain, would be common nouns from the very first.

Be it observed that, generally speaking, proper names are not imposed on objects of the description here spoken of-i.e. caves, trees, fountains, &c.-but rather on persons, places rivers, &c.; because this is found necessary for not confounding such things together.  Usually there is not any necessity for individuating by a proper name a tree, a cave, a fountain; and if there is, men are accustomed to secure such individuation by referring to circumstances connected with the thing.

Thus, for example, a cave would be called the cave of Polyphemus, from the man who was dwelling in it; or the cave of Hebron, from the district in which it stood; and so with the expressions the cedar of Lebanon, the rose of Jericho, the palm of Cades, from the places where these trees flourished; the well of Jacob, from him who dug it, or discovered, or made use of it; the healing fountain, from the medicinal properties of its waters, and so on.  For things of this kind there never is an imperative need of inventing proper names.

149.  Hence we can see why proper names, denoting as they do the individual substance of a thing, far from being the most frequent, are, even in the riches and most copious languages, wanting to numberless objects; whereas there is not a single thing in the world without a common name of some sort.  The common name is more necessary than the proper, and it is probable that men did not invent proper names until the perceived that without them a confusion of similar things would ensue.  When a case of this kind occurred, they would fix for the one particular thing a name significative of that proper and individual substance, whereby alone that thing became unmistakably  segregated from all others of the same species.

150  In this connection it is important to observe that the imposing of a name on that exclusive property which individualizes a being, and unmistakably singles it out from among all others of the same species, demands  a much more difficult exercise of abstraction than is required for naming that being from a quality it possesses in common with other beings.  Speaking in particular of bodies, their common qualities are the first to strike our senses, and to be cognised by us.  Consequently, it is much more likely that we should name a corporeal being from these qualities than from its own proper and individual substance, which, as separate from its accident, does not fall under our senses, and can only be separated from the accidents by means of an abstraction, or rather a series of abstractions.  I therefore believe the real truth to be, that it is only after a very long lapse of time, and after many comparisons have been made between things of the same species, that men’s intellectual powers grow so far developed as distinctly and expressly to notice that, besides the common qualities which fall under the senses, there is in each being a something so exclusively proper as to divide it completely from all other beings; and that something is its own self.

Accordingly, my firm persuasion is, that our supposed savages would not at first have felt the need of giving to his tree, cave, or the fountain a proper name, but only at a much later period, when having already seen many caves, trees, and fountains, he would have learnt to separate in his mind the individuality of each, and, what is still more, to see the necessity of singling out that individuality by a special name, so that he might in speaking, for instance, to his wife and children point out to them that particular cave, tree, or fountain, with such precision that they would not be able to mistake them for other caves, trees, or fountains.  I do not, however, believe that a necessity like this would arise while he continued in a savage state, nor yet for a good while after, even though he should have considerably advanced in civilization.  Even were the necessity to occur he would doubtless supply it by a much readier process than the most difficult one of inventing proper names; for example, by the context of his discourse, or by means of those accidental adjuncts which I have mentioned, or by some other expedient.

151.  Moreover, as we cannot know that a name is common simply from the fact of its being applied to many individuals, because, as we have seen, many might be called by the same proper name, so on the other hand we cannot say that a name is proper simply from finding it applied to one individual only.  For even a single individual may be designated by a common name.  Thus, in the supposition that only one man were left in this world, there would be no necessity whatever of a proper name for him, since the common name of man would then be quite sufficient to identify him beyond the possibility of his being mistaken for another.  And yet this would still be a common name, because derived from humanity-a quality which would equally belong to other human individuals if there were any in existence.

Nor is this all mere conjecture, based on imagination, like the narrative of Smith.  It is the fact as descried in the inspired book of Genesis.  There we read of a time when there was only one man on the earth.  No proper name was given to this man, for none was required; but he was called Adam, which in the Hebrew language conveys the same meaning as our word man.  And that we may better see how this was truly a common name, let us look at its origin.  It was derived from earth, the material of which the same sacred record declares man to have been formed, and it was intended to signify a ‘being composed of earth.’  Therefore, the first person ever named in this world was not designated through his individuality, but through a quality common to all men who should come after him, and hence by a common noun.

152.   Instead, then, of having recourse to an imaginary savage, and of losing themselves in an arbitrary supposition-a method which is, by universal consent, the reverse of philosophical-would not our philosophers have acted much more wisely by consulting the monuments of antiquity, which give us the real facts?

A sober investigation of these facts would have made them see the impropriety of assenting without careful examination to the opinion, certain as it might seem at first sight, that ‘proper nouns were invented before the common.’

It is just in propositions like these, which make an apparent show of evidence, that the most pernicious errors lie concealed, and in such a way as to render their detection a matter of no small difficulty.  The false evidence causes these propositions to be gratuitously accepted even by men otherwise circumspect, as Mr. Dugald Stewart is generally reputed to be, and makes them believe themselves dispensed from a diligent and painstaking study of the facts.

Had these respectable philosophers examined, as I have said, the manner in which the first men really imposed names on things, they would most certainly have found that those primitive names were never chosen arbitrarily, as is the case with proper names.  The first men did not express individual objects through their individuality, but always through a quality they held in common with other objects.  Thus Cain meant ‘a thing acquired or newly gotten;’ hence in giving this name Adam said, ‘I have gotten a new thing through God.’  Applicable as this word is to everything acquired or ‘newly gotten,’ it is clearly a common noun.  Abel meant ‘vanity’ Eve, ‘life-giver;’ Seth, ‘a being substituted;’ Enoch, ‘dedicated;’ Lamech, ‘poor,’ ‘humbled;’ all of which are, again, common nouns.  And the same may be said of the other Hebrew names of persons or things.  All of them designate the individual through common qualities, and are therefore common nouns.

A similar observation may be made as regards Greek names, and, indeed, the names of all antiquity, in which it may safely be affirmed that men never knew how to impose truly proper names, indicating the individuality itself of a thing, such as have come to be, in modern languages, Peter, Paul, Italy, France, England, the Adige, the Tiber, the Po.  Nay, even these names only beame proper from the time that their etymologies were lost of forgotten.

That these proper nouns which modern languages have inherited from antiquity were originally common nouns, is proved by all that remains to us of their etymologies; for from these we can see that the men of those early times designated the said persons, countries, rivers, &c., not by the individuality exclusively proper to each, but by qualities which were or might be possessed by other beings of the same species.

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Article 7. Fifth defect: Smith does not understand the reason why common nouns and proper nouns are severally so called.

146.  Having thus cleared up the ideas attached severally to the words proper noun and common noun, let us continue our analysis of the reasoning of Smith.

The proper name, then, is imposed on a being to express its individuality alone.  But as this name has no necessary relation with that individuality, one is free to apply it to the individuality of any other being one pleases.

Thus, for example, a father who has twelve sons may, if so inclined, call each of them in succession by the proper name of Peter.  I will, moreover, suppose that all persons now living who answer to the name of Peter are assembled together before us.  Does it follow that this name Peter, because applied to so many people, is a common noun?  Certainly not; and the reason is clear.  The fact of a name being common or proper does not depend upon its being used for naming one individual or many, but on the manner in which it names them.  If it names them, in consideration of a quality common to them all-as, for instance, in the case of the term man, which distinguishes human beings through humanity-then it is common.  But if it names them purely and simply with reference to their individuality, it is proper.  Hence even if every man in this world were called Peter, all that we could say of it would be that every man had two names, one common-i.e. man; and one proper-i.e. Peter.  As a matter of fact, each of us has the two names, and it is a mere accident that out proper name is, or is not, the same as that of our neighbors.  Indeed, the number of proper names is very small in comparison with the whole human race; nay, there might even be but one proper name for all men alike.

147.   Now, this reveals a new fallacy in the reasoning of Smith-I mean, in that part where he says, though without any proof, that the savage changes proper names into common, simply by applying them to many individuals; as if nothing else were wanted for effecting such a change.  So far is this from being true, that even if the name of Peter were, as I have said, given to all the men of a province, of a kingdom, of the world, it would still remain proper, since it would indicate men, not through their common humanity, but through the individuality of each.

Suppose, then, that the savage had given a proper name to the first cave which sheltered him from inclemency of the weather, another to the first tree with the fruit of which he relieved his hunger, a third to the first fountain at which he quenched his thirst; and suppose, further, that on seeing afterwards one, two, or three similar caves, one, two, or three similar trees or fountains, he had also given each of them the same name as he used in the first instance, we should thus have four caves, four trees, four fountains, called respectively by the same name; but it would still remain to be seen whether this savage, in applying one and the same name to four similar things, used it as  a proper or as a common noun.

Now, it is clear that in no case id he, as Smith asserts, denote a ‘multitude’ of individuals; since each time he said cave, tree, fountain, he meant only one cave, one tree, one fountain.  But even if he had made these names collective by saying in the plural caves, trees, fountains, that would not have sufficed by itself to prove that the names were ‘common’ (see146).  The only criterion for judging whether they were common or proper consists in knowing whether in them he contradistinguished the  individuals by means of qualities which they held in common, or designated those individuals through their own individualities alone

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Ultimate grounds are either absolute or relative.  The former are, strictly speaking, alone ultimate, and, as such, constitute the scope of General Philsophy;  whereas the latter are ultimate only in reference to a determinate branch of science, and hence from the scope of Special Philosophies, such as those of matematics, physics, history, politics, art, ect.

Though Rosmini prefers the term ultimate grounds, he does not object to calling them likewise first grounds.  “ultimate grounds,”  he says, “and first grounds  are equivalent expressions, because what is last in the one direction of thought is first in the other.”  Compare the Aristotelian doctrine, that what is first in essence or nature is last in generation, or, as St Thomas puts it, “What is first and better known in its nature is last and less known relatively to us.”  Of the relation of Philosophy to the other sciences  Rosmini says, “The ultimate grounds outside of the world and the ultimate grounds in the world, these form the object of philosophy, which thus occupies the last two and highest steps of the pyramid we have described.  Hence philosophy remains clearly separated from, and elevated above, the other sciences, as the guide and mother of them all.  These form the lower steps of the pyramid, depending upon the highest two and receiving their light from them”

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Article 6.  Forth defect: Smith does not understand the true distinction between common and proper nouns.

144.  I think that by this time the reader must already have begun to feel serious misgivings about a reasoning which, although it seemed at first sight very plausible, and based on the apparently truthful description of a perfectly natural fact, has been found, upon examination, to contain, in a few phrases, so many inaccuracies.

Adam Smith gave us to understand that common nouns simply signified ‘multitudes’ of individuals; but on enumerating the four kinds of names expressive of such ‘multitudes,’ we discovered that not one of them was common to many individuals.

We next examined the general or abstract names, which denote single qualities, essential or accidental, and we found that they also are not common to many individuals, but proper to a common quality.

Lastly, in these general or abstract names, or rather in the ideas which they represent to us, we have found that their nature consists simply in expressing a judgment whereby a quality is attributed to a subject, or in designating an object through a quality which indicates or makes it known to us, and which being common to many subjects, causes the same name to be applicable to each of them.  But we must proceed.

145.  The nature of common nouns being now ascertained, let us see what is the nature of proper nouns.

Both common and proper nouns express individuals and not collections of individuals, but with this difference: that while the common noun designates and distinguishes an  individual through a quality belonging to it, the proper noun makes known the individual, not through a quality of it, but directly; it expressed, so to speak, int individuality.  Now, individuality as such is essential incommunicable, essentially exclusive of everything but its own proper self.  One individual cannot be another.  hence a proper noun can apply to one individual only.  On the contrary, a common noun, by indicating a being through a quality which may be found equally in other beings, does not single it out with such precision as absolutely to contra-distinguish and isolate it from all others.  Whatever being has the same quality is entitled to the same name.  Thus the word man, unless when used in the abstract sense of humanity, signifies not many but only one man; yet as the one man is named from humanity, a quality common to all other men, the same word can be applied to them as well as to him.  But the case would be different if, instead of calling him man, I were to call him Peter; for this second name would not be derived from a quality common to other men, but would be used by me expressly to signify that individuality which belongs exclusively to Peter, and which in consequence cannot be communicated to any other person.

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Article 4.  Second defect: Smith does not distinguish the names indicating multitudes of individuals from those which indicate abstract qualities.

141.  There are names which do not indicate individuals but only their qualities, whether essential or accidental, and considered apart from the rest that goes to make up an individual.  It were useless either to deny or blink this fact.  For example, when I say human nature, hardness, fluidity, &c., I express accidental qualities.

Now these names may, indeed, be called general, but not common; general, because they do not signify individuals, but qualities common to many individuals; not common because the quality to which they severally apply, although found in many individuals, is but one.

That these names cannot rightly be styled ‘common’ is also seen y the fact that, in contradistinction to all common names, they can never be used in the plural number.  Each of them expresses a single thing, abstract and entirely simple, one and indivisible, and therefore impossible to be confused with any other.

Thus while we all speak of human nature, animalities, vegetativeness, whiteness, & c.  

Here, then, is a distinct class of names, which neither designates individuals nor fall under the denomination of ‘common;’ but can only be called generarl or abstract.

Article 5.   Third defect: Smith confounds with common names the names indicating multitudes of individuals and those indicating abstract qualities.

142.  From these general or abstract names, or rather from the idea represented by them, spring those names which are with all propriety called common, because they are applicable to each of many individuals; for instance, the words man, vegetable, animal, cavern, tree, fountain, &c., as also the adjectives white, hard, &c., whether they be used simply as adjectives, or whether, by an elliptical mode of speech, they be taken as substantives.

Now, unless, in analyzing the meaning of these names, we proceed with great caution, we shall easily be deceived by the artificial character of modern languages.  We are generally inclined to believe that to each word there corresponds but one idea, whereas that is not so.  On the contrary, instances of this kind are extremely rare.  The nature of language, and especially of modern languages, is such that in by far the greatest number of cases a single word expresses an idea of the most complex description; that is to say, composed of many other ideas.  Not only this, but that very same word indicates also the link which binds all those ideas together and gives them unity.  Hence it comes to pass that on submitting the meaning of a single term to analysis, we can often translate it into a proposition, and even several propositions.

This is true of the names of which I speak.  The word man, for example, is equivalent to the proposition, ‘A being is possessed of humanity;’ the word tree is convertible into the formula, ‘A being possessed of those properties which constitutes  a tree, and which, if they were to be summed up in a single word, which is wanting in the English language, would be called treeishness.’  And so with these names generally.  In all of them we attribute to beings a certain quality they are found to possess.  hence, under each of these names there lurks a judgment by which, as often as we pronounce or think of them, we attribute a predicate to a subject, while for the sake of brevity we express this operation by a single word which gives us its result, by representing a single coup d’ aeil the relation which we have discovered between that predicate and that subject.  Now, it is only these names which can with propriety be designated as common, since they are applicable to each individual of a certain class.  Thus the word man applies severally to every member of the human race; the word tree to every tree, no matter which; the word cavern to all caverns without exception; and so of all the rest.

143.  Such being the case, I must entirely disagree with the opinion of Adam Smith, that a common noun indicates a ‘multitude’ of individuals.  On the contrary, it invariably indicates one ‘individual’ only; but it does so through a quality common to many, and this is why, after being applied to one individual, it can, ad libitum, be applied to another, and then to another, and so on in succession to all the individuals characterized by the same quality.  If it were true that the word tree, for example, signified a ‘multitude’ of trees, the consequences would be that, when we said trees, we should express many such ‘multitudes.’  But no one has ever thought that, when using this plural, he was expressing anything more than a number of individual trees.

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Article 3 Defects in the above passage.-First defect: It does not distinguish the several species of names indicating multitudes of individuals.

138.   The first thing I have to observe on the above passage is that it speaks of common names as though they were all of one and the same kind.  Now, it being well known that there are several kinds of common names, I must examine whether it be correct to treat of these names without indicating their diverse species, and whether the reasoning of Adam Smith be applicable to every species or to only one.

The only notion which he gives us of a common name is, that it signifies a ‘multitude’ of individual.  Let us see, then, in the first place, if this applies to all the species of common names-in other words, if all names expressing a ‘multitude’ of individuals are common in the true sense of the term.

The first species consists of the numerals-two, three, four, five, &c.  Leaving aside the abstraction belonging to these names, and owing  to which we cannot apply them to a species of individuals without naming the particular species which we mean-e.g. two, three, four, five, men, &c.-we will consider them only in so far as they are capable of representing to us a multitude of individuals.

Now, when I say ten men, ten cities, &c., I certainly denote a ‘multitude’ of individuals; but it cannot on that account be said that the numeral ten is common, i.e. applicable to each of those individuals-to each city, to each man, &c.  It is not true, then, that all the names indicative of a multitude of individuals can, with propriety of language, be called ‘common.’

The numerals have therefore this peculiarity, that, together with the multitude, they state its numerousness, they fix precisely the number of the individuals contained in that multitude.

139.  The second species is formed of those words which in naming a multitude of individuals do not define it numerousness with precision, but only in a general way.  Such are the words few, some, many, a great many, &c.  These also, not being applicable to each of the individuals of the respective multitudes, are not entitled to the appellation of ‘common.’

The third species comprises those names which do not express the numerousness of the multitude indicated by them, either precisely or in general way, but only relatively to some idea which is connected therewith: for instance, the words nations, tribe, family, assembly,&c.  Now, although the word family does not by itself give us any clue for knowing how many persons there are in the family, or whether it be large or small, yet from the nature of the thing we can at once understand that a family is a far smaller collection than would be suggested by the word nation.  But inasmuch as these names also, indicative though they be of a multitude, are not applicable to the single individuals belonging to it, they must be excluded from the category of common names.

140.  Lastly, all the plurals, such as men, animals, houses, &c., indicate multitudes of individuals, but in such a manner as to determine nothing whatever about their numerousness.  Hence they constitute a fourth species of collective names to which, for the reason already stated, the qualification of ‘common’ cannot be attributed.

Regarding this indeterminateness proper to plurals some other observations ought to be made; but, not to interrupt the thread of our discussion, I will, for the present, go on with the enumeration of the various kinds of names, that we may see which among them are of such a nature as easily to be mistaken for those to which the designation of common names properly belongs.

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