The Divine Lamp

Article 3 Defects in the above passage.-First defect: It does not distinguish the several species of names indicating multitudes of individuals.

138.   The first thing I have to observe on the above passage is that it speaks of common names as though they were all of one and the same kind.  Now, it being well known that there are several kinds of common names, I must examine whether it be correct to treat of these names without indicating their diverse species, and whether the reasoning of Adam Smith be applicable to every species or to only one.

The only notion which he gives us of a common name is, that it signifies a ‘multitude’ of individual.  Let us see, then, in the first place, if this applies to all the species of common names-in other words, if all names expressing a ‘multitude’ of individuals are common in the true sense of the term.

The first species consists of the numerals-two, three, four, five, &c.  Leaving aside the abstraction belonging to these names, and owing  to which we cannot apply them to a species of individuals without naming the particular species which we mean-e.g. two, three, four, five, men, &c.-we will consider them only in so far as they are capable of representing to us a multitude of individuals.

Now, when I say ten men, ten cities, &c., I certainly denote a ‘multitude’ of individuals; but it cannot on that account be said that the numeral ten is common, i.e. applicable to each of those individuals-to each city, to each man, &c.  It is not true, then, that all the names indicative of a multitude of individuals can, with propriety of language, be called ‘common.’

The numerals have therefore this peculiarity, that, together with the multitude, they state its numerousness, they fix precisely the number of the individuals contained in that multitude.

139.  The second species is formed of those words which in naming a multitude of individuals do not define it numerousness with precision, but only in a general way.  Such are the words few, some, many, a great many, &c.  These also, not being applicable to each of the individuals of the respective multitudes, are not entitled to the appellation of ‘common.’

The third species comprises those names which do not express the numerousness of the multitude indicated by them, either precisely or in general way, but only relatively to some idea which is connected therewith: for instance, the words nations, tribe, family, assembly,&c.  Now, although the word family does not by itself give us any clue for knowing how many persons there are in the family, or whether it be large or small, yet from the nature of the thing we can at once understand that a family is a far smaller collection than would be suggested by the word nation.  But inasmuch as these names also, indicative though they be of a multitude, are not applicable to the single individuals belonging to it, they must be excluded from the category of common names.

140.  Lastly, all the plurals, such as men, animals, houses, &c., indicate multitudes of individuals, but in such a manner as to determine nothing whatever about their numerousness.  Hence they constitute a fourth species of collective names to which, for the reason already stated, the qualification of ‘common’ cannot be attributed.

Regarding this indeterminateness proper to plurals some other observations ought to be made; but, not to interrupt the thread of our discussion, I will, for the present, go on with the enumeration of the various kinds of names, that we may see which among them are of such a nature as easily to be mistaken for those to which the designation of common names properly belongs.

Share This