The Divine Lamp

Article 8
Sixth defect Smith does not see that the first names given to things were common nouns.

148.  For my own part, I thing it more probable that the names given by the supposed savage to his tree, to his cave, and to his fountain, would be common nouns from the very first.

Be it observed that, generally speaking, proper names are not imposed on objects of the description here spoken of-i.e. caves, trees, fountains, &c.-but rather on persons, places rivers, &c.; because this is found necessary for not confounding such things together.  Usually there is not any necessity for individuating by a proper name a tree, a cave, a fountain; and if there is, men are accustomed to secure such individuation by referring to circumstances connected with the thing.

Thus, for example, a cave would be called the cave of Polyphemus, from the man who was dwelling in it; or the cave of Hebron, from the district in which it stood; and so with the expressions the cedar of Lebanon, the rose of Jericho, the palm of Cades, from the places where these trees flourished; the well of Jacob, from him who dug it, or discovered, or made use of it; the healing fountain, from the medicinal properties of its waters, and so on.  For things of this kind there never is an imperative need of inventing proper names.

149.  Hence we can see why proper names, denoting as they do the individual substance of a thing, far from being the most frequent, are, even in the riches and most copious languages, wanting to numberless objects; whereas there is not a single thing in the world without a common name of some sort.  The common name is more necessary than the proper, and it is probable that men did not invent proper names until the perceived that without them a confusion of similar things would ensue.  When a case of this kind occurred, they would fix for the one particular thing a name significative of that proper and individual substance, whereby alone that thing became unmistakably  segregated from all others of the same species.

150  In this connection it is important to observe that the imposing of a name on that exclusive property which individualizes a being, and unmistakably singles it out from among all others of the same species, demands  a much more difficult exercise of abstraction than is required for naming that being from a quality it possesses in common with other beings.  Speaking in particular of bodies, their common qualities are the first to strike our senses, and to be cognised by us.  Consequently, it is much more likely that we should name a corporeal being from these qualities than from its own proper and individual substance, which, as separate from its accident, does not fall under our senses, and can only be separated from the accidents by means of an abstraction, or rather a series of abstractions.  I therefore believe the real truth to be, that it is only after a very long lapse of time, and after many comparisons have been made between things of the same species, that men’s intellectual powers grow so far developed as distinctly and expressly to notice that, besides the common qualities which fall under the senses, there is in each being a something so exclusively proper as to divide it completely from all other beings; and that something is its own self.

Accordingly, my firm persuasion is, that our supposed savages would not at first have felt the need of giving to his tree, cave, or the fountain a proper name, but only at a much later period, when having already seen many caves, trees, and fountains, he would have learnt to separate in his mind the individuality of each, and, what is still more, to see the necessity of singling out that individuality by a special name, so that he might in speaking, for instance, to his wife and children point out to them that particular cave, tree, or fountain, with such precision that they would not be able to mistake them for other caves, trees, or fountains.  I do not, however, believe that a necessity like this would arise while he continued in a savage state, nor yet for a good while after, even though he should have considerably advanced in civilization.  Even were the necessity to occur he would doubtless supply it by a much readier process than the most difficult one of inventing proper names; for example, by the context of his discourse, or by means of those accidental adjuncts which I have mentioned, or by some other expedient.

151.  Moreover, as we cannot know that a name is common simply from the fact of its being applied to many individuals, because, as we have seen, many might be called by the same proper name, so on the other hand we cannot say that a name is proper simply from finding it applied to one individual only.  For even a single individual may be designated by a common name.  Thus, in the supposition that only one man were left in this world, there would be no necessity whatever of a proper name for him, since the common name of man would then be quite sufficient to identify him beyond the possibility of his being mistaken for another.  And yet this would still be a common name, because derived from humanity-a quality which would equally belong to other human individuals if there were any in existence.

Nor is this all mere conjecture, based on imagination, like the narrative of Smith.  It is the fact as descried in the inspired book of Genesis.  There we read of a time when there was only one man on the earth.  No proper name was given to this man, for none was required; but he was called Adam, which in the Hebrew language conveys the same meaning as our word man.  And that we may better see how this was truly a common name, let us look at its origin.  It was derived from earth, the material of which the same sacred record declares man to have been formed, and it was intended to signify a ‘being composed of earth.’  Therefore, the first person ever named in this world was not designated through his individuality, but through a quality common to all men who should come after him, and hence by a common noun.

152.   Instead, then, of having recourse to an imaginary savage, and of losing themselves in an arbitrary supposition-a method which is, by universal consent, the reverse of philosophical-would not our philosophers have acted much more wisely by consulting the monuments of antiquity, which give us the real facts?

A sober investigation of these facts would have made them see the impropriety of assenting without careful examination to the opinion, certain as it might seem at first sight, that ‘proper nouns were invented before the common.’

It is just in propositions like these, which make an apparent show of evidence, that the most pernicious errors lie concealed, and in such a way as to render their detection a matter of no small difficulty.  The false evidence causes these propositions to be gratuitously accepted even by men otherwise circumspect, as Mr. Dugald Stewart is generally reputed to be, and makes them believe themselves dispensed from a diligent and painstaking study of the facts.

Had these respectable philosophers examined, as I have said, the manner in which the first men really imposed names on things, they would most certainly have found that those primitive names were never chosen arbitrarily, as is the case with proper names.  The first men did not express individual objects through their individuality, but always through a quality they held in common with other objects.  Thus Cain meant ‘a thing acquired or newly gotten;’ hence in giving this name Adam said, ‘I have gotten a new thing through God.’  Applicable as this word is to everything acquired or ‘newly gotten,’ it is clearly a common noun.  Abel meant ‘vanity’ Eve, ‘life-giver;’ Seth, ‘a being substituted;’ Enoch, ‘dedicated;’ Lamech, ‘poor,’ ‘humbled;’ all of which are, again, common nouns.  And the same may be said of the other Hebrew names of persons or things.  All of them designate the individual through common qualities, and are therefore common nouns.

A similar observation may be made as regards Greek names, and, indeed, the names of all antiquity, in which it may safely be affirmed that men never knew how to impose truly proper names, indicating the individuality itself of a thing, such as have come to be, in modern languages, Peter, Paul, Italy, France, England, the Adige, the Tiber, the Po.  Nay, even these names only beame proper from the time that their etymologies were lost of forgotten.

That these proper nouns which modern languages have inherited from antiquity were originally common nouns, is proved by all that remains to us of their etymologies; for from these we can see that the men of those early times designated the said persons, countries, rivers, &c., not by the individuality exclusively proper to each, but by qualities which were or might be possessed by other beings of the same species.

Article 7. Fifth defect: Smith does not understand the reason why common nouns and proper nouns are severally so called.

146.  Having thus cleared up the ideas attached severally to the words proper noun and common noun, let us continue our analysis of the reasoning of Smith.

The proper name, then, is imposed on a being to express its individuality alone.  But as this name has no necessary relation with that individuality, one is free to apply it to the individuality of any other being one pleases.

Thus, for example, a father who has twelve sons may, if so inclined, call each of them in succession by the proper name of Peter.  I will, moreover, suppose that all persons now living who answer to the name of Peter are assembled together before us.  Does it follow that this name Peter, because applied to so many people, is a common noun?  Certainly not; and the reason is clear.  The fact of a name being common or proper does not depend upon its being used for naming one individual or many, but on the manner in which it names them.  If it names them, in consideration of a quality common to them all-as, for instance, in the case of the term man, which distinguishes human beings through humanity-then it is common.  But if it names them purely and simply with reference to their individuality, it is proper.  Hence even if every man in this world were called Peter, all that we could say of it would be that every man had two names, one common-i.e. man; and one proper-i.e. Peter.  As a matter of fact, each of us has the two names, and it is a mere accident that out proper name is, or is not, the same as that of our neighbors.  Indeed, the number of proper names is very small in comparison with the whole human race; nay, there might even be but one proper name for all men alike.

147.   Now, this reveals a new fallacy in the reasoning of Smith-I mean, in that part where he says, though without any proof, that the savage changes proper names into common, simply by applying them to many individuals; as if nothing else were wanted for effecting such a change.  So far is this from being true, that even if the name of Peter were, as I have said, given to all the men of a province, of a kingdom, of the world, it would still remain proper, since it would indicate men, not through their common humanity, but through the individuality of each.

Suppose, then, that the savage had given a proper name to the first cave which sheltered him from inclemency of the weather, another to the first tree with the fruit of which he relieved his hunger, a third to the first fountain at which he quenched his thirst; and suppose, further, that on seeing afterwards one, two, or three similar caves, one, two, or three similar trees or fountains, he had also given each of them the same name as he used in the first instance, we should thus have four caves, four trees, four fountains, called respectively by the same name; but it would still remain to be seen whether this savage, in applying one and the same name to four similar things, used it as  a proper or as a common noun.

Now, it is clear that in no case id he, as Smith asserts, denote a ‘multitude’ of individuals; since each time he said cave, tree, fountain, he meant only one cave, one tree, one fountain.  But even if he had made these names collective by saying in the plural caves, trees, fountains, that would not have sufficed by itself to prove that the names were ‘common’ (see146).  The only criterion for judging whether they were common or proper consists in knowing whether in them he contradistinguished the  individuals by means of qualities which they held in common, or designated those individuals through their own individualities alone

Ultimate grounds are either absolute or relative.  The former are, strictly speaking, alone ultimate, and, as such, constitute the scope of General Philsophy;  whereas the latter are ultimate only in reference to a determinate branch of science, and hence from the scope of Special Philosophies, such as those of matematics, physics, history, politics, art, ect.

Though Rosmini prefers the term ultimate grounds, he does not object to calling them likewise first grounds.  “ultimate grounds,”  he says, “and first grounds  are equivalent expressions, because what is last in the one direction of thought is first in the other.”  Compare the Aristotelian doctrine, that what is first in essence or nature is last in generation, or, as St Thomas puts it, “What is first and better known in its nature is last and less known relatively to us.”  Of the relation of Philosophy to the other sciences  Rosmini says, “The ultimate grounds outside of the world and the ultimate grounds in the world, these form the object of philosophy, which thus occupies the last two and highest steps of the pyramid we have described.  Hence philosophy remains clearly separated from, and elevated above, the other sciences, as the guide and mother of them all.  These form the lower steps of the pyramid, depending upon the highest two and receiving their light from them”

1. Philosophy is the science of ultimate grounds.

It will be seen, by reference to the tabular view of the sciences in the introduction, that Rosmini draws a clear distinction between the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘metaphysics’, employing the latter in the limited sense of Science of the Real, which according to him, includes Cosmology, Ontology, and Natural Theology. Thus the term ‘metaphysics’, while narrower that ‘philosophy’, is wider than ‘ontlogy’ (cf. Preface to Metaphysical Works, in Psychology, vol. 1. pp. 5-16, where these distinctions are treated at length).

The above definition of Philosophy does not differ materially from that of Leibniz, who calls it “the science of sufficient reasons”; or from that of Descarte, who makes it “the science of things evidently deduced from first principles” (cf. Hamilton’s Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. 1. pp. 48-53, where a list of the more famous definitions of philosophy, ancient and modern, are given). It approaches, perhaps, still more closely the definition which Aristotle gives of wisdom, “the science which considers first principles and causes”; and it coincides with the definition of first philosophy, which St Thomas in part borrows from Aristotle. “The philosopher,’ says he, meaning Aristotle, “determines it (i.e. first philosophy) to be the science of truth, not of truth in general, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, that is, which relates to the first universal principle of being.” Rosmini condemns several other definitions of philosophy, especially those of Hobbes, Galluppi, Plato, and Wolf. Hobbes had defined philosophy as “a knowledge, acquired by correct reasoning, of effects or phenomena from their conceived causes or generations, and also of possible generations from known effects.” In regard to this Rosmini says, “Since from effects alone or from phenomena alone, without the aid of the ideal object, we can know only the proiximate causes, or, more properly speaking, the laws, according to which sensible things change, philosophy is destroyed by this definition, and there remain only physics and the natural sciences,usurping the title of philosophy.” Of Galluppi’s definition, which makes philosophy “the science of human thought,” he says, “But human thought is only the instrument wherewith philosophy finds and contemplates its objects, and these, among which the greatest is God, cannot in the smallest degree be reduced to thought..” In regard to the remark of Plato, that the philosopher “devotes himself always to the idea of being,” he says, “On the contrary, the idea of being must guide the human mind to discover the absolute and most real being, this being the end of all speculations-an end which it reaches, not through any idea, but through affirmation and intuition.” To Wolf’s definition of philosophy as “the science of things possible,” he objects: “Possibilities do not by any means constitute the grounds of things in their completeness, being but a single element of those grounds. Contingent things, for example, do not exist merely because they are possible, but because, being possible, a first cause has created them.” These objections help to make clear Rosmini’s view of the sphere and functions of philosophy, and the cardinal distinction which he makes between ideal being, which is in itself intelligible, and real being, which is intelligible only through the other. When he asserts that “the real, as merely real, signifies nothing, not going beyond itself or expressing anything but itself,” and that it “goes beyond the power of natural signs, altogether beyond the power of any spoken word, however eloquent, and of any writing, however learned, elegant, and sublime it may appear,” he comes very near drawing that distinction which, at first sight, seems to involve an absurd paradox, but which is, nevertheless, strictly true-the distinction, namely, between thought and knowledge. Thought being the mere instrument of knowledge (the quo cognoscimus, as the Scholastics say), and knowledge being that which thought accomplishes (quod cognoscimus), if follows that thought and knowledge are absolutely exclusive with respect to each other; that what is known cannot, as such, be thought; and that what is thought cannot, as such, be known. it is the failure to observe this distinction that has led Herbert Spencer and others into their strange muddle respecting the unknowable, by which they mean the unthinkable. Ideas are thinkable but absolutely unknowable; things are knowable but absolutely unthinkable.

In regard to Science, the genus of which philosophy is a species, Rosmini approves of the view expressed by Aristotle in the Later Analytics, where he says, “We think we know a thing absolutely, and not in the sophistical, accidental way, when we think we know the cause which produced it, know that that is the cause of that thing, and know that it must be the cause of that thing.” He, moreover, distinguishes between the subjective and the objective senses of the term. “The word science,” he says, “has a universal sense, equivalent to that of cognition; but it is also employed in a more restricted sense, to signify a particular mode of cognition. In this limited sense it may be regarded either subjectively, that is, as possessed by man, the knowing subject, or objectively, as knowable, as that which is intuited by a mind.” In the former view it is equivalent to philosophy; in the latter, it means “an entire system of demonstrated cognitions, depending upon a single principle.”

it is instructive to compare with these views respecting science and philosophy, the definitions of these terms given by Herbert Spencer. “Science,” says that writer, “is partially unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely unified knowledge.” it follows from this that we have not at present any philosophy, and indeed, that only omniscience is philosophy, and God the only philosopher.

God is the Supreme Good.  he is the Efficient Cause of all things, whence all derive their beings, and have a desire for Him in order to participate in His likeness, for the likeness to the agent is the perfection proper to each thing.  Wherefore, if His very likeness is an object of desire, much more is God Himself to be desired.  Hence He is not only Good, but He is simply Goodness itself.  Good, therefore, belongs t Him as the Source of all perfections, and as the First Cause, not as the agent of like nature with the effect, but as One not belonging to the same order as the effect, either according to species or genus; in a super-excellent way the First Cause of all things, not of the same kind, but outside of genus, and the principle of existing creatures; whence he is called the Supreme Good.

God only is Good by His Essence.  The rule of goodness is that of the degree of perfection which is possessed, and perfection is threefold; as, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in the existence which is given by its substantial form; its second perfection is found in the accidents added to it for its perfect action, such as heat, dryness, lightness, and so on; its third perfection, that it remains in its own place.

Such perfections as these belong to no creature by its own essence, but in that way to God only, whose Essence is His Existence, and in whom there is nothing accidental.  For such things as are said to be accidental in others belong to Him essentially, as, for example, to be powerful and wise.  Nor is He related to an end, for He is Himself the Last End of all things.  Hence God alone has all perfections by His Essence; and so He only is essentially Good.  Each thing is called good by the Divine Goodness; from the Exemplar, the First Efficient Cause and the Final End of all goodness.  Each thing is good formally by its likeness to Him.  This goodness is one, and it is also multiform.

1.  Proofs of the existence of God.
2.  God is Infinite Being or pure existence.
3.  The Divine Attributes.
4.  Conclusion

1.  Proofs of the existence of God.  It has been noticed above that the innumerable individual beings which make up the universe are subject to change, and that the change of anything whatsoever takes place by means of the action of some being other than itself.  It is the Action of B that causes A to become A*.  But the action of B itself implies a change in B, and this demands in turn the concurring causality of C, and so on (see 9:7).  We  cannot continue this process  back to infinity.  For in that case change would be without sufficient explanation and therefore an illusion, whilst the existence and reality of change is one of the most evident things in nature.  The setting  in motion of a process of change demands a starting point, an initial  impetus,  , whence the movement proceeds.  This absolute beginning is only possible on the condition that a Being exists who is beyond all change,-in whom nothing can  “become,”  and who is therefore immutable.

This being is God.  Now, God cannot set in motion the series of changes constituted by actuality and potentiality except by an impulse which leaves free and undisturbed His own impassibility.  For, if this initial impulse were to involve a modification, however slight, in the Primary Being, such modification would constitute a change, and require the intervention of a still higher Being.  Thus the process would be endless unless God were Himself the “prime mover, himself unmoved.”

Let us suppose that one decides to build a house, and that he wants it to have solid supports.  To this end he must lay deep the foundations which are to support the building.  He must continue to dig until he obtains a base of absolute fixity and security.  But obviously he must finally call a halt in his work of excavation, if the building is to be commenced at all.  We may therefore, nay must, conclude that the builder did in fact halt at some point in the earth, if de facto the building is there before our eyes.

The same applies to the scholastic argument which we are considering.  Change exists as a fact, even as the house in question exists as a fact.  Changes stares us in the face; it is found everywhere in the universe.  But if there were no starting point in the chain of efficient causation, the change itself could not exist.  We are not in a position to deny the existence of the evolution of the universe: we must therefore account for it.  To suppose an endless regression in the causal series possible would be like imagining that one can suspend a weight from the end of a chain whose other end simply does not exist, since link is added to link to infinity.

Change is a certain indication of contingency or non-necessity, and this leads Thomas to a second proof of the existence of God, intimately related to the preceding: the existence of  non-necessary beings demands the existence of a necessary Being.  As soon as a non-necessary being is presented as existing, it ought to be referred to an influence external to itself, and here again a regression to infinity would not explain existing reality.  One must stop at an absolutely necessary Being, whose very essence it is to exist, and which finds its own necessity in itself.  Such a being is God.

It is important to notice that the notion of contingency or non-necessity, upon which the argument rests, is independent of the notions of time and number.  The principle of causality does not involve the concept of time.  For, even if the series of contingent beings were without beginning, these beings could not be made intelligible without the existence of a necessary Being.

It all comes, then, to this: if any given thing is real, the sum total of all those other things, without which the reality of that fact would be inexplicable, must be no less real.  From the standpoint of metaphysics, God exists because the existence of the Universe demands Him.  Hence the existence of God is not, as one might suppose, a further mystery requiring explanation in addition to the general mystery of the world.  The scholastic argument for God’s existence has exactly the same value as the principle of contradiction and of efficient causation.

Such are the principle proofs which Thomas Aquinas brings forward for the existence of God.  There are other besides, all of which consist in an interpretation of facts.  he sternly rejects the arguments known as “ontological” which would better be described as “logical,” such as those of St Anselm and St Augustine.  From the content of our idea of God we cannot and may not infer the actual existence of God.  The fact that existence is implied in the idea of an all-perfect Being is no guarantee of the real existence of such a Being.  To pass thus from the conceptual order to the real order is tantamount to trying to suspend a picture from a painted nail.

2.  God is Infinite Being or pure existence.  Since material reality is alone proportioned to the knowing powers of man, since the mind only functions with the aid of the body (see 3:2), God can only be known by us in an indirect way.  “The highest knowledge which we can have of God in this life, is to know that He is above all that we can think concerning Him.”

In other words, we know God only by analogy, in attributing to Him all perfections-by negatio, in excluding from these perfections all elements of imperfection-y transcendence, in removing every limitation which in other beings modifies a perfection.  Our knowledge of God consists in knowing that He is infinite.  Aristotle stopped at the notion of Infinity.  Let us endeavor to show how this entirely negative concept does nevertheless attain to the Being who is the fullness of reality.

The Infinite Being, says Thomas Aquinas, having in Himself no potentiality, no limitation, is pure existence.  In order to realize exactly what this implies, let us avail ourselves of a simile, although in this subtle matter any comparison is necessarily inadequate.   

“Imagine a series of vessels, with different capacities, which are to be filled with water; let there be tiny vessels, and vessels that will contain gallons, and great receptacles which are to serve as reservoirs.  clearly, the volume of water which may be stored in each vessel must be limited by the capacity of the vessel itself.  Once a vessel is filled, not a drop can be added to its contents; were the very ocean itself to flow over it, the contents of the vessel would not increase.

“Now, existence in a finite being may be likened to the water, in our simile; for existence too is limited by the capacity of every recipient being.  This capacity is the sum total of the potentialities which from moment to moment become actual realities by being invested with existence.  The oak of the forest which is invested with the most beautiful qualities of its species, and with the most perfect vital forces; that man of genius who is endowed with the most precious gifts of mind and body,-these possess the maximum of existence that can possibly be found in the species of oak and of man.  but, be it remembered, the capacity for existence in each of these is limited and circumscribed by the very fact of the apportioned potentiality, or ‘essence.’  In this beautiful conception of Thomas, a vigorous oak has a larger measure of existence than a stunted one; a man of genius possesses existence in a larger sense than a man of inferior mind,-because the great man and the vigorous oak possess a larger measure of powers and activities, and because these powers and activities exist.  But, once more, there is a limit even to their existence.

“On the other hand, to return to our simile, let us picture to ourselves an existence indefinitely un-circumscribed, say the ocean, without shore to confine or to limit it.”  Such existence, with no qualifying or modifying adjective, is God.  God is existence; he is nothing but the plenitude of existence.  “He is the one who is,” whose very essence is existence.  All other beings receive only some degree of existence,-the degree increasing in measure with increasing capacity.  But they receive, in every case, their existence from God.  Finite beings act upon each other, since, as we have seen above, the corporeal world is a network of efficient agents; they determine the capacity of the vessel, and the size varies unceasingly, but it is God alone who gives the existence according to the capacity in question.

3.  The Divine Attributes.   The study of the Divine attributes amounts to the inquiry by a close effort of reasoning as to what is implied by “Being which is existence without limit.”  Thomas enumerates these attributes, and establishes in turn God’s simplicity, goodness, immutability, unity, justice, ect.  He is never tired of stressing God’s transcendent individuality, His knowledge and His government of the universe.

His transcendent individuality prevents Him from being confused with any of the limited beings to whom, y a free decree of His will, he has given or will give existence.  Any confusion of God with finite beings would be incompatible with His Infinity, and therefore destroys God.  A confusion of the essence or existence of the finite beings with the essence or existence of God  would lead to a contradiction.  For, a collection of finite essences, even if numerically indefinite, would nevertheless form a finite being.  Nor could God’s existence e the existence of all other existing beings, as Mater Eckhart, a famous contemporary of Thomas, taught; for infinite existence is of another order than that of the finite existence.  Per ipsam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse.-“On account of its purity, God’s existence is distinct from all others.”  Thus the Schoolmen not only reject the com-penetration of finite beings in a single whole (see 8:1 and 10:1) but also their com-penetration with God.  They deny monism in all forms.  Creation ex nihilo y an act of free will is the only theory which can satisfy the exigencies of the metaphysics of reality as it actually is.  In addition to the finite there must exist the Infinite, which can only be infinite on condition that it remains forever other than the finite, while at the same time the finite remains forever in dependence upon the infinite.

Since the principal of causality does not involve the notion of time, a creation for all eternity is not contradictory.  On this subject, which was warmly debated in the thirteenth century, Thomas wrote: “It cannot be proved that man, or heaven or stones did not always exist.”

God’s knowledge is perfect and identical with His essence.  It must extend not merely to His own being, but to all other possible essences.  God’s knowledge and government of the universe is dealt with in the theory which has been called the “system of laws.”  Thomas Aquinas there sets forth by way of synthesis the relations of subordination and dependence of contingent beings upon God.  The eternal law is the plan of Providence such as it exists in the infinite knowledge of God.  This plan is reflected in each and every being of the universe in a way conformable to its particular nature, and thus constitutes the ‘natural law.’  The effect of this natural law is to lead each being to exercise its activities in such a way as to lead to its end, and so to contribute to the whole plan of Providence.  It is blind and fatalistic in inferior beings, but in the case of man it is known by the reason, and it is in the power of human liberty to live in accordance with it or the contrary.  Lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.-“The natural law (of mankind) is simply a reflection of the eternal law in a rational creature.”  We shall see shortly what a close relation there is between the natural human law and morality, and why it is that all positive laws ought to be based upon the natural law (see 13:2;  15:7).

4.  Conclusion.  To Thomas Aquinas, the existence of God is not a truth which is immediately evident, but one requiring demonstration.  We do not know Him in the manner in which we know, for example, the principle of contradiction or our own existence, but we have to view Him through the thick veil of the world of sense reality, which is between Him and us.  Likewise, a reasoning process alone enables us to know some aspects, or attributes, of God’s Infinity.

Is such a knowledge of God anthropomorphic?  Yes and no.  Yes, in the sense that if we wish to say anything at all concerning God we must do so in a human way.  No, inasmuch as we are fully aware of the inadequate and limited application of the “names” which we give to the Godhead.Excerpted from THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS by Maurice De Wulf.

H/T Argent by the Tiber

The Son of God is the first-born of many brothers. Although by nature he is the only-begotten, by grace he has joined many to himself and made them one with him. For to those who receive him he has given the power to become the sons of God.

He became the Son of man and made many men sons of God, uniting them to himself by his love and power, so that they became as one. In themselves they are many by reason of their human descent, but in him they are one by divine rebirth.

The whole Christ and the unique Christ – the body and the head – are one: one because born of the same God in heaven, and of the same mother on earth. They are many sons, yet one son. Head and members are one son, yet many sons; in the same way, Mary and the Church are one mother, yet more than one mother; one virgin, yet more than one virgin.

Both are mothers, both are virgins. Each conceives of the same Spirit, without concupiscence. Each gives birth to a child of God the Father, without sin. Without any sin, Mary gave birth to Christ the head for the sake of his body. By the forgiveness of every sin, the Church gave birth to the body, for the sake of its head. Each is Christ’s mother, but neither gives birth to the whole Christ without the cooperation of the other.

In the inspired Scriptures, what is said in a universal sense of the virgin mother, the Church, is understood in an individual sense of the Virgin Mary, and what is said in a particular sense of the virgin mother Mary is rightly understood in a general sense of the virgin mother, the Church. When either is spoken of, the meaning can be understood of both, almost without qualification.

In a way, every Christian is also believed to be a bride of God’s Word, a mother of Christ, his daughter and sister, at once virginal and fruitful. These words are used in a universal sense of the Church, in a special sense of Mary, in a particular sense of the individual Christian. They are used by God’s Wisdom in person, the Word of the Father.

This is why Scripture says: I will dwell in the inheritance of the Lord. The Lord’s inheritance is, in a general sense, the Church; in a special sense, Mary; in an individual sense, the Christian.
Christ dwelt for nine months in the tabernacle of Mary’s womb. He dwells until the end of the ages in the tabernacle of the Church’s faith. He will dwell for ever in the knowledge and love of each faithful soul.

H/T Argent by the Tiber

The angel Gabriel had announced the news of something that was as yet hidden and so, to buttress the Virgin Mary’s faith by means of a real example, he told her also that an old and sterile woman had conceived, showing that everything that God willed was possible to God.

When Mary heard this she did not disbelieve the prophecy, she was not uncertain of the message, she did not doubt the example: but happy because of the promise that had been given, eager to fulfil her duty as a cousin, hurried by her joy, she went up into the hill country.

Where could she hurry to except to the hills, filled with God as she was? The grace of the Holy Spirit does not admit of delays. And Mary’s arrival and the presence of her Son quickly show their effects: As soon as Elizabeth heard Mary’s greeting her child leapt in her womb and she was filled with the Holy Spirit.

See the careful distinction in the choice of words. Elizabeth was the first to hear the voice but her son John was the first to feel the effects of grace. She heard as one hears in the natural course of things; he leapt because of the mystery that was there. She sensed the coming of Mary, he the coming of the Lord — the woman knew the woman, the child knew the child. The women speak of grace while inside them grace works on their babies. And by a double miracle the women prophesy under the inspiration of their unborn children.

The infant leapt and the mother was filled with the Spirit. The mother was not filled before her son: her son was filled with the Holy Spirit and in turn filled his mother. John leapt and so did Mary’s spirit. John leapt and filled Elizabeth with the Spirit; but we know that Mary was not filled but her spirit rejoiced. For the Incomprehensible was working incomprehensibly within his mother. Elizabeth had been filled with the Spirit after she conceived, but Mary before, at the moment the angel had come. “Blessed are you,” said Elizabeth, “who believed”.

You too, my people, are blessed, you who have heard and who believe. Every soul that believes — that soul both conceives and gives birth to the Word of God and recognises his works.

Let the soul of Mary be in each one of you, to proclaim the greatness of the Lord. Let the spirit of Mary be in each one of you, to rejoice in God. According to the flesh only one woman can be the mother of Christ but in the world of faith Christ is the fruit of all of us. For every soul can receive the Word of God if only it is pure and preserves itself in chastity and modesty.

The soul that has been able to reach this state proclaims the greatness of the Lord just as Mary did and rejoices in God its saviour just like her.

The Lord’s greatness is proclaimed, as you have read elsewhere, where it says Join me in magnifying the Lord. This does not mean that anything can be added to the Lord’s greatness by human words, but that he is magnified in us. Christ is the image of God and so any good or religious act that a soul performs magnifies that image of God in that soul, the God in whose likeness the soul itself was made. And thus the soul itself has some share in his greatness and is ennobled.

In the Church’s tradition the same biblical symbols are applied, either in turn or simultaneously, with one and the same ever-increasing profusion , the the Church and Our Lady.  Both are the New Eve; Paradise; the tree of Paradise, whose fruit is Christ, the great tree seen in the dream by Nebuchodonosor, planted in the center of the earth.  Both are the Ark of the Covenant, Jacob’s Ladder, the Gate of Heaven, the House built on the mountaintop, the fleece of Gideon, the Tabernacle of the Highest, the throne of Solomon, the impregnable fortress.  Both are the City of God, the mysterious City of which the Psalmist sang; the valiant woman of the Book of Proverbs, the Bride arrayed for her husband, the woman who is the foe of the serpent, and the great sign in heaven described in the Apocalypse-the woman clothed with the sun and victorious over the dragon.  Both are-after Christ- the dwelling place place of wisdom, even wisdom herself; both are “a new world” and “a prodigious creation”; both rest in the shadow of Christ.  There is in all of this something much more than a case of parallelism or the alternating use of ambivalent symbols.  As far as the Christian mind is concerned, Mary is the “ideal figure of the Church”, the “sacrament” of it, and “the mirror in which the whole Church is reflected”.  Everywhere the Church finds in her its type and model, its point of origin and perfection: “The form of our mother the Church is according to the form of His mother”.-excerpted from THE SPLENDOUR OF THE CHURCH 241-242

We must avoid relegating Mary’s maternity to the sphere of mere biology…If, therefore, Christ, and ecclesia are the hermeneutical center of the scriptural narration of the history of God’s saving dealings with man, then and only then is the placed fixed where Mary’s motherhood becomes theologically significant as the ultimate personal concretization of the Church.  At the moment when she pronounces her Yes, Mary is Israel in person; she is the Church in person and as a person.  She is the personal concretization of the Church because her Fiat makes her the bodily Mother of the Lord.   But  this biological fact is a theological reality, because it realizes the deepest spiritual  content of the covenant that God intended to make with Israel.  Luke suggests this in harmonizing 1:45 (”blessed is she who believed”) and 11:28 (”blessed…are those who hear the word of God and keep it”).  We can therefore say that the affirmation of Mary’s motherhood and the affirmation of her representation of the Church are related as factum and mysterium facti, as the fact and the sense that gives the fact its meaning.  The two things are inseparable: the fact without its sense would be empty.  Mariology cannot be developed from the naked fact, but only from the fact as it is understood in the hermeneutics of faith.  In consequence, Mariology can never be purely mariological.  Rather, it stands within the totality of the basic Christ-Church structure and is the most concrete expression of its inner coherence.