The Divine Lamp

Chapter 3

In What Way It Is Possible To Make Known The Divine Truth

Soince, however, not every truth is to be made known in the same way, “and it is the part of an educated man to seek for cinviction in each subject, only so far as the nature of the subject allows” (Ethic III, 4), as the Philosopher most rightly observes as quoted by Boethius (De Trin. II), it is necessary to show first of all in what way it is possible to make known the aforesaid truth.

    Now in those things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways.  For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason, for instance that God is three and one: while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason.

    That certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability  of human reason, is most clearly evident.  For since the principle of all the knowledge which reason acquires aout a thing, is the understanding of that things essence, because according to the Philosopher’s teaching (Post. Anall. III. 9) the principle of a demonstration is what a thing is, it follows that our knowledge about a thing will be in proportion to our understanding of its essence.  Wherefore, if the human intellect is incapable by its natural power of attaining to the comprehension of His essence: Since  our intellect’s knowledge, according to the mode of the present life, originates from the senses: so that things which are not objects of sense cannot be comprehended  by the human intellect, except in so far as knowledge of them is gathered from sensibles.  Now sensibles cannot lead our intellect to see in  them what God is, because they are effects unequal  to the power of their cause.  And yet our intellect is led by sensibles to the divine knowledge so as to know  about God , tha He is, and other such turths, which need to be ascribed to the first principle.  Accordingly some divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason.

    Again.  The same is easy to see from the degrees of intellects.  For if one of two men perceives a thing with his intellect with greater subtlety, the one whose intellect is of a higher degree understands many things which the other ia altogether unable to grasp; as instanced in a yokel who is utterly incapable of grasping the subtleties of philosophy.  Now the angelic intellect surpasses the human intellect more than the intellect of the cleverest philosopher surpasses that of the most uncultured.  For an angel knows God through a more excellent effect than does man, for as much as the angel’s essence, through which he is led to know God by natural knowledge, is more excellent than sensible things, even than the soul itself, by which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God.  And the divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human.  For the divine intellect by its capacity equals the divine essence, wherefore God perfectly understands of Himself what He is, and He knows all things that can be understood about Him: whereas the angel knows not what God is by his natural knowledge, because the angel’s essence, by which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect unequal to the power of its cause.  Consequently an angel is unable by his natural knowledge to grasp all that God understands about Himself: nor again is the human reason capable of grasping all that an angel understands by his natural power.  Accordingly just as a man would show himself to be a most insane fool if he declared the assertions of a philosopher to be false because he was unable to understand them, so, much more a man would be exceedingly foolish, were he to suspect of alsehood the things revealed by God through the ministry of His angels, because they cannot be the object of reason’s investigations.

    Furthermore.  The same is made abundantly clear by the deficiency which every day we experience in our knowledge of things.  For we are ignorant of many of the properties of sensible things, and in many cases we are unable to discover the nature of those properties which we perceive by our senses. Much less therefore is human reason capable of investigating all the truths about that most sublime essence.

    With this the saying of the Philosopher is in accord (Metaph. 2) where he says that our intellect in relation to those primary things which are most evident in nature is like the eye of the bat in relation to the sun.

    To this truth Holy Writ also ears witness.  For it is written (Jo 11:7): Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? and (Job 36:26): Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge, and (1 Cor 13:9): We know in part. 

    Therefore all that is said about God, though it cannot be investigated by reason, must not be forthwith rejected as false, as the Manicheans and many unbelievers have thought (St Aug. De utilit. credendi)- Excerpted from THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES.  Public domain text.

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