The Divine Lamp

The text in plain script and the notes in red are those of John Henry Mc Mahon and are taken from his work on the Philosopher’s Metaphysics, which is in the public domain. Text in blue represent my notes. I hope to soon post W.D. Ross’ translation of Metaphysics Bk. 1, Ch. 1 with Mc Mahon’s notes, along with some notes by St Thomas Aquinas. The text of Ross’ translation can be found HERE.

A. Analysis Of The Preface.

The Metaphysics opens with a short Preface, in which Aristotle seeks to introduce his readers to the philosophy that he is now about to develop for them, and which he implies is quite distinct in its aim from that found in the other portions of his works(1); though at the same time inseparably connected with them, as pieces of that vast edifice of knowledge, practical as well as speculative, which it was his ambition to build up and leave behind him for the service of mankind.

1. This is apparent from his imposition of the term Sophia, or Wisdom, to designate the science under investigation in this Treatise. For Aristotle, Metaphysics is the science (i.e., intellectual knowledge acquired by means of causes or based on general principles) which governs all other sciences. The reason for this is that it investigates the cause of being itself.

2. Aristotle’s object in the Preface

For this purpose he endeavors to exalt (2) as much as possible the nature of the inquiry undertaken in this Treatise, and he thereby calculated on enlisting the sympathy of his readers in its behalf. Moreover, by thus arraying Metaphysics in an attractive garb, he was enabled to answer indirectly the objections that were afloat in the popular mind against the practicability of their study. Now both these ends were assuredly answered in this Preface; for whatever would have a tendency to promote the dignity of Metaphysics as a science, would necessarily exercise a reflex influence in giving a decided answer to all the sneers that might be leveled against it by ignorant and presuming Sophists.

(2) This he does towards the end of chapter 1.

3. Positive and negative defense of Ontology.

Thus Aristotle Defends Ontology positively and negatively: positively, by a bold analysis of the nature and objects of the science; and negatively, by making this analysis subserve as a plain answer to all the cavils of the Sceptics.

4. Aristotle’s chief aim in this Preface.

In this Preface, therefore, to the Metaphysics, we may lay it down that the chief aim of Aristotle is to invest Ontology with its peculiar attributes as a science, and this, too, for the purpose that thereby it should be elevated to its proper position amongst the other sciences; and this he conceived to be the most effectual refutation against all misconceptions as to its expediency, or scope, or general utility.

5. How this aim is attained.

The course, then, in which Aristotle pursues to accomplish all this is as follows: he aims to establish that Ontology, or, as he calls it, Wisdom, was the science properly so called. Viewed in relation to other sciences, it contained their most absolute generalizations. The science of Metaphysics might be said to bear the same relation to physical or natural science which logic has to psychology. As logic exhibits the reasoning process of the mind, and thus illustrates its capabilities for the attainment of knowledge, so Metaphysics, as science, is conversant about the highest and purest deductions from experimental philosophy, and its province is to exemplify those abstract notions and fundamental principles which establish the certainty of knowledge itself. Sense and experience merely deal with individual instances, but Ontology lays hold on what is the universal element therein, and thus gradually mounts up to be, what it is, science about causes and first principles (This is shown in chapter 1) .

B. Analysis Of Chapter 1

6. What it is that invests Metaphysics with its dignity.

And this very fact, that Metaphysics is a science of causes, it is that invests it with its dignity and importance, and draws the line of demarcation between it and all other sources of information. The senses merely bear their testimony to the particular fact of a particular sensation, but say nothing about the cause. The practical or experienced-the common workman, for instance,-understands the doing of a thing, but they have no perception as to the principle or cause of it; and for this reason we estimate the architect above the carpenter, inasmuch as the one is, whereas the other is not, conversant with the principle or cause of what is being constructed. To attribute, indeed, an acquaintance with the cause to a carpenter, would be as absurd as if we were to do so in the case of one of the brute creation; for both fulfill their functions, whilst acting, wholly irrespective of a knowledge of causes, and what the latter does from blind instinct, the former accomplishes from the mere impulse of habit; so that, in short, what sheds such luster on Metaphysics as a science, what imparts such elevation to it, is its being a science conversant with causes and first principles.

7&8. Confirmation of this from the kindred sciences (7), such as mathematics (8).

But, indeed, it may be also said that the origin of the sciences kindred to Metaphysics bears the completest testimony to its dignity and value as a science, that calls into play the loftiest faculties of the human mind, and elevates them above things sensual and groveling. The sciences kindred to Metaphysics, from their very earliest dawn, were pursued not for the sake of any extrinsic advantages; for they sprang up in places where increasing civilization had supplied the necessary and even superfluous wants of the inhabitants.

Thus it was that the mathematical sciences took their rise in Egypt amongst the priests; for the sacerdotal caste, having their worldly expenses defrayed for them out of the public purse, were permitted to enjoy leisure, and thus were induced to cultivate the abstract sciences, not from their mere utility, but from the pure love of knowledge itself, as such.

9. Why Ontology has its claims upon us.

And this fact it is which, in the most eminent degree, evinces the claim which Metaphysics, as a science, has upon our sympathies, because it is a purely speculative science; that is, a science cultivated for the sake of the knowledge it furnishes its votaries with. And, indeed, beside the particular instance in the case of the Egyptians just mentioned, that Metaphysics, or any high order of science, is pursued for the sake of knowledge, as such, is in general proved from the origin of speculation itself. For mankind, from wonder, first forms systems of philosophy; and wonder is attended with a feeling of ignorance, as well as a desire to remove that ignorance. Now this desire to remove ignorance, wherever it exists, at the same time manifests the most unmistakable love of knowledge for its own sake. In short, what is the love of knowledge, but, in other words, the desire to be liberated from the bondage of ignorance?

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