The Divine Lamp

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Note: Due to the length of the entry under this heading, it will be posted in two parts.

1. The fundamental principle of group life. Man is intended by nature to form a society. The group life is necessary, for if left to himself in an isolated state, an individual would be deprived of the materials, the intellectual guidance, and moral support necessary for the attainment of happiness. The group life is necessary precisely and only because of this insufficiency of the individual for his own needs.

In this way, then, we justify the fundamental principle of life in society, which we may enunciate as follows: The collectivity exists for the sake of the individual, and not the individual for the sake of the collectivity.” Similarly, the well-being of a group will not differ in kind from that of the individuals which compose it.

The principle is a general one, and applies to domestic groups, political (village, city, state), religious (parish, abbey, diocese, Christendom), and economic ones (e.g., trade union or guild). It is based upon general ethics, which emphasizes the value of human personality, and this moral individualism, itself one of the most striking achievements of the civilization of the Middle Ages, is in turn linked to metaphysics, which recognizes no other existent, substantial reality than the individual, in the particular sphere in question.

2. The unity of the group and the inalienable rights of its members. The collectivity therefore is not a substance as such, as is taught by some contemporary philosophers, and the very notion of ‘a collective person’ is contradictory (10:1). Its unity is not the internal unity which belongs to a natural substance, and which ensures coherence within it, but rather an external unity. Each member of a group retains his value as a person, but his activities are united or rather co-ordinated with those of others. This is especially true of the State, “which comprises many persons, whose varied activities combine to produce its well-being.” (Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 1)

The unity of a social group or of the State is a “unity of functions” exercised by the different members. The only difference between natural groups (such as the family or the State) and artificial ones (such as a club or a political party) is that the working in common is necessary in the first case and not in the second.

Since the group exists for the sake of the members, it goes without saying that it cannot take away or modify those inalienable rights which are expressions of the personality, i.e., which belong to the individual as possessing a rational nature. Whether he be slave or free, rich or poor, ruler or ruled, an individual has “the right to preserve his life, to marry and to bring up children, to develop his intelligence, to be instructed, to hold to the truth, to live in the Society.” (Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, 1. 94, art. 2). These are some of the perogatives of the individual which appear in the thirteenth-century Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Among the various natural groups, scholastic philosophers paid most attention to the family and the State.

3. The Family. The family, which forms the cell of the social organism, comprises the husband, wife, children, and servants. The father is the head of this group, and derives his authority from God (15:4). Although the wife belongs in a sense to the husband (she is said to be part of the husband), her independence relative to her husband is greater than that of children relative to their father, or servants to their masters The subordination of a child to his father is complete, as is that of a serf to his master.

From this it follows that there will be stricter relations of ‘justice’ between husband and wife than between father and children, masters and serfs, for, as we have seen above, justice requires a distinction (ad alterum) between persons. But always the individual rights of human beings remain. As for the serfs, the thirteenth century was not prepared to give them complete enfranchisement, but still their condition was altogether different from the slavery of antiquity and the early Middle Ages. Moreover, both canonical and civil legislation were constantly bettering their condition.

4. Origin of authority in the State. Whether great or small, a State consists of a group of families under the authority or power of one or several persons. Whence comes this sovereignty, i.e., the power of a man to command and rule his fellows? Schoolmen reply that all power comes from God, and explain this as follows: The whole universe is regulated by the plan of Divine Providence, the eternal law of all reality (lex aeterna). Each individual thing contributes, by attaining to its own end, to the realization of this divine plan and the object of the whole. In consequence, man will play his part in the cosmic order ordained by God for the Universe precisely by achieving the destiny which belongs to him as a rational being and thus ensuring his happiness (12:1-2). Now, since the group life was instituted in order to help individuals to attain their ends, the governing authority which forms a necessary element of a society (ratio gubernationis) must be a way of realizing the divine plan, and ultimately come from God also. “Since the eternal law is the reason or explanation of government in the chief ruler, the reason for governing rulers must also be derived from the eternal law.” (Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 95, art. 3) Rulers are therefore divine delegates. The theory is a general one, and applies to every kind of authority. In the case of the State, it does not matter by what means this divine power is transmitted, or in whom it is found. These are points for separate consideration.

5. Government is an officium or duty. The raison d’etre of government determines its nature: it is utilitarian, and officium, ‘office’ or duty. The princes of the earth are instituted by God not in order that they may seek their own profit, but in order that they may ensure the common well-being. Even in the case of the papal theocracy, the idea of officium is always found with that power, and the Pope describes himself as the servus servorum Dei, servant of the servants of God. Hence all treatises written for the use of princes and future monarchs condemn the capricious, selfish, arbitrary or tyrannical exercise of power.

Thomas builds up a whole system of guarantees in order to save the State from a government so completely opposed to its nature. (De Regimine Principum, lib. I, cap. 6) The guarantees are preventative in the first place:let the people carefully inquire concerning the candidate for power when choosing their ruler. Similar guarantees will exist throughout the monarch’s reign, for his power will be controlled and countered by the intervention of other factors, as we shall shortly see. There are likewise repressive guarantees: resistance to unjust commands of a tyrant is not only permitted, but even enjoined. Thomas expressly condemns tyrannicide: one must go to any length in order to put up with an unjust ruler, but if the regime becomes quite unsupportable, then one must have recourse to that power of deposing the monarch which is the corollary of the right to choose one. This doctrine holds good whatever be the nature of government,-monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. This brings us to the question of the depository of power.-Maurice De Wulf

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