The Divine Lamp

Article 6

Conclusion on the imperfection of the system of Locke.

Let us know briefly recapitulate all we have said thus far:-

1.  Every particular idea contains, at the least, one universal-i.e., the idea of existence; for we cannot have the idea of any one thing until we have mad a judgment in which we say to ourselves, ‘This thing exists.’

2.  We form particular ideas in the first instance by uniting the ’sensible’ with the idea of existence, and thus placing that ’sensible,’ as it were, in the class of existent things.

A particular idea, therefore, may be defined as ‘the perception which the understanding forms of a “sensible” to which is attributed the common quality of existence, which quality in virtue of this attribution becomes proper.’ (see note 1)
3.  Hence it is impossible to form a particular idea without contributing thereto the idea of existence; and, since this operation may be called a synthesis, a particular idea implies a synthesis made by the understanding.

4.  The common or universal  cannot be drawn from sensations, because it is not contained in them.  The understanding must therefore carry it with itself.

5.  From the particular idea the universal can be drawn through abstraction, because the universal is already contained in that idea.  This operation is called analysis.

6.  Locke, not having the least suspicion that here was any difficulty in explaining the formation of particular ideas, supposed them to be furnished immediately by our sensations in the manner I have described.  Hence he thought that universals could be easily obtained from these ideas through analysis; because, in fact, the universals are contained in them.

The imperfection of the system of Locke, therefore, consists in his having erroneously assumed that the universal really exists in the sensible things themselves, and, as a consequence, in not having perceived the difficulty which stands in the way of explaining the origins of the universal.

Owing to this error, he did not see the necessity of a synthesis preceding the analysis-that is, of an operation by which the understanding joins that which falls under the senses with the universal idea of existence previously possessed by it, and thus makes that judgment whereby particular ideas are formed.

Supposing the synthesis to be already made in the external things themselves, he began his theory by the analysis of particular ideas, and derived from it, by a simple separation, the universals in their abstract form.  He did not explain the formation of these ideas, but assumed it.

I shall conclude this article by quoting a passage from an Italian philosopher who, in language as accurate as it is clear, thus exposes the imperfection of the theory of Locke: ‘In man’s knowledge we must distinguish two epochs.  The first consists in synthesis,which forms the objects of experience and composes the great book of sensible nature.  In this epoch the first operation of the understanding must be synthesis.  The second epoch begins by reading the book of nature as already formed, and introduces the intelligent spirit to read and understand it.  He starts by the assumption that the senses give us complete ideas of the individuals which are the objects of experience.  He supposes as given the externality of sensations, and their union in an object (And I shall add, he supposes as given the universal idea of existence); and, as a consequence, he derives all simple ideas (all universals-see note 2) from experience by means of analysis.’  And further on he says” ‘In truth, what does the English philosopher do?  In presenting to man’s meditation the great book of nature, he expects him to draw thence all simple ideas by means of analysis.  Now, it cannot be concluded from this that all simple ideas thus derived are data of sense, or that they are feelings distinct from and evolved out of other feelings.  If in these simple ideas there should be found some subjective elements (see note 3), these elements may, indeed, be derived from experience by means of analysis.  But why?  Only because the understanding has placed them there through that synthesis by which it has placed them there through the synthesis by which it has formed the objects of experience.  The fundamental question consists in determining whether the first operation of the activity of thought be analysis or synthesis. (see note 4)–
NOTES:

1.   I consider, however, as will be seen latter, that between the intellectual perception and the particular idea there is some difference, inasmuch as the particular idea is the object seen by us, tied to the affirmation which we make of its subsistence; while the intellectual perception is the affirmation itself.

2.  By saying simple idea we do not bring out the difficulty so well as we should by the word universal; for, to make the difficulty of drawing simple ideas from the phenomena of sensations properly understood, one would first have to prove the impossibility of the simple being found by analyzing the composite.  But when I sayuniversals, I at once make it quite clear that they cannot be found in the particular, because the particular excludes the universal as its contrary.

3.   Subjective, i.e., posited by the intelligent subject himself, and therefore innate.  This term, subjective, however, is not exact, and , we shall see, by its inexactness it has caused the fundamental error of the system of Kant.  In fact, the human spirit may have in it some universal innate idea without at the same time drawing it from its very self, but on the contrary, receiving It from without; in this case the universal, though not subjective, would still be innate.  This remark is of great importance for understanding will the theory which I shall expound in due course.

4.   Galluppi, LETTERS FILOSOFICHE, &c., Letter 7.  It is not enough, however, to know that the first operation of the activity of though is synthesis; it is necessary furthermore to know what kind of synthesis one speaks.  This is the vital question.

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