The Divine Lamp

Only the first three sections listed below will be dealt with in this post. The rest will be posted at a latter date.

I. What the epistemological problem involves.

II. Objectivity of external sensations.

III. Real objectivity of abstract and general ideas. Universals.

IV. The Via Media between Naive Realism and Idealism.

V. The nature of the mental synthesis.

VI. Conclusion

I. What the epistemological problem involves. It has been indicated that the epistemological problem centers upon the inquiry concerning the validity of our spontaneous assertions. This inquiry resolves itself into two problems. First, the motive which leads the mind to establish a relation between a subject and a predicate in a judgment, and secondly, the validity of the respective terms themselves. Thus, when I say that a number is odd or even, or, that water boils at 111 degrees C., I may inquire:

(a) What leads me to form a mental synthesis of number and odd or even; of water and boiling at 1oo degrees C?

(b) What is the validity of these terms: number; odd; even; water; boiling? Are they mere mental products or do they refer to objects independently existent in an external world?

Aquinas does not formulate these two problems with modern precision, for he wrote at a time when idealism and skepticism were mere academic theses which no one took seriously; but his doctrine contains a solution of the two problems which we have indicated.

We will begin with the second, and his answer may be summed up as follows: “Our sense perceptions correspond to an external world, but their content is not adequate or complete. Again our abstract and general ideas (water, life, number, equality, ect.) correspond to a reality which is not solely a product of the mind, since it has been inferred from sense data.”

II. Objectivity of external sensations. Generally speaking, according to the Schoolmen, the information presented to us by our senses is valuable, when working normally and when referring to their proper object, i.e., the special quality which each sense perceives to the exclusion of all the others. In the case then of color, sound, odors, quantitative state and the shape of bodies, the sense data of sight, hearing, smell, touch were considered as infallible. “The senses announce to us as they are themselves affected or modified.”

Do our senses give us not only accurate information concerning the material world but also adequate knowledge? Scholasticism is prevented from admitting this in virtue of its basic principles, since in every act of cognition we contribute something of our own. Color cannot exist in my visual organ in the same way that it exists outside. But the problem of the extent to which our sensations correspond to the external world was neglected in the thirteenth century. The illusions of the senses were indeed known at the time; but as will be seen it was held that the erroneous information which resulted therefrom was not imputable to the senses as such. At the most they conceded to the perceptions of touch the privilege of giving us the most intimate contact of all with reality, since continuous quantity, which is perceived by the sense of touch, is the fundamental attribute of the material things, resulting from its very nature. The Schoolmen were not aware of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, in the sense introduced by Descartes and Locke. They held that quantity and extension do not constitute the essence of bodies (as Descartes thought), but rather its fundamental property.

III. Real objectivity of abstract and general ideas. Universals. An abstract idea has the same validity as a sensation, for it is from the content of sensation that the content of our ideas are derived. This content-including that of the highest and most general concepts, such as causes, life, substance-is contained in some way in the complexus of reality grasped by our senses; for, obviously, if they were not somehow in sense data, they could never have been derived from it.

But, there is a special difficulty when we come to consider what sort of correspondence can exist between reality and the concepts, each of which represents some aspect of it. We came across the same difficulty previously, when dealing with the origin of ideas (ch. 3, art. 2). Here the difficulty concerns their validity. Outside us, everything is individual; the universe of the schoolmen is a pluralistic universe, composed of single substances, and everything which effects these individual substances is particularized. This being so, how can there be any correspondence between that which is concrete and singular (e.g., this living being, this material movement) on the one hand, and the abstract, universal notion (life, motion) on the other? Such is the famous problem of Universals,-or rather of the validity of our abstract and universal ideas.

Aquinas replies that the correspondence “between ideas and individual realities is not adequate, but is none the less faithful.” To prove this, let us distinguish, as he does, between the abstract character of ideas, and its universality.

Consider the character of abstractness, which is the primordial one. We already know that the content of the concept ‘man,’ ‘life,’ ‘local motion’ is considered apart from those particular characteristics inseparable from each individual man, or each living being, or instance of local motion. As viewed by the mind, reality is neither one nor multiple; it seems to be completely indifferent to anything connected with number. The concept simply expresses the whatness of the reality ‘man,’ ‘movement,’ ‘life.’ In consequence, the abstract concept is a faithful representation of reality, for all the elements which go to make up the whatness or essence of ‘man’ or ‘movement’ or’ life’ are found in each individual man or movement. Abstraction does not falsify (abstrahentium non est mendacium).

But the concept, although faithful to, is not entirely commensurate with the concrete things, for the mind neglects the hall-mark of individuality which differentiates each particular man, living being, or movement from others, and is incapable of knowing it. The abstract concept teaches us nothing concerning the essence of the individual. Moreover, not only is it true that the hall-mark of individuality escapes the mind, but our idea of a living being does not take account of the differences in essence between living beings of several kinds. The more abstract our knowledge is, the less it conveys of reality. The human mind has nothing to be proud of. Feeble and weak, but reliable in the little that they teach us,-such is the nature of our abstract ideas.

As for the process of universalization, which the abstract idea undergoes, this is entirely the work of the mind, for it consists in attributing to the content of the abstract idea an indefinite elasticity, and enables us to realize for instance that the essence of local motion or of humanity is found identically and completely in all instances of local motion, and in all human beings, whether actually existing or only possible. The characteristic of universality is the result of a reflection. Peter or John do not admit of multiplication. Universals do not exist outside of us; they exist only in our understanding. On the other hand, the whatness to which our mind gives the form of universality has a foundation in the extra-mental world. The process of universalizing neither takes away nor adds anything to the validity of the abstract ideas. Universale est formaliter in intellectu, fundamentaliter in rebus. Such is the condensed formula which sums up the Thomistic solution of the problem. It was not discovered by Aquinas, but is rather the result of a slow and painful elaboration by Western thought in general. We find already in Abelard, who flourished in the twelfth century, this doctrine of sound common sense, which fits in so well with the individualism of the Feudal system. To be concluded. (excerpted from THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS by Maurice De Wulf)