The Divine Lamp

This part of the Compendium of the Summa treats of Goodness in general and corresponds to question 5 of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica. That question is treated in six articles which you will find links to below. I have also included pertinent links to the Summa Contra Gentiles.
ST I, 5, 1 Whether goodness differs really from being?
ST I, 5, 2 Whether goodness is prior in idea to being? Goodness and Being are the same in substance but different according to our mode of conception; for Goodness implies the notion of desirability, where as Being is necessarily not bound up with anything of that kind. Nevertheless, as everything is good and perfect according to its actuality, a thing is good in proportion to its measure of being, which is actuality, and hence Goodness and Being are substantially the same. Being, however, is prior to Goodness in our conception of them, because a thing is knowable accordingly as it is actual; and, therefore, since Being is the proper object of the intellect, it falls under knowledge, and is thus prior to Goodness.

ST I, 5, 3 Whether every being is good?
ST I, 5, 4 Whether goodness has the aspect of final cause? Every being, as such is good, for being is actuality, which is a perfection, and this again is desirable and good in our idea of it, and hence everything is good; and good is a final cause for the reason because that which is first in the cause itself comes last in the thing which is caused; thus fire gives heat before it produces the nature of fire in its effects, although heat in the fire produces the substantial form. Hence in the process of causation we find, first, good, and the end which moves the efficient cause; secondly, the act of the efficient cause to the form; thirdly, there comes the form; and hence the contrary must be the case in the effect caused; for first is the form which makes it a being; secondly, the effective power which makes it perfect in being, because each thing is perfect accordingly as it can produce its likeness; thirdly, comes the idea of goodness which makes a thing perfect.

ST I, 5, 5 Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
ST I, 5, 6 Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous (just), the useful and the pleasant ( delectable)? The idea of Good is expressed in Mode, Species, and Order. The form makes everything what it is, and this presupposes antecedent and consequent principles, as, for instance, determination to one form or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient; and this is signified by mode; hence it is said that measure fixes the mode. The species is signified in the form because each thing is constituted in a species by the form, and tendency to the end or to action follows from the form. Further, each thing acts so far as it is in actuality and tends to that which belongs to it according to its form; and this belongs to order. hence the idea of Good implying perfection consists in mode, species, and order. So Good is properly divided into the useful, the just and the delectable. That which is desirable and terminates the movement of desire as the means wherey it tends to something else, is called useful; that which is desired as an end so as to entirely terminate desire and is desired for its own sake, is called just; and that which, being desired for its own sake, terminates desire by rest in the desired thing, is called delectable. Good is thus properly divided into these three.

S t Thomas doesn’t deal with this subject in the SCG in isolation but in relation to God. the SCG Book One, Chapter 37 can, however, be read at this point.

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The subjects dealt with in this post are found in more detail in the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica, question 3.  I have provided links to each article  of question 3 as it corresponds to what is contained in the post.  I’ve also provided at the end of each subject dealt with, a link to pertinent passages in the Summa Contra Gentiles; however, the SCG deals with the subject matter in a different manner than the ST, one would be better off reading Book One of the SCG, chapters 14-27 as a whole.

ST I, 3, 1 Whether God is a body?  God is not corporeal; first, because movement is not possible to a body except by an external agent-God is the First cause of motion, Himself being immovable, as was shown above; secondly, a body is a potentiality (in potentia) because, as it is continuous, it is divisible indefinitely, whereas God is the noblest of all Beings in Act; and, therefore, cannot be corporeal, a body being either living or not living, and a living body is nobler than a not living body; but a living body does not live as such, otherwise every body would live, and so it must live y another, which is the soul. That which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is, therefore, impossible that God should be corporeal.  (See SCG 1, 16 and 1,20)
ST I, 3, 2  Whether God is composed of matter and form?  (See SCG 1, 17, 1, 18,  )
ST I, 3, 3  Is there composition of quiddity, essence, or nature, and subject in Him? (See SCG 1, 21)
ST I, 3, 4  Is He composed of essence and existence? (See SCG 1, 22)
God is not composed of matter and form. Matter is of itself a potentiality. God is True Actuality, having no potentiality. Further, every created being is good and perfect by virtue of its form and by participation, as matter participates form; but as God is the first and highest Good, He is not Good y participation, but by His own Essence; therefore He is no composite. It is clear also, from being the First Efficient Cause, an therefore, the First Cause and acting of Himself, and Form by His own Essence, why He is not composed of matter and form. God is identified with His Essence or Nature, whereas in single forms which are their own individuality the subject is the same as the nature; therefore, God is His own Deity and His own Life, and all else that can be predicated of Him. In things composed of matter and form nature differs from the subject, because the nature or essence comprehends in itself only what falls under the definition of Species, and so it does not comprehend the individualizing matter, and thereby it is distinguished from the subject. So God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence; for whatever is in anything besides its essence must be caused either by the essence or by some external agent; but it cannot be by the essence alone, for to e its own cause of being is beyond any being. If this is caused by an external agent, it must be as regards anything that has existence and essence distinct, that it should have a cause other than itself; but with God that cannot be, for He is, we have seen, the First Efficient Cause. Further, existence when distinct from essence is related to it as act to potentiality; but God is Pure Act with not potentiality, and, therefore, He is identified with His Essence; this is evident likewise from the fact that He is the First Being, and, therefore, must Be. If His Existence and Essence were not the same, he would Be by participation, and thus He would not the First Being; which is absurd to say of God.
ST I, 3, 5 Whether God is contained in a genus?   Neither is God, properly speaking, in any genus. Species is made of genus and difference; and that from which difference comes stands towards that which makes the genus actual to the potential (thus the rational may be compared to the sensitive, as the actual to the potential, and so on); bus since in God the potential cannot be added to His Actuality, it cannot be that He should be as a species in a genus. Moreover, if God were in a genus, it must be that of Being, for genus signifies the essence of a thing, as when we predicate of a thing that is is such; but Being cannot be a genus, as Aristotle says, because every genus has differences external to its essence, whereas no difference can e external to a simple being. Therefore, God is not in a genus, for outside of Being there is only not-Being, which cannot be the difference among beings. Besides, all the members of one genus have those things in common which constitute the genus in its essence (of which it may be predicated that it is such), but they differ in their being; thus the being of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor is the being of one man the same as another’s. There is a necessary difference, therefore between being (or existence) and essence in things which are in a genus; whereas the contrary has been proved in God, and, therefore, He is not in a genus. Neither does He belong to a genus by reduction to first principles, for whatever belongs to a genus by reduction does not extend beyond it; whereas God is the First Principle of all Being, and hence He cannot be contained as the first principle in any particular genus.  (See SCG 1, 25)
ST I, 3, 6 Whether in God there are any accidents?  Nor can there be any accident in God. The subject is to the accident as the potential is to the actual, and God being Pure Actuality, the potential has no place in Him. Then, as God is His own Existence, there can be nothing added to His Nature; just as heat has only heat, although a thing which is hot may have something external added to the heat, such as whiteness. Thirdly, whatever exists of itself is prior to that which is accidental. Hence, as God is the First Being, there cannot be in Him anything accidental.  (See SCG 1, 23)
ST I, 3, 7 Whether God is wholly simple?  God is, therefore, wholly Simple, for in Him there is no composition nor quantitative parts, neither is his Nature distinct from His Subject. he is wholly Simple likewise because what is composite comes after its component parts, and depends upon them; whereas God is the First Being. Moreover, a thing composite has a cause for its unity; But God has no cause, being Himself the First Efficient Cause. Also, in everything which is composite there is potentiality and acutality, which have no place in God. Finally, everything which is composite is a whole separate from its parts, whether like or unlike, which can in no way be said of God, Who is His own Form, or rather His own Form, or rather His own Being, and, therefore, is wholly Simple.

ST I, 3, 8 Whether God enters into the composition of other things?  Neither does God enter into the composition of any other things, as some have erroneously thought ans said that He was the soul of the first heavens, or the formal principle of all things, or primal matter (materia prima), for God is the First Efficient Cause, and such cause is numerically distinct from the form of the effect, and only agree with it in species, as in the case of man generating a man. Matter does not agree with its efficient cause either numerically or specifically, for it is in potentia, and the latter is in actu. God, as the First Cause, is the highest, and acts by His own power; and so He is not a part of anything else. Nor can any part of a composite thing be the absolute first among beings, as God is; not matter or form, which are the principles of anything composite; for matter, which is potentiality, is simply posterior to actuality, and form, which is part likewise, is participated form which comes after that which is For by Essence. Therefore God does not enter into composition at all.  (See SCG 1, 26 and 1, 27)

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The following may be read in conjunction with Question 5 (in six articles) of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica.  Aquinas also deals with the subject of The Good in the Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, Question 21 (On Truth).

Goodness and being are the same in substance but different according to our mode of conception; for Goodness implies the notion of desirerability, whereas Being is not necessarily bound up with anything of that kind. Nevertheless, as everything is good and perfect according to its actuality, a thing is good in proportion to its measure of being, which is actuality, and hence Goodness and Being are substantially the same. Being, however, is prior to Goodness in our conception of them, because a thing is knowable accordingly as it is actual; and, therefore, since Being is the proper object of the intellect, it falls under knowledge, and is thus prior to Goodness.

Every being, as such, is good, for being is actuality, which is a perfection, and this again is desirable and good in our idea of it, and hence everything is good; and good is a final cause because it is desirable. What is desirable is a final cause for the reason because that which is the first in the cause itself comes last in the thing which is caused; thus fire gives heat before it produces the nature of fire in its effect, although heat in the fire produces the substantial form. Hence in the process of causation we find, first, good, and the end which moves the efficient cause; secondly, the act of the efficient cause to form; thirdly, there comes the form; and hence the contrary must be the case in the effect caused; for the first is the form which makes it a being; secondly, the effective power which makes it perfect in being, because each thing is perfect accordingly as it can produce its likeness; thirdly, comes the idea of goodness which makes a thing perfect.

The idea of Good is expressed in Mode, Species, and Order. The form makes everything what it is, and this presupposes antecedent and consequent principles, as, for instance, determination to one form or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient; and this is signified by mode; hence it is said that measure fixes the mode. The species is signified in the form because each thing is constituted in a species by the form, and tendency to the end or to action follows from the form. Further, each thing acts so far as it is in actuality and tends to that which belongs to it according to its form; and this belongs to order. Hence the idea of Good implying perfection consists in mode, species, and order. So Good is properly divided into the useful, the just and the delectable. That which is desirable and terminates the movement of desire as the means whereby it tends to something else, is called useful; that which is desired as an end so as to entirely terminate desire and is desired for its own sake, is called just; and that which, being desired for its own sake, terminates desire by rest in the desired thing, is called delectable. Good is thus properly divided into these three.

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It is necessary for the salvation of man that, besides the natural sciences, there should exist some doctrine received by revelation; for many things are made known by revelation which transcends reason.  Moreover, that which is discoverable about God by human reason could be known only to a few, and that after much time, and not without a large admixture of errors.  It was good, therefore, for man to e taught by means of adoctrine divinely revealed; for salvation, which is in God, depends upon a knowledge of the truth.

This doctrine is a science proceeding from principles made known to us by the light of a higher science, as music proceeds from principles explained by arithmetic.  For Sacred Doctrine proceeds from principles made known by the light of a higher knowledge, namely, the Divine Knowledge, and in it certain particulars are treated of, both as an example of life and in order that we may know clearly by what instrumentality this revelation is made.

Sacred Doctrine takes account of all things only in so far as they belong to the formal order of Divine revelation.  This science is one, neither wholly practical nor wholly speculative; but being of a higher order it includes both, yet remains one, as God knows both Himself and what He does with the same knowledge.  It is, however, more speculative than piratical, for it treats more of Divine things than of human actions, being concerned with the latter only in so far as they are intended to lead man to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists.

And this science is higher in dignity than other speculative sciences, for these derive their certainty from human reason, which may err, while Sacred Doctrine, owing to the light of Divine Knowledge, can never be deceived; moreover, they consider only things which are below reason, while she treats principally of such as transcend reason.  Sacred Doctrine is also higher in dignity than other practical sciences, for, among such, that science is accounted the more honorable which is not subordinated to a further end, as military science is to civil; but the end of this doctrine, in as far as it is practical, is eternal beatitude, to which all other ends of the practical sciences are subordinate.

And since it treats most properly of God as the First Cause, it is wisdom in the highest sense; for he is accounted wise in any department of knowledge who studies the highest cause in that department.  Seeing, therefore, that Sacred Doctrine determines concerning God, not only as he may be known by creatures, but also as He is known by Himself alone, and by others through revelation, it is properly called wisdom in the highest sense, and God is the subject of it, for all things are considered with reference to Him, all things being related to Him either as their beginning or their end.

Sacred Doctrine does not employ argument to prove its principles, which are articles of faith, but proceeds from them to demonstrate something else, as the Apostle argues from the resurrection of Christ to that of others.  The inferior sciences, indeed, do not prove their first principles or argue with those who deny them, ut leave them to e proved by a higher science, while metaphysics, which is the highest among them, only disputes with those who deny its first principles if the adversary grant something; if he grant nothing it cannot argue with him, but can still solve his objections.  In like manner, Sacred Doctrine, having no superior, disputes with those who deny its principles provided the adversary grant something, and proceeds to argue from one article of faith against those who impugn others, as in the case of heretics.  If, however, the adversary believe none of those things which are revealed, it is no longer possible to prove the articles of faith by reason alone, but only to solve objections brought against a faith which is rooted in infallible truth.  For as it is impossible that what is contrary to truth can be proved to be true, the arguments brought against faith can be answered.

I t benefits Sacred Doctrine to express things Spiritual and Divine by the use of corporeal metaphors, for God provides for every creature according to his nature, and men are led naturally by means of things sensible to knowledge which is purely intellectual.  moreover, the Sacred Scriptures are for the instruction of all men, and the uncultured apprehend intellectual things more easily under corporeal similitudes.

And this Doctrine has several meanings under one letter.  There is the literal, which is also called the historical sense, and the spiritual, when the things expressed in the words mean something else.  The spiritual sense is threefold; for as the Old Law is the sign of the New, and the new Law is the figure of the future glory, there follows from this the allegorical sense.  As they signify what makes up eternal glory, they give the anagogical sense.  Since God is the author of this Doctrine, and he comprehends all things in the mind at once, it is most fitting that the one literal sense should contain many meanings.

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What follows is from St Thomas Aquinas’ Compendium of the Summa Theologica.  It is a simplified form of the five proofs for the existence of God, which St Thomas treats of in the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica, Question 2, which can be read HERE.  St Thomas treats of the subject in a much fuller fashion in the Summa Contra Gentiles, chapters 3-13 which can be read HERE  (see especially chapters 10-13)
That God exists is in itself a self-evident truth; but it is not so to us who do not see the Essence of God; and it requires to be proved by those things which are more known to us as regards ourselves and less known in their nature, that is, by effects.  Although we know God in a general way, we do not therefore know Him absolutely.  It is possible to demonstrate the Existence of God by effects, which are more known to us than their cause, for effects, which are more known to us than their cause, for effects being granted, a pre-existing cause there must be; and we call this demonstratio quia, not propter quid, for not even by effects do we know the Essence of God.

The Existence of God may be shown by five proofs.  The first is drawn from the principle of motion.  It is evident to our senses that motion exists.  Whatever is moved must be moved by some external agent.  Nothing is moved unless it is in potentiality (in potentia) to its term of motion.  Motion is made accordingly as things are changed from the potential to the actual, and this requires some actual agent to move them from the potential state.  Since it cannot be that anything should be both potential and actual as regards the same order, it follows that the mover and the moved cannot be identical.  Thus, not to go on indefinitely, we must come at last to a First Cause immovable of motion; and there we find God.

The Second Proof consists in the order of Efficient Causes in sensible objects.  Nothing can be its own efficient cause, for then it would exist before itself.  In every order of being the first is the cause of the intermediate, and this latter the cause of the ultimate; so that if the cause e removed the effect ceases to be, and if the first is gone there can e neither the intermediate nor the ultimate.  Hence, not to proceed indefinitely, there must be a First Efficient Cause; and there too we find God.

The Third Proof is taken from possible and necessary things.  Some things may be or not be; they are possible, as they are subject to generation and decomposition; but everything could not be always thus, for what is not necessary at some time is not.  If, therefore, all things may possily not be, at some time there must have been nothing; and if this be true even now, there would be nothing, for what is not can only exist by that which is.  All things, therefore, are not mere possibilities in their origin; there must exist some necessary thing.  But whatever is necessary, either has cause for its necessity or it has not; and, not to proceed indefinitely, as regards necessary things with a cause for their being necessary, we are obliged to postulate something necessary in itself with no cause for its necessity, but itself the cause to other things of their necessity; and this is God.

The Fourth Proof proceeds from our finding some things better than others.  A thing is said to be more or less as it approaches to that which is called the most.  There exists, therefore, something which is best and truest, the source to things of all goodness and truth, and of all their other perfections; and this we call God.

The Fifth Proof is drawn from the idea of government.  Some things are without understanding, yet they work for an end, because often and always they work in the same way to obtain the best end; hence it is evident that they attain the end not by chance, but by intention; and since they must act towards the end not by their own but by some one’s knowledge, they reach the end because they are directed by an Intelligent Being.  There must, therefore, be such an Intelligent Being Who directs all natural things to their end; and Him we call God.

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What follows is from St Thomas Aquinas’ Compendium of the Summa Theologica. It treats in simplified form the three articles of question four of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa Theologica. Those articles can be read HERE. One may also wish to read the succinct treatment in the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES. Chapter 28.

The ancient philosophers did not attribute that which is Best and highest to the First Principle, because they considered only the imperfect material principle. god is Perfect, because He is the First Efficient Principle, supreme in Actuality, and, therefore, supremely Perfect. In Him are the perfections of all things, for whatever perfection exists in the effects must be found in the efficient cause, and thus they exist in God in a more eminent manner than is the case in creatures. For God is His own very Existence of Himself, and hence it must be that He contains all perfection of being, for perfection is identified with being. The creature is like to God, because God is the Efficient Cause of all, and every agent does a work like unto itself in proportion to its actuality. If an agent is one in species with its effect, there is likeness between them in species, as man generates a man; and if they are not one in species, there is likeness, but not in species, as those things which are generated by the sun’s heat are like to the sun in some degree, but they do not receive the form of the sun in specific likeness, but only in generic likeness. If there is an Agent outside of Genus, the effect has a more remote likeness to it; for the likeness is not based either on genus or species, but only on analogy, inasmuch as both have being. In this way creatures are like to God, the First Natural Principle of all.

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What follows is an excerpt from St Thomas’ own Compendium to his Summa Theologica; the Summa in simple form. The current post deals with the eight articles that make up question three of the Prima Pars (first part) of the Summa. By clicking on the text in boldface you can read the articles of the Summa itself, as they are dealt with in the Compendium. At the end of this post I provide a link to an online edition of the Summa Contra Gentiles, wherein the subject matter of the current post is dealt with in much more detail than in the Compendium or the ST. I suggest reading chapters 14-27 in relation to the subject “The Simplicity of God.” Many people find the format of the SCG much easier than the ST.

God is not corporeal; First, because movement is not possible to a body except by an external agent-God is the First Cause of motion, Himself being immovable, as was shown above; secondly, a body is a potentiality (in potentia) because, as it is continuous, it is divisible indefinitely, whereas God is a Being in Act and Pure Act; thirdly, God is the noblest of all Being and Act, and, therefore, cannot be corporeal, a body being either living or not living, and a living body is nobler than a not living, and a living body does not live as such, otherwise every body would live, and so it must live by another, which is the soul. That which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is, therefore, impossible that God should be corporeal.

God is not composed of matter and form. Matter is of itself a potentiality. God is True Actuality, having no potentiality. Further, every created being is good and perfect by virtue of its form; but as God is the first and highest Good, He is not Good by participation, but by His own Essence; therefore He is not composite. it is clear also, from His being the First Efficient Cause, and, therefore, the First Cause and acting of Himself, and Form by His own Essence, why He is not composed of matter and form. God is identified with His Essence or Nature, whereas in single forms which are their own individuality the subject is the same as the nature; and, therefore, God is His own Deity and His own Life, and all else that can be predicated of Him. In things composed of matter and form nature differs from the subject, because the nature or essence comprehends in itself only what falls under the definition of Species, and so it does not comprehend the individualizing matter, and thereby it is distinguished from the subject. So God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence; for whatever is anything besides its own essence must be caused either by the essence or by some external agent; but it cannot be by the essence alone, for to be the cause of its own being is beyond any being. If this is caused by an external agent, it must be as regards anything that has existence and essence distinct, that it should have a cause other than itself; but with God that cannot be, For He is, we have seen, the First Efficient Cause. Further, existence when distinct from essence is related to it as act to potentiality; but God is Pure Act with no potentiality, and, therefore, He is identified with His Essence; this is evident likewise from the fact that He is the First Being, and, therefore, must Be. If His Existence and Essence were not the same, He would Be by participation, and thus He would not be the First Being; which is absurd to say of God.

Neither is God, properly speaking, in any genus. Species is made of genus and difference; and that from which difference comes stands toward that which makes the genus as the actual to the potential (thus the rational may be compared to the sensitive, as the actual to the potential, and so on); but since in God the potential cannot be added to His Actuality, it cannot be that He should be as a species in a genus. Moreover, if God were in a genus, it must be that of Being, for genus signifies the essence of a thing, as when we predicate of a thing that it is such; but Being cannot be a genus, as Aristotle says, because every genus has differences external to its essence, whereas no difference can be external to simple being. Therefore, God is not in a genus, for outside of Being there is only not-Being, which cannot be the difference among beings. Besides, all the members of one genus have all those things in common which constitute the genus in its essence ( of which it may be predicated that it is such), but they differ in their being; thus the being of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor is the being of one man the same as another’s. There is a necessary difference, therefore, betwee4n being (or existence) and essence in things which are in a genus; whereas the contrary has been proved in God, and, therefore, He is not in a genus. neither does He belong to a genus by reduction to first principles, for whatever belongs to a genus by reduction does not extend beyond it; whereas God is the First Principle of all Being, and hence He cannot be contained as the first principle in any particular genus.

Nor can there be any accident in God. The subject is to the accident as the potential is to the actual, and God being Pure Actuality, the potential has no place in Him. Then, as God is His own Existence, there can be nothing added to His Nature; just as heat has only heat, although a thing which is hot may have something external added to the heat, such as whiteness. Thirdly, whatever exists of itself is prior to that which is accidental. hence, as God is the First Being, there cannot be in Him anything accidental.

God is, therefore, wholly Simple, for in Him there is no composition nor quantitative parts,neither is His Nature distinct from His Subject. He is wholy Simple likewise because what is composite comes after its component parts, and depends upon them; whereas God is the First Being. Moreover, a thing composite has a cause for its unity; but God has no cause, being Himself the First Efficient Cause. Also, in everything which is composite there is potentiality and actuality, which have no place in God. Finally, everything which is composite is a whole separate from its parts, whether like or unlike, which can in no way be said of God, Who is His own Form, or rather His own Being, and, therefore, is wholly Simple.

Neither does God enter into the composition of any other things, as some have erroneously thought and said that He was the soul of the first heavens, or the formal principle of all things, or primal matter (materia prima), for God is the First Efficient Cause, and such cause is numerically distinct from the form of the effect, and can only agree with it in species, as in the case of man generating a man. Matter does not agree with its efficient cause either numerically or specifically, for it is in potentia, and the latter is in actu. God, as the First Cause, is the highest, and acts by His own power; and so He is not a part of anything else. Nor can any part of a composite thing be the absolute first among beings, as God is; not matter nor form, which are the principles of anything composite; for matter, which is potentiality, is simply posterior to actuality, and form, which is part likewise, is participated form which comes after that which is Form y Essence. Therefore God does not enter into composition at all.

Summa Contra Gentiles:Book One: God.

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Have you ever tried to read or study St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica and found yourself bogged down at question 1, article 3? Perhaps, for you, the place to begin would be to read his compendium. What follows is an excerpt from that Compendium dealing with article 1 of the first question of the Summa. I have provided links to the Summa itself in case anyone wants to read through the articles in conjunction with the compendium; this might make going through the Summa a bit easier. I have also provided links to other sources for further ease.

Chapter 1 SACRED DOCTRINE: ITS NATURE AND EXTENT In this chapter the saint deals with the first question of the Summa: “The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine” which is divided into ten articles.

Article 1 of the Summa looks at the question: Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?

This is treated in the first paragraph of the Comp:

• It is necessary for the salvation of man that, besides the natural sciences, there should exist some doctrine received by revelation which transcends reason. Moreover, that which is discoverable about God by human reason could be known only by a few, and that after much time, and not without a large admixture of error. It was good, therefore, for man to be taught by means of a doctrine divinely revealed; for salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of the truth.

St Thomas deals with this subject more fully in chapters 2, 3 & 4 of the Summa Contra Gentes. For more, see the full text of THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA article on revelation, especially the first 3 sections on pages 1-3. You can also profitably consult chapter 1 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, as well as chapter 2.

For links to many online books and articles, podcasts and videos of interest to Catholics, please see the pages on my other site.

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