Metaphysics: Book 1, Chapter 2 (1)
1.  Aristotle, having shown, in the first chapter, the the science under investigation-which he here calls wisdom, though elsewhere by a different denomination-is conversant about causes, proceeds now to lay down what sort these causes are, their nature, and number.

1.  Wisdom conversant about primary and universal causes.

Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is Wisdom. If one were to take the notions we have about the wise man, this might perhaps make the answer more evident.

2.  Threefold proof of this; first, from the definition of wise man.

We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them in detail; secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of Wisdom); again, that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge;

2a. second proof: from the definition of wisdom.
and that of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of Wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of Wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him. “Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about Wisdom and the wise.  

2c. Third proof: from the applicability of these definitions to the present science.
Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge (2); for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal.  And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry (3). But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable); and the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature.

2.  During the first age of Greek philosophy it was styled “sophia”, or “wisdom,” and its cultivators were termed “wise men;” and the term philosopher was first applied to Pythagoras.  This change, no doubt, betokened a corresponding change in men’s mode of thought; for thereby an element hitherto undiscovered was brought into notice,-namely, the relation of our emotions to scientific investigations.

3.  There is the same reasoning adopted by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 2.

3.  Conclusion from the foregoing: that wisdom is a science of causes.

Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes.

4.  What sort of a science wisdom is-not active but speculative-proof thereof.

4a. From the earliest philosophers. That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers(4) . For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom (5), for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage;

4. Aristotle shows that the science under investigation is speculative, not active, from the fact that the earliest philosophy sprang from wonder,-that wonder that flows from ignorance,-that the removal of ignorance amounts to knowledge,-that this was accomplished by speculation and not practice; ant that therefore wisdom, the source of the highest knowledge, was speculative and not active.  Compare Alexander Aphrodisiensis on the passage, and also Thomas Aquinas in his remarks on the Proemiun of Aristotle.

5.  Philosophy necessarily, at first, partook largely of the nature of the fabulous, on account of its being therewith deeply tinged through the influence of poetry.  This is manifest from the works of Greek antiquity in the instances of Linus, Musaeus, and Orpheus.

5.  This science is most liberal.

but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another’s, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake.

6.  Not human in origin: proved from the poets.

Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage(6) , so that according to Simonides ‘God alone can have this privilege’, and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him (7). If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate (8). But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the proverb, ‘bards tell a lie’),

6. Men are often the slaves of thier nature on account of their superabundant bodily necessities-Asclepius.

7. Aristotle’s object, in bringing forward Simonide, is to show that this wisdom, on account of the very elevated speculations it contains, seems a thing of Divine growth, as being inconsistent, in regard to its origin, with the frail faculties and condition of man.

8. Their superior qualifications would excite the rancour of the Deity, on the supposition of the truth of the poetic idea of the Divine as a nature essentially envious.  Herodotus was of the same opinion, that the character of the Divinity being envious, there resulted misfortune, sent by the invidious Deity upon those amongst the human race that shone above their fellows.

7.  This science is most honorable.

nor should any other science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle (9), and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better.

9. This is a remarkable passage to occur in the writings of Aristotle, about whose deism or atheism so much has been said and written.

8.  This science developed in an order contrary to the early philosophy.

“Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries (10). For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are, as they do about self-moving marionettes, or about the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side; for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason, that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause; for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable.

10. That whereas the old philosophy originated from wonder,-that is, ignorance,-and attained unto a sort of knowledge, yet that when man reached this knowledge, knowledge, as such, became the great actuating motive in speculation.  This present science under investigation, however, would set out from an opposite point in this progress, because it started from the consideration of that which is the highest object of speculative knowledge.

“We have stated, then, what is the nature of the science we are searching for, and what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach.

The following contains the text of Book 1, Chapter 1 of Aristotle’s METAPHYSICS. The translation is that of W.D. Ross and is in the public domain. The source I used for the text is copyrighted under the GNU Free Documentation License. Ross’ text is in plain black script. Section headings in bold type are from McMahon’s METAPHYSICS OF ARITOTLE.  Notes from other non-copyrighted works are in red. My own notes, if any, are in blue.  A brief analysis from McMahon can be found HERE.

The Metaphysics of Aristotle(1).

(1) Metaphysics is sometimes taken as meaning “beyond,” or “above” physics because, according to Aristotle himself, this science is superior to all others. It should be noted, however, that Aristotle did not give this name to his work. According to MacMahon, the designation of it as “Metaphysics” comes from Andronicus of Rhodes “who, out of the materials employed in compiling the Physics, set down after them, and designated as meta physika whatever he found unsuited for insertion here.” Apparently Andronicus, finding that the subject matter of this body of writing was different from The Physics, separated them from that work in his compilation of Aristotle’s texts. Thus the word originally designated their place with in the Organon (body of work) of Aristotle: they were put after (meta) the physics. Other scholars maintain that the term is derived from the fact that it was considered appropriate to study this particular subject only after (meta) having studied The Physics.

1. Man’s natural thirst for knowledge, and a proof thereof.

“ALL men by nature desire to know (2). An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses(3); for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else(4). The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.

2. “all men desire to know.” This, probably, is what Cicero means when he says, in the De Officiis, I, 4,- “In primisque hominis est, propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio.” The assertion, however, that all men desire knowledge, has been objected to, on the ground that in some this desire is wholly absent; but this absence merely mounts to a suppression of the natural desire from various causes; e.g., want of leisure for intellectual pursuits, constitutional laziness, voluptuous habits. This natural craving for knowledge leads to a concentration of individual abilities on particular studies, and thus to a subdivision of intellectual labor. Aristotle omits to notice here the connection between this desire and our social capacities, which ensures the mutual communication between mankind of their mental and scientific discoveries.

Aquinas, in his commentary on the Metaphysics notes that Aristotle gives three reasons why men desire by nature to know: 1. a thing naturally desires its own perfections; 2. by nature things are inclined to perform operations proper to them, and understanding is proper to man’s nature; 3. each thing is inclined to be untied to its source. See Aquinas’ Commentary on the Metaphysics, Lesson 1, under the heading “commentary,” # 2-4.

3. Aristotle thus assigns two reasons for our love of the senses,-their utility, and their being sources of knowledge; or, as Thomas Aquinas expresses it, “in quantum sunt utiles ac gognoscitivi.”

4. “ we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else.” Aristotle’s reasoning amounts to this. Man loves knowledge, and loves the senses, therefore, for their own sakes; that is, so far forth as they are the inlets of knowledge, and, consequently, the sense of sight for the cause he assigns. The elevation of this sense above the others was in accordance with the notions of the old philosophers, and of the scholastics; and this superiority was grounded on the immediateness of the perceptions afforded by the organ of vision, compared with the others which came in through a medium. This notion is discarded by the moderns. All the sense, as such, are equally the source of knowledge, as is most satisfactorily proved by Brown, and with much originality too, in his Philosophy of the Human Mind. I’m not sure this is a fair assessment of all scholasticism which gave more than one reason for sights superiority.

2. Different degrees of knowledge in the brute creation, and their different order of development.

“By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them(5), though not in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee, and any other race of animals that may be like it; and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught.

5. “from sensation memory is produced in some of them (brute animals), though not in others.” That memory is a distinct faculty of man, much less in brutes, is denied by Brown; but that what we term memory in the human species is found in brutes, is shown by Locke in the instance of birds, after a few attempts, learning to warble particular airs of music.

3. Comparison between men and brutes.

“The animals other than man live by appearances (6) and memories, and have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings.

6. “Appearances.” It is not, however, quite so easy to determine the meaning of this word in the philosophic works of the ancients. In the present case, Aristotle seems to mean those ideas that are conveyed into the minds of animals by means of their representative power…Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary, defines (the word) thus: Quae est motus factus sensu secundus actum;” which reminds us of Hobbes’ definition of sensation itself.

4. The different degrees of human knowledge, and their order of development.

Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art.

5. The generation of art and science from experience.

but really science and art come to men through experience; for ‘experience made art’, as Polus says, ‘but inexperience luck.’ Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced. For to have a judgement that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they were ill of this disease, e.g. to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fevers-this is a matter of art.

6. The comparison of art to experience, in regard to practice.

“With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.)

7. The superiority of art over experience, in regard of knowledge.

But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not.

8. Three proofs in support of the above proposition (#7)

The first proof. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ and the cause. Hence we think also that the masterworkers in each craft are more honourable and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are done (we think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire burns,-but while the lifeless things perform each of their functions by a natural tendency, the labourers perform them through habit); thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes.

The second proof. And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know, that the former can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot.

The third proof. “Again, we do not regard any of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they do not tell us the ‘why’ of anything-e.g. why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot.

9. Speculative rather than active art is wisdom.

“At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure (7).

7. Aristotle here shows the paths through which men must travel into this “wisdom,” or first philosophy; and for this purpose adduced the example of the Egyptian priests, who were enabled to construct the speculative sciences of geometry and mathematics by having enjoyed the leisure from the laborious employments of life. They were thus allowed an opportunity of contemplating the heavenly phenomena, and, from such observations of experience, of deducing the abstract sciences. The student will do well to consult Alexander’s Commentary on the passage, and the more elaborate explanation of Asclepius, taken from Ammonius.

10. That wisdom is a science of causes, reaffirmed, and stated as the object of the present treatise.

“We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the masterworker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes.

A. Analysis Of The Preface.

The Metaphysics opens with a short Preface, in which Aristotle seeks to introduce his readers to the philosophy that he is now about to develop for them, and which he implies is quite distinct in its aim from that found in the other portions of his works(1); though at the same time inseparably connected with them, as pieces of that vast edifice of knowledge, practical as well as speculative, which it was his ambition to build up and leave behind him for the service of mankind.

1. This is apparent from his imposition of the term Sophia, or Wisdom, to designate the science under investigation in this Treatise. For Aristotle, Metaphysics is the science (i.e., intellectual knowledge acquired by means of causes or based on general principles) which governs all other sciences. The reason for this is that it investigates the cause of being itself.

2. Aristotle’s object in the Preface

For this purpose he endeavors to exalt (2) as much as possible the nature of the inquiry undertaken in this Treatise, and he thereby calculated on enlisting the sympathy of his readers in its behalf. Moreover, by thus arraying Metaphysics in an attractive garb, he was enabled to answer indirectly the objections that were afloat in the popular mind against the practicability of their study. Now both these ends were assuredly answered in this Preface; for whatever would have a tendency to promote the dignity of Metaphysics as a science, would necessarily exercise a reflex influence in giving a decided answer to all the sneers that might be leveled against it by ignorant and presuming Sophists.

(2) This he does towards the end of chapter 1.

3. Positive and negative defense of Ontology.

Thus Aristotle Defends Ontology positively and negatively: positively, by a bold analysis of the nature and objects of the science; and negatively, by making this analysis subserve as a plain answer to all the cavils of the Sceptics.

4. Aristotle’s chief aim in this Preface.

In this Preface, therefore, to the Metaphysics, we may lay it down that the chief aim of Aristotle is to invest Ontology with its peculiar attributes as a science, and this, too, for the purpose that thereby it should be elevated to its proper position amongst the other sciences; and this he conceived to be the most effectual refutation against all misconceptions as to its expediency, or scope, or general utility.

5. How this aim is attained.

The course, then, in which Aristotle pursues to accomplish all this is as follows: he aims to establish that Ontology, or, as he calls it, Wisdom, was the science properly so called. Viewed in relation to other sciences, it contained their most absolute generalizations. The science of Metaphysics might be said to bear the same relation to physical or natural science which logic has to psychology. As logic exhibits the reasoning process of the mind, and thus illustrates its capabilities for the attainment of knowledge, so Metaphysics, as science, is conversant about the highest and purest deductions from experimental philosophy, and its province is to exemplify those abstract notions and fundamental principles which establish the certainty of knowledge itself. Sense and experience merely deal with individual instances, but Ontology lays hold on what is the universal element therein, and thus gradually mounts up to be, what it is, science about causes and first principles (This is shown in chapter 1) .

B. Analysis Of Chapter 1

6. What it is that invests Metaphysics with its dignity.

And this very fact, that Metaphysics is a science of causes, it is that invests it with its dignity and importance, and draws the line of demarcation between it and all other sources of information. The senses merely bear their testimony to the particular fact of a particular sensation, but say nothing about the cause. The practical or experienced-the common workman, for instance,-understands the doing of a thing, but they have no perception as to the principle or cause of it; and for this reason we estimate the architect above the carpenter, inasmuch as the one is, whereas the other is not, conversant with the principle or cause of what is being constructed. To attribute, indeed, an acquaintance with the cause to a carpenter, would be as absurd as if we were to do so in the case of one of the brute creation; for both fulfill their functions, whilst acting, wholly irrespective of a knowledge of causes, and what the latter does from blind instinct, the former accomplishes from the mere impulse of habit; so that, in short, what sheds such luster on Metaphysics as a science, what imparts such elevation to it, is its being a science conversant with causes and first principles.

7&8. Confirmation of this from the kindred sciences (7), such as mathematics (8).

But, indeed, it may be also said that the origin of the sciences kindred to Metaphysics bears the completest testimony to its dignity and value as a science, that calls into play the loftiest faculties of the human mind, and elevates them above things sensual and groveling. The sciences kindred to Metaphysics, from their very earliest dawn, were pursued not for the sake of any extrinsic advantages; for they sprang up in places where increasing civilization had supplied the necessary and even superfluous wants of the inhabitants.

Thus it was that the mathematical sciences took their rise in Egypt amongst the priests; for the sacerdotal caste, having their worldly expenses defrayed for them out of the public purse, were permitted to enjoy leisure, and thus were induced to cultivate the abstract sciences, not from their mere utility, but from the pure love of knowledge itself, as such.

9. Why Ontology has its claims upon us.

And this fact it is which, in the most eminent degree, evinces the claim which Metaphysics, as a science, has upon our sympathies, because it is a purely speculative science; that is, a science cultivated for the sake of the knowledge it furnishes its votaries with. And, indeed, beside the particular instance in the case of the Egyptians just mentioned, that Metaphysics, or any high order of science, is pursued for the sake of knowledge, as such, is in general proved from the origin of speculation itself. For mankind, from wonder, first forms systems of philosophy; and wonder is attended with a feeling of ignorance, as well as a desire to remove that ignorance. Now this desire to remove ignorance, wherever it exists, at the same time manifests the most unmistakable love of knowledge for its own sake. In short, what is the love of knowledge, but, in other words, the desire to be liberated from the bondage of ignorance?

A1. All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.

In his commentary on the Metaphysics, St Thomas Aquinas gives three reasons why “all men by nature desire to know.” The first is that”each thing naturally desires its own perfection. Hence matter is also said to desire form as any imperfect thing desires its perfection. Therefore, since the intellect, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and becomes them actually only through knowledge, because the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, as is stated in Book 3 of THE SOUL, so each man naturally desires knowledge just as matter desires form. The second reason is that each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation, as something hot is naturally inclined to heat, and something heavy to be moved downwards. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand, for by reason of this he differs from all other things. Hence the desire of man is naturally inclined to understand, and therefore to possess scientific knowledge. The third reason is that it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source, since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. This is also the reason why circular motion is the most perfect motion, as is proved in Book 8 of THE PHYSICS, because its terminus is united to its starting point. Now it is only by means of his intellect that man is united to the separate substance, which are the source of the human intellect and that to which the human intellect is related as something imperfect to something perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the ultimate happiness of man consists in this union. Therefore man naturally desires to know.”

For Aristotle, man learns through his senses: By what medium is it that the oak tree, situated at a distance of ten yards, say, from my eye, affects my organism?…

Origin of intellectual knowledge: There is a well known adage of scholastic and Thomistic psychology, which states that we derive the content of our abstract ideas from the content of our sensations, and, by means of these, ultimately from the material universe. Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit sensu. “There is nothing in the mind that is not first in the senses.” Our ideas of life, strength, greatness, motion, action exercised or received, double, half, left, right, ect.,- all these and a thousand others equally abstract in nature- are derived from the sense perceptions which surround us. We have proper and direct knowledge of the material world only. Our mind is closely united to our body, and it is in and through the corporeal bodies that we obtain our intellectual knowledge. It follows from this that even moral ideas (justice, right, ect.,) and our knowledge of spiritual beings (the mind, spirits, God) is derived from, and must be expressed in terms of the material, by means of comparison, analogy, negation, and transcendence. We have only an improper and indirect idea of what is spiritual. Although we can prove that there is such a thing as a spiritual being, we do not know in what it consists properly, and our feeble minds have to conceive it by applying to it the notions of being, reality, causality, etc., which have come to us through the channel of our senses. (SOURCE)

Aristotle thinks-and most people would agree-that in light of how our knowledge begins, sight is the most important and valued of the senses, for it is the most useful.

By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught, e.g., the bee, and any other race of animals that may be like it; and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught.

All animals have sentient souls. All (apparently) have the sense of touch, which for some may be the only sense they possess. Animals with more sense powers are higher (more perfect) than those with less (the highest being man). Further, other factors contribute to this gradation of being: e.g., though all animals have sensation, not all are by nature able to develop memory, which is derived from sensation.

The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings. Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity of a single experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art, but really science and art come to men through experience; for ‘experience made art’, as Polus says (in Plato’s Gorgias), ‘but inexperience lucj’. Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced. For to have a judgment that when Callais was ill of this disease this liquid did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked of in one class, when they were ill of this disease, e.g., to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fever,-this is a matter of art

As the opening chapter of the Metaphysics proceeds, Aristotle notes that memory is the cause of experience in men, and that from many such remembered experiences of a particular action producing like results all or most of the time, art develops. Notice also that the way in which art develops from experience is similar to the way in which experience develops from memory. “(T)he way in which art rises from experience is the same as the way spoken of above in which experience arises from memory. For just as one experiential cognition comes from many memories of a thing, so does one universal judgment about all similar things come from the apprehension of many experiences. Hence art has this [unified view] more than experience because experience is concerned only with singulars, whereas art has to do with universals.” (AQUINAS)