The Divine Lamp

Article 4

The difficulty found by Dr. Reid in the system of Locke had in some way been perceived by Locke himself.

113. If writers would only listen attentively to the voice of their own conscience, they would probably avoid much of the adverse criticism which is heaped on them y the public. For it seldom happens that anything deservedly reprehensible is found by the public in their productions, of which the authors themselves had not beforehand some secret fear, some suspicion, but which they unfortunately had not the courage to look straight in the face and thoroughly sift to the bottom.

114. I should think that some such feeling as this must have been experienced by Locke as regards the opposition which his system would be likely to encounter, and of which Dr. Reid became afterwards the exponent. I have already noticed the uncertain tone of Locke in speaking of the idea of substance. A similar embarrassment may be observed in him where, in defining knowledge, he refuses this name to whatever in our mind is not accompanied by a judgment. this, in reality, is the same as to say, that without making a judgment it would be impossible for us to know anything.

I have no desire to dispute about words; but I believe that I may safely say, that either Locke is not consistent, or else he attributes to the word idea a sense different from that in which it is generally used. For the generality of men, to have the idea of a thing and to have knowledge of a thing, are equivalent expressions. Nor could anyone understand how it would be possible to have the idea of a thing without having some knowledge of that thing. If, then, it is a contradiction to say, in the ordinary sense of the words, “i have an idea of a thing, but I have no knowledge of it whatever,” it must be conceded that, according to the common belief of men, the idea of a thing always includes a knowledge of some sort. From which it seems legitimate to infer, that since Locke perceived that every cognition necessarily supposes a judgment, he had also some suspicion that the same must be said of ideas. but as, on the other hand, he was unable to explain to himself how our first ideas are formed-since before them there could be no judgment, because every judgment supposes some antecedent idea-so, to escape from the troublesome dilemma, and to supply the need he had of making it appear that some ideas could be acquired independently of any judgment, he betook himself to the imaginary distinction between knowledge and idea, and to the absurd supposition that there are ideas wholly devoid of knowledge.

It seems to me, therefore, that it was the love of system which led him to adopt an expedient as repugnant to the general belief of men as it was a deviation from the practical good sense, free from frivolities, which he usually exhibits. Such was the consequence of his pledging himself to the principle, that “There is nothing innate in the human mind, but all knowledge is acquired through sensation and reflection.”

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