The Divine Lamp

Article 9
Condillac stumbles upon the difficulty without perceiving it: that is, he accounts for the formation of ideas by unconsciously begging the question.

86. If, instead of so heedlessly passing over the act by which we compare ideas together and find out their differences, Condillac had taken pains to analyze it, as is the duty of a philosopher professing to give a satisfactory explanation of the facts of the human soul, perhaps the difficulty which I have stated above, and which, as I believe, cannot be overcome except by admitting something innate in our mind, would have attracted his notice. Let us follow him:

In fact, we cannot compare two ideas without perceiving some difference or similarity between them; to observe such relationships is to judge.

From hearing our author speak of the comparison of ideas, one would suppose that he had already explained what he meant by the word idea.

But his definition of idea comes much later. It was therefore natural that in this passage, where he attempts to show that judgment is simply the result of a comparison of ideas, he should meet with no obstruction. For, the nature of an idea not being as yet defined, one cannot say what the passage really means; and it is precisely when a reasoning appears to be correct in form, while the words of which it is composed have no fixed meaning, that readers are apt to be more indulgent with error.
87. That we may not fall into the same mistake, let us first examine the value which Condillac assigns to the word idea; this will enable us to see whether his reasoning is proof against all criticism.
He distinguishes sensations from ideas in the following way:

“A sensation is not an idea until it is seen as a feeling which is limited solely to modifying the state of the spirit. If I am experiencing pain at the moment, I do not say I have the idea of the pain but that I feel it.
” If I remember a pain I have had, the remembrance and the idea are therefore one and the same thing.”

It appears from this passage that, according to Condillac, an idea is a sensation, not in so far as actually experienced by us, but only in so far as preserved in our memory.
I have already pointed out that sensation, considered only in so far as preserved in our memory, is quite a different thing from the real sensation, or that passive modification which we experience when our sensitive organs are being impressed by external things (see 75-77). Since, then, an idea is here taken as identical with the remembrance of sensations-which is not a sensation, and begins only when the sensation has passed away-it is obvious that the word idea has a sense essentially different from that of the word sensation.
But it will be well for us to see what it was that prompted our philosopher to lay down the distinction between sensation properly so called and the remembrance of a sensation.
The sequel proves that he did it for the reason that the sensation, as such, does not represent anything outside itself, whereas the remembrance represents, or rather recalls to our mind, something different from itself-i.e. the sensation whereof it is the remembrance. Consequently, what in the opinion of our philosopher causes an apprehension of our mind to be an idea, is its property of representing an external thing. This is why he attributes to the sense of touch the power of changing sensations into ideas-namely, because he supposes that the touch, alone of all the senses, has the virtue of imparting a representative character to our sensations. But let him speak for himself:

Existing sensations of hearing, taste, sight and smell are only feelings as long as such senses have not been taught by touch. Until this moment, the soul can consider them only as modifications of itself. But if these feelings exist only in the memory that recalls them, they become ideas. We do not say in that case: I have the feeling of what I hae been, but: I have the remembrance of the idea.

The present-or past-sensation of solidity is the only one which is per se simultaneously feeling and idea. It is feeling relative to the soul which it modifies, and idea relative to something external.
This sensation compels us very soon to judge all the modifications which the soul receives from touch as something external to us. That is why my tactile modification is representative of the objects which the hand touches.
Touch, accustomed to assign its sensations to an external source, causes the other senses to do likewise. All our sensations appear to us as qualities of the objects around them. They represent them, therefore, they are ideas.

Now, I beg the reader to observe that the sense to which Condillac here attributes the power of changing sensations into ideas-i.e. of rendering the sensations representative of something external-is the very same which he had before credited with the faculty of judging of external objects (see 70-71).
Indeed, his whole theory on sensations may be said to center in the proposition that “the touch is the only sense which judges external objects by itself, and communicates the power of judging of those objects to the other senses.” We are given to understand that the touch is likewise that sense whose sensations are, ipso facto, ideas, and which transforms into ideas the sensations of the other senses also.
Therefore, according to Condillac, sensations are transformed into ideas through a judgment. Again, in the passage we have just quoted, he says that the only reason why the touch can transform sensations into ideas is because it has in itself the power of judging of external objects. Therefore the transformation of sensations into ideas is effected through that judgment by which this sense, on being modified by sensations, judges that the external objects exist.

88. As against this I might refer the reader to the demonstration I have previously given of the absurdity of attributing to the touch the faculty of judgment-an absurdity as great as, if not greater than, it would be to claim for the sense of sight the power of hearing (see 70). Again, I might call attention to the great and very obvious difference which exists between the act of judgment and the sensation of touch-the former being wholly internal and done by the spirit alone, while the latter is soley the result of an external impression actually made on our sensitive organs.
But for the present I will not oppose Condillac on either of these grounds. I will only take him on his own principles, and argue thus:

89. You say that the act of judgment consists in comparing two ideas together, and making out their differences.
Then in another place, when explaining what you mean by an idea, you say that no idea can be formed except by means of a judgment; and from this you conclude that the touch is te only sense which can transform sensations into ideas, because it is the only sense which has in itself the ability to judge of sensations.
Now, here lies precisely my difficulty. Will you be good enough to say how these two propositions can be reconciled? (1) The judgment is formed through a comparison of ideas; (2) ideas are formed through a judgment. Which of the two is formed first, the judgment or the idea?
If every idea must be formed through a judgment, it seems that the judgment precedes the formation of ideas; but if a judgment is only the result of a comparison of ideas, it seems that we must have ideas before we can form any judgment. (Excerpted from THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS by Blessed Antonio Rosmini. The work is in the public domain)

Posted by Dim Bulb.  Check out MY OTHER SITE.